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Abstract 
This thesis engages in a sympathetic critique of the critical (dialogical) dimension of 
cosmopolitan democracy and its idealisation of a specific form of global civil society (GCS) to 
contest the exclusionary practices of contemporary global governance. Drawing upon the 
work of Jürgen Habermas, the critical approach assumes civil society as a communicative 
(local) vehicle that draws from the lifeworld, to steer the systemic neoliberal modes of global 
governance. The thesis in contrast, describes a scenario resulting in the reversal of this logic; 
global neoliberal modes of rationality can actually colonise the communicative spaces of 
(local) civil society. To highlight this claim, a specific neoliberal global democratic project is 
examined to reveal two new roles for global civil society; professional service providers, and 
democratic watchdogs. These roles re-inscribe a new identity for civil society akin to the 
neoliberal form of systemic rationality. An empirical case study of these roles within 
Cambodian civil society is then undertaken to demonstrate how endogenous communicative 
spaces can be marginalised through exogenous neoliberal interventions. The thesis suggests 
that the critical cosmopolitan democratic project must reject its de-contextualised 
communicative assumptions of global civil society in order to retain its inclusionary ideal.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis aims to interrogate the dynamics of the cosmopolitan democratic project and its 
ambitious attempt to formulate a more inclusive conception of global governance. The 
attempt to extend the boundaries of the democratic political community outside of the nation-
state relies upon an elevation of the role of civil society, as an inclusive and participatory 
structure capable of transcending these territorially defined boundaries, and allowing a more 
diverse set of stakeholders the chance to impose their collective voices on the coordination of 
global processes.  
 
A nascent 'global' form of civil society is privileged within these frameworks as a solution to 
the perceived 'democratic deficit' that exists on a global level, contemporary structures of 
global governance are largely coordinated by actors representing either state or market 
interests; a bounded sphere of decision-making that largely excludes citizen's interests located 
within democratic communities. This gap between the decision-makers and decision-takers 
within global politics is furthermore exacerbated by the increasingly asymmetrical 
relationship of the territorial state under the contemporary process of globalisation, 
understood in its spatial form as, ―the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and 
deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction‖ (Held and 
McGrew 2002, p1). In this understanding, globalisation can be seen as increasing the 
democratic deficit between global forms of governance and bounded political communities; 
globalising processes increasingly affecting the lives of many, are coordinated outside of the 
nation-state in the hands of the few.  
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The potential for a global form of civil society is seen in this regard to represent an important 
link between the local and the global, a transmission belt that can increase the representation 
and participation of a variety of interests that emerge from within and across national 
boundaries, offering new channels of communication often blocked or marginalised through 
the more formal routes of political participation outside of the nation-state.  
 
The role of civil society as an inclusive ideal within contemporary structures of global 
governance is furthermore juxtaposed with that of a specific form of globalisation, the 
neoliberal dimension and sets up a dualism that I aim to interrogate at the heart of the thesis; 
the globalisation of civil society as a counter-weight to the globalisation of neoliberal modes 
of governance. Before interrogating this dualism it is important to introduce two different 
approaches to the cosmopolitan democratic project that I have categorised as the liberal and 
the critical dimension, in order to firstly understand the way in which they approach this 
dualism and secondly, to expose my own position as a sympathetic engagement with the 
latter, before moving on towards discussions of the research hypothesis. 
 
The liberal dimension of cosmopolitan democracy attempts to create a multi-stakeholder 
approach to the operational logics of global governance, through reforming the present United 
Nations (UN) system to a more inclusive and democratic structure. Within this project there is 
an inherently liberal bias emanating from the cosmopolitan influences of Immanuel Kant to 
create a democratic form of governance that invokes universalistic moral principles aimed at a 
more 'humane' form of governance. This privileging of the individual as the ultimate unit of 
moral worth leads the liberal dimension to critique the unjust forms of neoliberal economic 
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globalisation, as a valorisation of capital over humanity and the inequalities that impact on the 
welfare of individuals.  
 
The remedy to neoliberal forms of global governance that prioritise market and economic 
expansion, is contained within the potential of global civil society to 'tame' and control this 
exclusive dimension, thus to put democratic decision-making in the hands of individuals 
rather than markets. Civil society is seen under this model as a moral domain that links the 
grassroots with the global, concerned with questions of the good life, the environment, social 
welfare and justice. This dimension of cosmopolitan democracy is concerned largely with the 
democratic deficit as a problem of access for the participation of civil society within global 
structures such as the UN system. The argument suggests that so long as spaces are created 
for these actors, the democratic deficit will be eradicated and the neoliberal forms of 
globalisation will be subordinate to the aims of humanity. This prioritising of access, fails to 
question the quality of democratic participation itself, assuming that within global structures, 
representatives of civil society, the state, and the market, will be guided by a moral 
cosmopolitan framework; the quality of participation is assured to result in a more equitable 
and humane outcome than present structures.  
 
The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy takes a different approach to the 
construction of a more inclusive form of democratic governance beyond the nation state. 
Drawing upon the work of Jurgen Habermas, it attempts to formulate a global framework 
based upon a dialogical rather than a monological formation of the principles, norms and 
rules, in the outcome of democratic decision-making. The liberal dimension draws its 
principles through a form of monological self-reflection associated with Immanuel Kant, and 
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strongly criticised by Habermas for relying upon a foundational epistemology to 
validate/invalidate truth claims through an a priori standpoint. Monological self-reflection can 
be seen as ―any strategy of examining rational commitments and orientations in an artificial 
state of inward-looking self-reflection‖ (Kingwell 1995, p19). The liberal dimension promotes 
the universalistic moral primacy of human rights, ecological sustainability and social welfare 
from a pre-determined structure, the critical dimension, however, attempts to generate 
universal accepted discourses through dialogic interaction (grounded in intersubjective 
communication) rather than this form of monological reasoning.  
 
The liberal dimension is accused here, of creating a selective framework that appears to allow 
a greater inclusion of actors into the global democratic framework but at the expense of 
marginalising those that exist outside, or fail to adhere to, the liberal cosmopolitan 
framework. Civil society keeps its ethical and humanitarian promise within these structures, 
but only because it is seemingly guided by an overarching cosmopolitan framework that pre-
determines the content of dialogue within these newly generated spaces. The attempt to create 
a more inclusive form of global democratic governance is seriously questioned when the 
frameworks are pre-established along monological criteria, thus they are deeply exclusive. As 
a consequence, the thesis turns towards the critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy as 
harbouring the potential for a more inclusive discussion on global democratic governance. 
 
The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy, employs a 'minimal-foundationalist' 
epistemology that ―reject[s] the supposition that there is one conception of the good life which 
ought to be universalised...their resistance to unjustified modes of exclusion is linked with a 
conception of the self and society which values the expansion of the boundaries of dialogic 
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forms of life. Dialogue is the preferred means by which subjects should decide whether 
systems of exclusion are justified‖ (Linklater 1998, p109). There is an acceptance here of the 
foundational content of truth claims, but these must be constructed through a dialogic process 
to be deemed inclusive and valid. To this end, the critical dimension attempts to create a 
global democratic framework that privileges the role of civil society within a deliberative 
democratic framework; an attempt to link the local with the global that is not only concerned 
with access for the participation of civil society under these frameworks, but the actual quality 
of this participation (through the adjudicatory mechanism of deliberation) to ensure that 
decision-making is inclusive and truly democratic.  
 
The critical project accepts that the search for an inclusive global democratic project is 
admirable, but ultimately misguided if our intent is to expand pluralistic spaces to ensure that 
representatives of civil society have the same decision-making access as representatives of the 
state and the market, instead our task is to expose sites of domination and exclusion where 
decision-making structures at the global level are imbued with what Habermas deems 
'distorted communication'.  
 
We can now return to the dualism constructed between civil society and neoliberal forms of 
global governance; under the liberal cosmopolitan framework, civil society offers a solution 
to those unaccountable governing structures that prioritise the unfettered expansion of 
markets, through subsuming them under the guiding structure of liberal cosmopolitan 
principles. As this thesis will demonstrate, the concept of a ‗guiding‘ structure is, however, 
problematic in its claims for democratic inclusion. In contrast, this thesis supports the notion 
of a critical cosmopolitan framework that focuses on a critique of the steering mechanisms 
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that are associated with neoliberal forms of governance. This form of governance promotes a 
form of instrumental rationality within decision-making that effectively distorts the validity of 
decision-making structures at the global level. Democratic deliberation at the global level is 
seen as authentic when actors participate through communicative action rather than 
instrumental reasoning; to this end the critical project enlists civil society as the 
communicative vehicle that can challenge the exclusive forms of rationality inherent within 
the (neoliberal) spaces of global governance. This links to the Habermasian separation 
between system and lifeworld, where the systemic forms of rationality emanating from the 
(administrative) state and the (economic) market attempt to impinge on the social dimension 
of undistorted communication; the lifeworld. In order to remedy the effect of systemic 
imperatives, civil society is elevated as a panacea; drawing from the communicative structures 
of the lifeworld and effectively steering, through the framework of deliberation, neoliberal 
modes of rationality that are claimed to saturate the contemporary structures of global 
governance.  
 
The numerous authors that draw upon this framework to inject an inclusive, deliberative form 
of democracy at the global level all draw upon the importance of civil society as a 
communicative sphere that is tasked with attempting to steer the systemic forms of neoliberal 
governance. These authors utilise the notion of global public spheres to analyse decision-
making processes under deliberation where civil society can fulfil this role and create more 
inclusive structures. Although many of the authors remain sceptical of the current ability for 
civil society to successfully influence and steer these exclusive practices, its role as a 
communicative sphere emanating from the lifeworld remains largely unquestioned; only the 
obstacles that need to be overcome are questioned in order for their success.  
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I am sympathetic to this critical project for attempting to formulate an inclusive link between 
the local and the global, where civil society is privileged as the vehicle through which a more 
legitimate global democratic framework can be constructed outside of the nation-state, in this 
respect the thesis offers a sympathetic problematisation of the critical project that hopes to 
intervene within the internal debates, but without seeking to undermine its raison d‘être. The 
core contribution of the thesis should therefore be thought of as a constructive intervention in 
order to strengthen this vein of work and carry on the critical tradition of exposing sites of 
exclusion within the global democratic project.  
 
The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy is often within the literature concerned 
with an  abstract discussion on the problems of inclusion and exclusion at the global level, 
thus at times discussions on the creation of frameworks such as 'global public spheres' and 
even the more empirically grounded analysis of global regimes, tend to be vague and 
hypothetical. In some respects this is understandable; the literature avoids the liberal pitfalls 
of establishing pre-determined frameworks, and instead tends to analyse what is already 
emerging, thus the aim is to interrogate potential systems of inclusion / exclusion within these 
frameworks. As will be demonstrated within the thesis,  few actively engage in an analysis of 
the actual concrete practices of global governance, the downside is that with this lack of 
contextualised engagement with empirical research, a number of assumptions are made by the 
critical cosmopolitan project that are replicated throughout their theoretical frameworks. The 
key question raised by the thesis is that of the identity of civil society promoted under these 
frameworks, a subject that has not received adequate attention within the literature.  
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External criticisms have been aimed at both the liberal and critical variants of cosmopolitan 
democracy for basing their theoretical hopes on an assumption that the emergence of a 'global 
civil society' will supply the fuel and machinery required to transform the exclusive structures 
of global governance. These critics often describe the unevenness of global forms of civil 
society such as the dominance of northern over southern networks for example or the unequal 
funding opportunities that affect who can and who cannot participate, yet the cosmopolitan 
project attempts to side-step these criticisms through describing the role of global civil society 
as firstly a spatial rather than geographical phenomena, and secondly, as a project to be 
realised. The spatial understanding has resulted in authors using the term 'transnational' rather 
than global within their projects to avoid making geographical assumptions (though of course 
there are those that still use the term ‗global‘ albeit within a spatial rather than geographical 
understanding), and outlining that problems with the inherent unevenness of global forms of 
civil society do not undermine the project itself, merely reflect the barriers and obstacles that 
must be overcome in order to create an inclusive democratic project. I am sympathetic with 
these critiques at the lack of empirical engagement with the concrete forms of global civil 
society, however, I want to push this critique further and suggest that the critical dimension of 
cosmopolitan democracy needs to problematise its de-contextualised discussions of civil 
society, and re-engage with contextual practices of contemporary global civil society in its 
geographical as well as spatial form. 
 
The critical literature makes a key assumption about civil society within the global democratic 
framework, that despite problems and obstacles in its composition, it still has an important 
role as a communicative vehicle that draws from the lifeworld whilst attempting, under a 
framework of deliberation, to steer the systemic modes of governance. Empirical analysis of 
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contemporary structures of governance all assess the role of civil society as a persuasive and 
communicative force that deploys reflexive action in its attempt to guide and instigate 
decision-making away from the instrumental modes of reasoning associated with state 
(administrative) and market (economic) logics.  The dualism is again exposed as one where 
civil society and its communicative potential are juxtaposed against neoliberal forms of 
instrumental reasoning. The battle for a more inclusive global democratic project revolves 
around utilising the steering mechanisms of civil society to legitimise the content of 
democratic decisions, thus to relegate the systemic forms of administrative and economic 
logics as a servant to democratic will-formation.  
 
This thesis raises a simple yet important question, what if the supposed communicative 
identity of civil society as a steering mechanism vis-à-vis systemic modes of governance, 
were demonstrated to be potentially reversible? By this I provoke the question that, what if 
under certain contemporary frameworks, systemic modes of rationality could effectively 
permeate the communicative structures of civil society, amounting to what Habermas would 
classify as 'colonisation'. The critical cosmopolitan project seems content with the assumption 
that if civil society fails to steer systemic forms of rationality within global decision-making 
structures, then these are structures to be reformed, yet it fails to interrogate the possibility 
that the very vehicle responsible for channelling communicative action into global structures 
of governance, may in fact be colonised, by the instrumental logics it seeks to undermine. I 
propose to demonstrate that such a case exists; neoliberal forms of instrumental rationality at 
the global level can in fact colonise the perceived communicative structures of civil society at 
the very local level of collective organisation. This is not to undermine the communicative 
ideal of civil society per se, merely to point out that it is far from invulnerable to systemic 
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saturation within its structures.  
 
There are further implications with this line of thought that the thesis will draw out, namely, 
that those systemic steering mechanisms that I will argue are colonising the communicative 
potential of civil society, reflect a problematisation of the assumed local-global links 
constructed by the critical cosmopolitan project. Their frameworks tend to imply that the 
exclusive global dimension of governance can be solved through the elevation of the inclusive 
local, yet there is a general failure to understand and interrogate the relationship of the local-
global link in practice. This thesis will demonstrate how neoliberal forms of global 
governance can be implicit in the construction of local spaces for civil society, seriously 
questioning the unidirectional assumptions of the local-global link within the critical 
cosmopolitan framework. The critical cosmopolitan project accepts the problems at the global 
level of instrumental rationality inherent within the neoliberal spaces of governance, yet it 
fails to recognise that these are not simply steering mechanisms, but effectively part of a 
political project that has incorporated civil society as part of a new democratic and 
participatory agenda.  
The thesis does not however, attempt to suggest that this global-local reversal is a universal 
process and that neoliberal constructions of civil society are globally reproduced, it merely 
wishes to highlight that this is a potential problem that the critical cosmopolitan project must 
respond to through re-aligning its critical focus towards the local, before engaging in 
discussions of the global.  
 
The core contribution that this thesis will make to the critical literature is to provide evidence 
of the colonisation of (local) spaces of civil society from the (global) neoliberal modes of 
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systemic rationality. This theoretical contribution will provide an important critique of the 
way in which the critical approach relies upon a model of civil society that is 
communicatively bounded; a coordinating mechanism to steer systemic forms of governance. 
To demonstrate this, I have drawn upon an original case study of civil society in Cambodia 
that effectively traces (global) neoliberal development frameworks influencing the democratic 
structures of governance within the country, and the effect they have when interacting with 
(local) civil society organisations (CSOs). The result is to provide a detailed account of how 
the various identities of CSOs at the local level can become colonised under neoliberal forms 
of systemic rationality, highlighting the need for the critical cosmopolitan project to reassess 
its theoretical understanding of CSOs as communicative conduits. The critical cosmopolitan 
project needs to refocus its neoliberal critique internally at the potential for colonising 
identities of actors participating in structures of global public spheres.   
 
The Methodological Underpinnings of the Cambodian Case Study  
 
In order to successfully utilise the case study of Cambodian civil society, it is important to 
understand its function within the thesis and the important theoretical/empirical link it 
implies.  A case study can be seen as a specific entity or 'bounded system‘ to denote that 
regardless of complexity, cases are objects rather than processes, reasons or policies (Stake 
1978, p6).  
 
Stake (1995, p3) outlines three different approaches to understanding the use of a case study 
within social research. If there is a desire to learn about the case itself, not for generalisation 
or extrapolation, but because of its particularity then this is known as an intrinsic case study. 
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On the other hand, if the case study is a means to another end, for example to accomplish 
something other than an understanding of the particularities of the case, then this can be 
deemed an instrumental case study. Finally, if the case study in its instrumental form is co-
joined with other case studies to analyse the linkages and coordination between them, this is 
known as the collective case study.  
 
The Cambodian case study represents in many ways an instrumental case study, given that it 
is not being interrogated to uncover new understandings within the particularities of the case 
(no matter how interesting these are), but in order to extrapolate these findings in order to 
modify a theoretical framework. In this respect the thesis employs a single-case study that 
invokes a notion of 'theory testing' rather than utilising the case-study in a deductive method 
to generate new theories and hypotheses (George and Bennett 2004, p115).  
 
Single case studies within social science research have at times been heavily criticised for 
their inability to say something meaningful without further qualification (see Flyvbjerg 2006,  
p224-228), however, these criticisms usually fall under the natural science approach to 
research and are linked towards positivist techniques, discussed below. Instead there are a 
variety of ways in which single case studies can be utilised for a rigorous research paradigm. 
A useful list of these case-study approaches is compiled by Lijphart (1971) and includes the 
six categories of: atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, 
theory-infirming and deviant. The first two reflect intrinsic case study approaches, 
atheoretical approaches are descriptive and refuse to construct generalisations, instead 
focusing on contextualised data-gathering. Interpretive approaches are similar, however, they 
differ in the incorporation of a generalised hypothesis within the case study to see whether 
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data collated can improve or refute this hypothesis. The final four approaches in contrast are 
used primarily for theory-building. Hypothesis-generating approaches aims at constructing 
hypothesis in areas where no theory exists yet, often the theory found is tested  among a large 
number of cases to create generalisable theory. Theory-confirming and Theory-infirming are 
both similar approaches that draw upon an established theoretical generalisation and test its 
proposition through a case study. A Theory-confirming case study tends to strengthen the 
proposition whilst theory-infirming case studies weaken it, yet both are can be seen as single 
additions to a multitude of cases, offering one more case to either support or critique the 
generalisation. The final case study approach, and the one most closely drawn upon by the 
Cambodian case-study, is known as the deviant case analysis.   
 
Deviant case analysis can be seen as the ―detailed examination of cases that seem to go 
against the pattern identified. This may serve to disconfirm the pattern identified or it may 
help to add greater sophistication to the analysis‖ (Gill cited in Marvasti 2004 p114). The 
Cambodian case study is utilised within the thesis as an example of 'deviant case analysis'; a 
single case study that is selected because it can demonstrate a deviation from established 
theoretical generalisations. These cases are purposely selected to expose and refine theoretical 
propositions, thus the focus on the case itself is more instrumental than intrinsic and makes no 
claim to generalisability of the findings to other cases. In this way they ―weaken the original 
proposition, but suggest a modified proposition that may be stronger‖ (Lijphart 2008, p257). 
Deviant case analysis, however, implicitly links the single case study to a comparison of other 
cases in order to rigorously prove that the said case study is indeed a deviation, thus although 
it is seen as a useful tool for theory building, it is reliant on other cases for legitimacy 
(Lijphart 2008, p258). This case study departs from this notion of a 'deviant case among 
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many', and instead can usefully be combined with an approach that creates a stronger link 
between the single empirical case study and its relationship to a theoretical framework; the 
extended case method 
 
The extended case method is often attributed to Michael Burawoy (1998,1999, 2009;  
Burawoy et al 1991, 2000) employing the logic of deviant case analysis, by revealing flaws in 
existing theoretical assumptions, and then drawing upon an in-depth empirical case study to 
reconstruct these theoretical assumptions (Pearce 2002, p105; Babbie 2009, p10).  Theory is 
therefore logically prior to the empirical case study, ―not discovered but revised, not induced 
but improved, not deconstructed but reconstructed...In short, theory exists to be extended in 
the face of external anomalies and internal contradictions. We don't start with the data, we 
start with the theory‖ (Burawoy 2009, p13).  
 
In this way the extended case method aims, ―not to abstract the minimum number of essential 
features in one case that can be generalized in other cases but, rather, to situate the individual 
case in as much richness of detail as possible with the wider social fields that structure the 
processes unfolding within that case‖ (Sullivan 2002, p265). The Cambodian case study 
employs this approach because it firstly recognises the utility of an empirical analysis  in 
questioning the perceived generalisations of a wider theoretical framework, and secondly, 
because it attempts to distance itself from positivist principles of research whilst 
simultaneously linking the general (theoretical premise) with the particular (empirical case 
study). Positivist approaches tend to be critical of the ability for a single case study to provide 
the objective rigour in order to be able to say anything about general theoretical concepts, 
unless the research methods can reflect this and offer the potential for replication. Burawoy 
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attempts to adopt a form of 'reflexive science' (1998b) and suggests that the case study can be 
subjective and partial, whilst accepting that external macro-theoretical debates can be 
interrogated within these micro spheres, and can form legitimate conclusions from them.  
 
There are four important implications of the extended case study whilst undertaking social 
research, summarised by Burawoy as:  
 
The extension of the observer into the lives of participants under study, the 
extension of observations over time and space; the extension from microprocesses 
to macroforces; and, finally and most important, the extension of theory (2009, 
pxv) 
 
The first two implications demonstrate a critique of positivist understandings of research by 
suggesting that although objectivity and impartiality of research is impossible, we should not 
assume this as a problem. We need to be aware that we cannot separate ourselves as the 
observer, from the participant, ―no matter how we approach our research we are always 
simultaneously participant and observer, because we inescapably live in the world we study‖ 
(Burawoy 2009, p9). The positivist approach to research attempts to gather data from an 
objective and external standpoint, in an attempt to ―insulate ourselves from our subjects, 
observing them from the outside, interrogating them through intermediaries‖ (Burawoy 1998, 
p5). In this methodological approach the aim of research is to effectively bracket ourselves off 
from the subjective realm; separate facts from the distorting effect of values.  Within the 
positivist paradigm of grounded theory
1
, reliability and coding of data analysis is the preferred 
option for gathering accurate and generalisable deductions; categories and sampling 
                                                 
1
 Grounded theory, associated with the work of Glaser and Strauss aims at ―the discovery of theory from data 
systematically obtained from social research‖ (1999, p2). In this way the authors avoid a priori assumptions 
through generating theoretical claims after a rigorous and testable process of data extraction. This process is 
of course closely related to the positivist method of predicting and explaining behaviour. 
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techniques attempt to make a more objective and replicable set of results. The attempts to 
engage with positivist methods such as survey research, attempts to de-contextualise 
experience into observable facts and data, Burawoy equates this method with homogenising a 
form of experience that represents Habermas' notion of the system in its lack of reflexivity 
and therefore attempts to colonize the lifeworld (Burawoy 1998, p30)
2
. This interesting 
insight allows us to recognise that the participants we engage with are not mere subjects that 
we can quantify in an instrumental way; they are the vital resources through which dialogic 
interaction (in the shape of semi-structured and open-ended interviews or participant 
observation) can tell us more about their lives and the social processes that shape them.    
 
The move towards a reflexive model of science as a model that ―embraces not detachment, 
but engagement as the road to knowledge‖ (Burawoy 1998, p5) represents an acceptance that 
as observers/participants, we have to be aware that we cannot but help bringing theory to the 
field whilst undertaking social research. The aim of the social researcher is therefore to 
attempt to minimalise communicative distortions rather than attempt to stand outside of the 
social context as a neutral. This is contrary to the positivist approach of grounded theory in 
that we should not try and cast off our preconceptions of what we may find within the case 
study and in fact should outline ―as coherently as possible what we expect to find in our site 
before entry‖ (Burawoy et al 1991, p9). The social research undertaken within Cambodia 
mirrors this critique of the positivist approach to research, through firstly, the undertaking of a 
more reflexive method of data-collection (outlined below), and secondly an understanding 
that the interrogation of socio-economic practices within Cambodia were inevitably framed 
through the theoretical lens guiding the hypothesis.  
                                                 
2
 For a more in depth discussion on the Habermasian duality of system-lifeworld see p93-95 
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Burawoy's idea of extending micro processes to macro forces and the implications of this 
extension to a theoretical model defies the classical form of anthropology utilising the 
interpretive understanding of research to argue for a form of subjectivity through confining 
fieldwork to isolated social practices, where attempts to interact with local actors inevitably 
cannot be replicated or even deemed significant for discussions on the general level (Burawoy 
et al 2000, p2). This is not the case for the fieldwork in Cambodia that I have undertaken; the 
reflexive empirical methods employed serve to frame a discussion that can extend to the 
macro-theoretical level  
 
With this extrapolation of the Cambodian case study to the macro-theoretical level, it is 
important to reiterate that the thesis does not intend to set itself up as an anthropological 
investigation into the complexities and nuances of Cambodian civil society as a whole. There 
is in no way an attempt here to construct a holistic ‗map‘ of the multifaceted aspects of civil 
society that is developing in the country today. The case study is utilised, following the 
Burawoy methodology cited above, as an important tool to highlight and problematise aspects 
within the critical interpretation of cosmopolitan democratic theory.  
 
The thesis draws upon the Cambodian case study as a method to problematise the theoretical 
assumptions of the critical cosmopolitan democratic project in constructing a certain 
understanding of civil society as a reflexive and communicative force to steer the 
unaccountable sites of neoliberal global governance. 
3
 In essence, the case study provides 
                                                 
3
 The term neoliberal global governance is outlined in more detail throughout chapter two, though it is worth 
stating here that this purports to an understanding of neoliberalism as a political project that prioritises a 
systemic and instrumental understanding of governance at the international level, often severed from 
democratic communities who lack the ability to form an influential public sphere to convert communicative 
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evidence of the way in which an increasingly pervasive global neoliberal project has closely 
aligned itself with the development of civil society, colonising the communicative potential 
and imbuing various local actors within Cambodia with an instrumental identity that requires 
urgent attention and critique
4
. Furthermore the case study highlights that for those authors 
supporting the construction of deliberative global public spheres, the very identities of actors 
within these spheres needs to be taken into account; particularly given the pervasiveness of 
the link between neoliberalism and civil society in the current epoch. Advocates of critical 
cosmopolitan democracy (to which this thesis is ultimately sympathetic) need to engage in a 
more contextualised understanding of the identity of CSOs within their democratic projects; 
the Cambodian case study reveals that the supposed communicative steering mechanisms of 
civil society can in fact be subverted through neoliberal systemic logics. 
 
The Cambodian Case Study: Methods of Research 
  
As stated previously, the aim of the case study is to demonstrate the global permeation of 
neoliberal practices into the communicative structures of local civil society actors, effectively 
re-inscribing an instrumentalist form of rationality internally. Cambodia proved to be an 
interesting choice to highlight these colonising practices; the devastation of Cambodian 
society under the Khmer Rouge era (1975-1979) resulted in  a large influx of aid and 
development programmes attempting to 're-build' Cambodian society. These programmes 
were supported by a variety of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies (including INGOs) 
who had a relatively free hand in implementing them due to an unstable Cambodian 
                                                                                                                                                        
power into meaningful forms of governance 
4
    A critique of instrumentality and the pathologising nature of neoliberalism as a system of domination is at the 
heart of the legacy of Critical Theory (see Honneth 2009). This thesis makes clear throughout that it supports 
a critical stance against neoliberal forms of governance for its disciplinary logic and attempted distortion of 
communicative spaces (in particular see p92-98)  
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government, and a strong belief that Cambodian civil society represented a 'blank slate' with 
an opportunity for reconstruction. The result, as will be described within the thesis, is that 
Cambodia represents an opportunity to observe the unhindered external influences of 
neoliberal development practices and the impact this can have on the development of local 
forms of civil society.  
 
There have been very few studies of civil society in Cambodia; those that have engaged with 
an analysis of the sector have quite rightly described how local and endogenous forms of 
collectivised activities are sporadic and difficult to pinpoint, whilst externally constructed 
forms of civil society are overly dependent upon the organisations that formed them.
5
 This 
case study attempts to link those dependency discussions with new primary research to 
demonstrate how a specific neoliberal form of civil society is privileged by external donor 
policies and the colonising effect this is having on new roles (and a new identity) for civil 
society development within the country.   
 
In order to identify these neoliberal interventions in Cambodian civil society, numerous semi-
structured interviews of civil society actors were undertaken during two visits from the 4
th
 
March - 30
th
 March 2007, and from the  2
nd
 January - 14
th
 January 2009. Respondents were 
selected from a variety of contexts in order to ensure that a discussion on civil society was not 
limited to specific sectors within the country, interviews were therefore obtained from a 
mixture of more formalised sources including staff of NGOs, bilateral donor organisations, 
think tanks, and also less formal sources; members of Community Building Organisations 
(CBOs) and village chiefs.   
                                                 
5
 For example local NGOs are often depended upon International NGOs and/or bilateral donors, whilst CBOs 
are often dependent upon NGOs  
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The first fieldwork visit coincided with the World Bank's attempt to carry out a 'Civil Society 
Assessment'
6
 in Cambodia as part of its Social Accountability project. In order to obtain a 
preliminary assessment of Cambodian civil society, the bank contracted out the work to a 
local Cambodian think tank; CAS (Centre for Advanced Studies) to plan and carry out the 
preliminary assessment over a period of three days in the districts of Tramkok and Koh 
Andeth (both in Takeo province) from 22nd-24
th
 March 2007. I was fortunate enough to 
participate in this preliminary assessment of Cambodian civil society as an observer, 
including the consultation weeks before, and after the fieldwork, therefore I was able to 
situate myself within the global (World Bank) perceptions of civil society, and the local 
(Cambodian) evidence on the ground.  
 
During this period I also carried out interviews within the urban NGO sector in Phnom Penh, 
to complement the analysis of civil society with the research team in rural Cambodia
7
. The 
second visit from the 2
nd
 January - 14
th
 January 2009, followed along the same lines and 
attempted to look specifically at the more formalised NGO sectors in the capital. It is worth 
turning now to an analysis of the data collection methods used within the fieldwork 
 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the method of data collection for the case study for 
a variety of reasons. They allow for a more reflexive discussion than that afforded by rigorous 
surveys and questionnaires, thus avoiding the positivist pitfall of trying to obtain generalisable 
data from a neutral and objective standpoint. Interviews using a more structured approach 
                                                 
6
 This assessment was concerned with the more rural CSOs as opposed to the dominant urban NGO sector, and 
forms an important part of the fourth chapter. 
7
     This distinction is extremely important for an analysis of what constitutes civil society in Cambodia,     
outlined in chapter three. 
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(including surveys and questionnaires) tend to set rigid questions that can marginalise and 
silence respondents through a crude categorisation process that rarely takes the pluralistic 
social context of a respondent into account. Questions within semi-structured interviews are 
thus guided through a dialogic process centred around key topics and themes rather than 
standardised direct questions (Babbie 2009, p318).  
 
Semi-structured interviews are furthermore seen as flexible and continuous; each interview 
allows the researcher to create a clearer image of the phenomenon under study, and therefore 
to refine and improve future questions (Babbie 2009, p318). The aim was to approach each 
respondent with a basic question that could establish the purpose and focus of the interview, 
yet rather than following a pre-set interview guide, the intention was to ―listen actively and to 
move the interview forward as much as possible by building on what the participant has 
begun to share‖ (Seidman 2005, p66). This sharing was important; information obtained from 
one respondent created a snow-ball opportunity to pinpoint and engage with others in the field 
that had not previously been considered. At the same time, the sharing of information helped 
to clarify what was happening within civil society far more effectively than any form of 
survey or structured interview approach. Within reflexive semi-structured interviews, 
researchers enter into a reciprocal relationship with respondents, to develop a genuine (albeit 
guided) conversation (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006 p134). 
 
At the same time the semi-structured interview process holds a distinct advantage over the 
open-ended interview process by allowing for a link with the macro-theoretical arguments 
made in the thesis through key topic areas for discussion, rather than an interview without 
parameters focusing entirely upon the respondents themselves.  
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There are difficulties, however, in the attempt to create a global-local link within the interview 
process, especially when the objective is to identify 'neoliberal' colonising interventions of 
civil society. Due to this complexity, interviews were framed around a more non-academic 
discussion that intended to interrogate the micro-processes involved with institutions without 
discussing the macro-processes that frame the results within the thesis. In order for this to be 
accomplished, questions aimed at respondents working within the urban NGO sector 
(including donor agencies) were designed around a discussion of the economisation of the 
sector, particularly focusing upon the core terms such as  competition, professionalism and an 
engagement with the market. This would allow a fruitful discussion on the changing NGO 
sector within Phnom Penh over the last decade in line with external donor strategies, without 
the difficulty of engaging at a theoretical level on the dimensions of neoliberal instrumentality 
and colonisation of communicative practices. Burawoy's extended case method allows for a 
sensitive discussion on these economic micro processes that can then inform the macro-
theoretical dimension of the thesis.  
 
Interviews utilised within the rural CSO sector were focused upon a broader exploratory 
discussion of CBO dependency on NGOs and the increasing market influence within CBO 
collective activities. This allowed for a discussion on the micro-processes affecting various 
individuals at the local level, and allowed me to utilise the data within the thesis to provide a 
more macro-theoretical discussion on neoliberal forms of rationality; the product of this CBO 
dependency.  
 
Interviews undertaken within the urban NGO sector were accessible without the need for a 
23 
 
translator; the heads of most local NGOs have a good grasp of English, whilst heads of 
international NGOs and donor organisations are often foreign nationals who also speak fluent 
English. For interviews undertaken in rural Cambodia and those associated with CBOs, I was 
fortunate enough to have a member of CAS act as a translator for the questions/responses that 
the research team were posing to individuals within CBOs, and also to translate the questions 
that I was allowed to raise during the interview process, effectively including me within the 
research process and allowing me to gain a better grasp of localised collective activities
8
 
 
The decision to undertake a qualitative research project in Cambodia required an 
understanding of the social context and climate within which I would be engaging with 
respondents. The time spent with CAS gave me an important insight into how interviewing 
techniques required a great deal of sensitivity when dealing with critical subject areas. There 
are of course problems associated with situating oneself within a localised rural context, given 
the way that an outsider can potentially distort and 'write themselves' into the setting (Mason, 
2002 p86). Despite this, it is important to attempt to situate as close as possible rather than to 
stand on the outside as a neutral observer; my integration as part of the research team, 
hopefully helped to reduce some of these distortions. 
 
Research in the field was carefully orchestrated by the team, who determined that a more 
exploratory and open-ended interview would be fruitful to engage local people about their 
relationship with civil society and the state but without risking being perceived as antagonistic 
to the government. The research team were specifically tasked with exploring the relationship 
                                                 
8
 The CAS research team carried out a more open-ended interview process in order to fulfil the goal of a 'civil 
society assessment', thus the translator described the conversations to the best of his ability. I was fortunate to 
be allowed to intervene in the conversation and steer it towards a discussion on dependency and 
economisation as a form of semi-structured interview technique, without any objections.  
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between citizens and the state as the core element of civil society from the World Bank 
perspective, yet asking citizens about their views on whether the government was adequately 
held accountable etc... could have been perceived as being critical of the government and 
unlikely to yield a genuine response.  
 
The recent Khmer Rouge legacy has left problems with trust between citizens and those in 
authority, many Cambodians still openly refuse to (critically) discuss the state or the dominant 
political party in power for fear of reprisals. CAS researchers were therefore careful to ask 
about civil society in general, and use the results to determine what the role of the state was in 
this relationship.
9
 This open-ended process allowed myself the chance to interject and guide 
the discussion towards an analysis of the economisation of collectivised activities (through 
microfinance for example), without imposing questions on them that could potentially 
jeopardise the interview.  
 
With these issues in mind, CAS kept the interviews anonymous to ensure that no pressure 
would be placed upon the respondents during the discussion and could therefore engage in a 
full and frank account of the various collective activities at a community level. As a 
consequence, my interviews were also kept anonymous to respect both the wishes the 
respondents, and that of CAS.   
 
Interview respondents in the NGO sector within Phnom Penh were also offered anonymity in 
order to be able to successfully discuss internal organisational practice in a more critical light. 
                                                 
9
 In my opinion this was the best method; the 2009 World Bank document 'Linking Citizens and the State' 
discussed within the thesis as an outcome of CAS's research, demonstrates that there is very little interest 
from citizens in demanding accountability from the state, thus structured interviews enquiring about this 
interest would have been of little use.  
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The NGO sector in Phnom Penh is relatively close-knit: a critical discussion of their financial 
and organisational dependency on donor organisations runs the risk of adverse effects in their 
relationship with donors without this anonymity (particularly when the results are published 
and the target audience is likely to include the NGO sector in Cambodia
10
). I was also 
fortunate to have been given advice from two prominent Cambodian scholars who suggested 
that if I wanted to investigate a more critical view of internal transformations and external 
dependency then it would be best to use anonymous interviews to ensure that no pressure is 
unduly placed between staff members and forms of hierarchy. 
 
In terms of obstacles and hindrances to research in the country, the one that I believe proved 
the most challenging, was attempting to obtain interviews from the more professional 
organisations of the NGO sector (for example, the microfinance sector). I was extremely 
interested in how this sector was transforming in Phnom Penh from small scale donor-
sponsored NGO projects towards commercialised ‗microfinance institutions‘ (MFIs), 
however, attempting to obtain interviews from the more commercial organisations proved 
difficult. Two of the most advanced (in transformatory terms) MFIs, would only agree to be 
interviewed if I arrived with a completed check-list; A copy of my thesis outline, a list of 
questions to be asked, one signed letter of recommendation from a ‗University Chancellor‘, 
and a photocopy of my passport. This was in contrast to the donor-funded NGOs working in 
microfinance where staff were happy to answer any questions without these check-lists in 
place.  
 
These problems served to highlight that the more professional sectors were expecting a 
                                                 
10
 For example some of these interviews were reproduced in Norman (2010)   
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positivist qualitative interview approach (hence the expectations of questions in advance), 
however, this went against the reflexive and semi-structured approach that had been the 
foundation of my interview techniques thus far.  If the aim of my case study was to 
demonstrate a shifting NGO sector towards more professional neoliberal organisational 
practices, then this kind of barrier to my research only served to strengthen the case.  
 
The reflexive interview process undertaken in Cambodia, enabled me to utilise primary 
empirical research in support of the theoretical hypothesis discussed above. I will now turn 
towards a brief discussion on the framework of the thesis, in order to clarify how the case 
study on Cambodia can be explicitly linked to the theoretical discussion on cosmopolitan 
democracy  
 
Framework of the thesis  
 
The thesis commences, with a broad literature review of the cosmopolitan democratic project, 
and its idealisation of civil society (in a nascent global form) as a potential solution to the 
'democratic deficit' in global politics. The chapter proceeds to outline both the liberal and 
critical variants of this project in both their theoretical and practical attempts at forming 
inclusive frameworks of global governance. Whilst both elude to the inclusive nature of their 
frameworks, the chapter demonstrates how the liberal dimension reproduces a layer of 
exclusion, and therefore turns towards the critical dimension as a more adequate solution to 
the democratic deficit. The utilisation of CSOs within global public spheres is interrogated to 
reveal a specific ideal role; an inclusive communicative steering mechanism that can counter 
the exclusive systemic (neoliberal) forms of global governance.  
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The second chapter introduces the neoliberal dimension of global governance, outlining the 
origins and rise of a specific form of neoliberal economic paradigm and its link with global 
development discourses emanating from the core Multilateral Economic Institutions (MEIs). 
Importantly, the chapter examines the emergence of a 'neoliberal democratic project' enacted 
by the World Bank and a plethora of bilateral donors, who have effectively incorporated a 
new role and identity for CSOs within their policy discourses on development. The chapter 
describes how this renewed interest in civil society has resulted in two specific roles for CSOs 
under a neoliberal ideal-type; professional service provision, and as a democratic state 
watchdog. These roles are discussed within a general context, drawing from a variety of 
studies, to demonstrate how this neoliberal ideal-type represents a reversal from the assumed 
communicatively bound steering power of CSOs under the critical cosmopolitan project. 
Under the new global neoliberal development paradigm, one can observe systemic 
colonisation of CSOs through the attempt to forge a neoliberal form of rationality within these 
organisations. 
 
The third and fourth chapters represent the empirical case study of Cambodia, and serve to 
demonstrate in concrete terms, the discussions outlined in chapter two. It aims therefore, to 
highlight the new neoliberal democratic project that has penetrated Cambodian civil society, 
from the global policy discourses emanating from Multilateral and Bilateral donors, to the 
very grassroots of collectivised civil society construction. It focuses upon the emerging dual 
roles of service provision and democratic state watchdog, and outlines how the effects 
represent systemic forms of colonisation. The result is to observe the marginalisation of 
endogenous communicative forms of civil society under the exogenous neoliberal model.  
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Chapter three looks explicitly at the urban NGO sector in Phnom Penh, the dominant 
understanding of civil society within the country, and demonstrates how a level of 
dependency on external donors has resulted in neoliberal forms of professionalisation 
saturating the sector. After a general analysis of the sector, the chapter moves towards a 
specific look at the service provision role of microfinance within the country, and highlights 
how global neoliberal discourses are re-shaping the identities of NGOs practicing 
microfinance towards a more instrumental understanding of the sector.  
 
Chapter four shifts away from the urban NGO sector, towards an analysis of civil society 
development within rural grassroots communities. The chapter examines the lack of 
endogenous CBOs, and describes how most CBOs in rural Cambodia are actually externally 
introduced, and nurtured, by the NGO community. This has inevitably resulted in a 
relationship of dependency, the side-effect of which is to observe external (neoliberal) 
idealisations of civil society introduced to the grassroots. This includes introducing an 
entrepreneurial and credit culture among social collectives (including rural forms of 
microfinance) and results in a similar attempt to construct systemic forms of rationality within 
collective activities.  
 
The chapter then turns towards the second role of CSOs as democratic state watchdogs and 
includes a discussion on the new World Bank project of Social Accountability at the 
grassroots. The chapter describes how the World Bank recognises the need to externally 
'stimulate' the demand for accountability due to a lack of endogenous infrastructure,  resulting 
in the increasing promotion of technical and depoliticised CSOs in a conscious attempt to turn 
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advocacy and critical dissent in Cambodia 'from shouting to counting'.  
 
The concluding chapter attempts to re-integrate the findings of the Cambodian case study 
within the theoretical discussions of the critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy. It 
discusses the implications of these findings and outlines important future directions if the 
critical dimension is to fulfil its promise as an inclusive democratic project.  
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Section One: Interrogating the Dynamics of 
Democratic Global Governance 
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1. INTRODUCING THE COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRATIC PROJECT 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The origins of cosmopolitanism are said to originate from Athens with the cynic philosophy 
of Diogenes in the fourth century BC. When asked one day what countryman he was, 
Diogenes replied that he was a 'citizen of the world' (Diogenes 1853, p240-241). This was 
intended to suggest that Diogenes' loyalties were not restricted to the Athenian polis and 
represents a critique of the narrow allegiances that the polis demanded upon its citizens. The 
concept was drawn upon more positively by the Stoic tradition
11
 to more fully develop the 
idea of a kosmou politês (world citizen) and imply that there are two communities, the local 
community from birth, and the boundary-less community of human 'argument and aspiration' 
(Nussbaum 1996, p4). This idea was revitalised within the enlightenment period, specifically 
with Immanuel Kant, who attempted to develop a vision of a universal community of 
humankind, bound through a 'transcendental formula' of public right.
12
 (Kant 2000, 2003). 
This implies that for cosmopolitanism, the sphere of justice is without boundaries and 
therefore ―owed to all regardless of location or origin, race or gender, class or citizenship‖ 
(O'Neill 2000, p45). There are three fundamental tenets that are generally agreed upon as 
forming the basis for an understanding of cosmopolitan morality:  1. Individualism, and the 
belief that the individual is the ultimate unit of concern 2. Universality; all human beings 
possess equal moral status, and 3. Generality, all persons are the subject of concern for 
                                                 
11
 The Stoics were a group of philosophers in the third century BC who believed in the idea of a universal 
natural law, thus they denied the ethical traditions of Plato and Aristotle, associated with a personal ethics of 
the polis. The Stoics therefore introduced the concept of the Cosmopolis (see Colish 1985) 
12
 Public right comes from publicity, and suggests that all moral actions between people are deemed wrong 
unless publicly accepted by all (Kant 2003, pviii)  
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everyone, thus the human status has global scope (Pogge 1992, p48; Caney, 2005, p3-4; 
Hayden 2005, p3) 
 
This chapter will not, however, focus on the debate surrounding moral cosmopolitan 'justice' 
that has a long and contested history within International Relations literature and specifically 
as the sub-division of international ethics
13
 and instead moves towards those cosmopolitan 
approaches that tend to focus on the political acts of inclusion/exclusion that feature within 
contemporary global institutions with a specific focus on the project of 'cosmopolitan 
democracy'. This moral dimension is less concerned with the institutional arrangements of 
global politics and instead seeks to interrogate the underlying debates of justice beyond 
borders (Beitz 1999, p519), exclusion is seen as occurring when justice becomes bounded 
within particular spheres, especially the contemporary boundaries of the nation-state (O'Neill 
2000). At the global level, the moral position recognises that humanity has an obligation to 
strive for a world without inequality
14
, and that in order for this to happen, governance must 
not be subservient to state-centrism but the individual (see Singer 1972; Barry 1991; Beitz 
1994; Nussbaum 1996; O'Neill 1996; Pogge 2000; Caney 2001, 2005). The shift towards a 
cosmopolitan analysis of democracy moves from this ‗moral‘ form of cosmopolitanism and its 
view of the nation-state as an inhibitor of universal forms of moral worth, towards more 
‗political‘ cosmopolitanism that recognises the need to push further and reform contemporary 
institutions in order to elevate the individual to the centre of these frameworks; democracy 
                                                 
13
 For instance the Kanitan Lineage has been drawn upon within IR from authors such as O'Neill (1996, 2000) 
and Barry (1989).  Another school drawing upon the cosmopolitan principles associated with John Rawls 
(1993, 1999) have inspired contemporary authors within IR such as Beitz (1979, 1994, 1999), Pogge (1989, 
2001) and Caney (2005)  
14
 The cosmopolitan position outlined valourises human rights and distributive justice as normative values to 
defend,  therefore they view circumstances such as global poverty as unjust and as a consequence the state 
has a moral duty to the individual to ensure its eradication (see Pogge 2001)  
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becomes the vehicle of this reform
15
. In this respect political cosmopolitanism is not just 
about the call for global moral responsibility in the contemporary era, but a practical attempt 
to apply the principles of democracy globally (Archibugi 2000, p143).   
 
The cosmopolitan democratic project in its most basic form can be understood as an attempt 
to expand democracy beyond the nation-state, thus it is often seen as synonymous with 
'global' and 'transnational' notions of democracy. There is a debate surrounding what the term 
'global' means in this context, authors such as Holden (2000) and Morrison (2003) argue that 
authors using cosmopolitan terminology tend to equate global with the geographical 
expansion of democracy whilst 'transnational' conceptions reinforce the spatial distinction of 
democracy as beyond the nation-state. This is, however, not so clear cut in the literature; most 
cosmopolitan authors use the terms interchangeably and tend to denote the term global as 
spatial rather than geographical. In order to maintain consistency this chapter will keep with 
the more popular spatial usage and takes up Archibugi's usage of cosmopolitanism to 
transcend the 'statism' that is present in global politics (2002b, p31).  
 
As with the distinction between the moral and political practices of cosmopolitanism, there 
are fundamental differences between the variety of authors who support a form of 
cosmopolitan democratic project, I have attempted here to categorise these authors into two 
distinct schools of thought that represent their differences in approach; a liberal cosmopolitan 
and a critical cosmopolitan approach to democracy beyond the state. Their differences will be 
drawn out throughout this chapter, however, it is important to establish this differentiation 
here in order to understand their different understandings of inclusion and exclusion in global 
                                                 
15
 The contrast between the moral and political forms of cosmopolitanism leads Archibugi to classify his 
cosmopolitan democratic project as 'cosmopolitical democracy' (2000) 
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politics.  
 
The Liberal dimension tends to lean closely towards the Kantian moral concern of individual 
worth and attempts to construct a more humane order ―in which people's needs come to take 
precedence over the interests of states and their geopolitical machinations‖ (McGrew 2002a, 
p272). Booth recognises that the liberal dimension of this cosmopolitan project relies upon the 
establishment of the universal declaration of human rights to transcend the sovereign 
dimensions of governance and reinvent the 'global human being' (1999, p66). This is not to 
denigrate the importance of democracy, merely to point out that allowing people a voice in the 
structures of global governance must be complemented by a 'cosmopolitan' framework that 
reflects the primacy of the individual through a global order based upon universal morality 
and justice
.
 Indeed, Richard Falk, a liberal cosmopolitan, argues that ―Democracy is 
conceived as extending beyond constitutional and free, periodic elections to include an array 
of other assurances that governance is orientated towards human well-being and ecological 
sustainability‖ (2000, p172). 
 
The critical dimension, retains a broadly sympathetic approach to the global democratic 
project, however, it draws its theoretical inspiration from the neo-Kantian writings of Jürgen 
Habermas and tends to be critical of the liberal strands of cosmopolitanism of inclusion for 
pre-formulating global frameworks through a form of monological self-reflection; thus as will 
be argued, it is actually deeply exclusive. As an alternative position, it attempts to formulate a 
dialogical approach to global governance through applying the theory of deliberative 
democracy to the structures of global governance
16
. This entails constructing democratic 
                                                 
16
 This link between cosmopolitanism and dialogue has led to some authors explicitly using the term 'dialogic' 
cosmopolitanism (see Linklater 1998, Dobson 2003, Mignolo 2000). 
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spaces outside of the state in a similar form to the liberal project, but it refuses to pre-
determine the substantive content or boundaries of democratic dialogue. For the critical 
dimension, the quality of participation is just as important as the access for participation; 
democracy is about creating substantive norms on the common good through a process of 
intersubjective dialogue where moral decisions are formed within, and not prior to, dialogue.  
 
Throughout this chapter it will become apparent that there are subtle differences between 
them in the way that they approach questions of inclusion, the cosmopolitan democratic 
project in all of its guises, however, is concerned with two interrelated features of 
contemporary global politics; firstly the problems of a 'democratic deficit that is said to exist 
within contemporary practices of global governance, and secondly, the rise of a global form of 
civil society that is emerging and offers the potential to remedy this deficit. 
 
1.1.1 Global Governance and the Democratic Deficit 
 
The cosmopolitan democratic project can be contrasted with much of the mainstream 
literature in International Relations that tends to focus on enhancing democracy globally; the 
promotion and expansion of democratic states throughout the international system, often 
equated with  'Democratic Peace Theory' (DPT)
17
 and its state-centric conceptions of the 
promotion of democracy. This is, however, counter to the projects described in this chapter, 
which attempt to transcend the state-centric bias present in DPT and extend democracy to the 
global political order and therefore to be  concerned with democratic global governance rather 
than a globality of democratic governments.  Governance can include government but it is 
                                                 
17
 DPT tends to stipulate that the spread of democratic governments around the world would inevitably result in 
liberal zone of peace due to their primary assertion that democracies do not go to war with each other. See for 
example Doyle (1983, 1997) Russett and Oneal (2001)  
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also not solely restricted by it; it lacks 'sovereign centres' (Dryzek 2006), is 'pluricentric' 
rather than 'unicentric' (Fenger and Bekkers 2007) and includes a variety of informal non-
governmental mechanisms that are equally attempting to satisfy needs and wants within the 
system of rule (Rosenau 1992, p4, Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Governance therefore 
includes a myriad of actors from political institutions, corporations and civil society, but 
importantly it is the way in which governance can sustain coordination between these 
interests (Pierre and Peters 2000, p3-4).  
 
DPT advocates tend to recognise that a democratic deficit exists in the world that can be 
fulfilled through the expansion of liberal democracies, in this definition a democratic deficit is 
defined by the absence of democratic political systems throughout the world (Kaldor 2007, 
p37). There are many who are critical of the current democratisation trend that has led 
Freedom House to suggest recognising the twentieth century as the ‗democratic century‘ 
(cited in Gaventa 2006, p8), calling to attention the deficits within the actual practices and 
quality of democracy itself. In contrast the cosmopolitan democratic project recognises that a 
democratic deficit exists on a global level when the territorially-bound state engages in 
democratic decision-making mechanisms at a global level that directly affect the rights of 
citizens without allowing them a say in this process.
18 
This echoes a concern that 
contemporary global institutions are generating a gap between the decision-makers and the 
decision-takers of global politics (Held 1998). Citizens are rarely able to influence policies 
that occur from outside of the territorial state; national parliaments within democracies are 
directly elected and accountable through a form of representation that simply does not exist 
on a global level, contributing to a weak democratic chain (Scholte 2005, p87).  
                                                 
18
 At its most basic level it can be seen as ―the absence of a developed platform where...issues are presented for 
public scrutiny and debate‖ (Ward 1992, p8).  
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Contemporary global structures are seen as deeply exclusionary due to the lack of 
representation and participation afforded to citizens. Criticisms of major institutions for 
lacking citizen representation include for example, the UN system (Childers and Urquhart 
1994; Kochler 1997), the WTO (Keohane and Nye 2000; O'Brien at al 2000;  Nanz and 
Steffek 2005; Eckersley 2007), the IMF (Scholte 2000; Dawson and Bhatt 2002), and the 
World Bank Group (Bhatnager and Williams 1992;  Fox and Brown 1998; Woods 2000; Clark 
2002). Important decisions on trade-rules, debt relief, macro-economic restructuring policies, 
intellectual property rights and the privatisation of key public services are all undertaken 
behind closed doors of the undemocratic global system, vastly contributing to the anguish felt 
by many over the democratic deficit (Naidoo 2008)
19
. The democratisation of contemporary 
institutions has largely been ignored by governments; there has been no major global 
institutional reform since the end of the cold war
20
 (Archibugi 2004, p438). Scholte labels this 
exclusion part of an institutional democratic deficit, where oversight of these global public 
spaces has been weak and limited in access for the 'demoi'; states, intergovenmental and 
supragovernmental organisations have bypassed democratic procedures through high levels of 
exclusivity and a lack of democratic representation (2002, p291).  
 
There is, however, another element of the democratic deficit that is of equal importance for 
advocates of cosmopolitan democracy, which Scholte labels the structural democratic deficit, 
marked by an increasing gap between ‗supraterritorial spaces and territorial self-
determination‘; the democratic state is territorially bound and thus cannot effectively regulate 
                                                 
19
   For example private sites of global governance such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICASS) and the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) have no public 
participation or consultation, thus contributing to the notion of unaccountable structures of governance (see 
Scholte 2002, p291). 
20
 Except for the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002  
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global spaces. In addition, the territorial state has traditionally represented a nationalist 
structure of community, yet under globalisation there is an increase in 'substate and transstate 
ethnonations' where democracy is struggling to break away from traditional conceptions of 
the 'people' (Scholte 2002, p291).This global democratic deficit is exacerbated by the 
complex relationship between the territorial democratic state and its increasingly 
asymmetrical relationship with the contemporary process of globalisation. Held and McGrew 
pose a definition of globalisation in its spatial form as, ―the expanding scale, growing 
magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social 
interaction‖ (2002, p1). Globalisation can be understood as a spatial phenomenon that lies 
upon a continuum of the 'local' at one end and the 'global' at the other, implying a shifting 
from the local forms of human organisation towards transcontinental and transregional 
patterns of activity (Held 2002, p305). These patterns of social interaction that permeate 
across territorial borders form 'domains of activity' and include, economic, political, 
technological, military, legal, cultural and environmental transborder shifts (Held 1998, p13). 
Germain highlights how for example, the logic of global financial governance often subverts 
political authority bounded by the nation-state due to the formers heterogenous and 
transnational outreach in contrast to the latter‘s territorially defined domain (2010, p495)21. 
 
The result is on the one hand an intensification in the development of 'overlapping 
communities of fate'
22
 and on the other, a sharp decrease in channels of democratic control 
available to citizens outside of their territorial political communities. Held (2002, p307-308) 
outlines five key dis-junctures appearing between the process of globalisation and its 
                                                 
21
   The contemporary financial crisis serves as an illustration of the problematic systems of control available to 
the territorially defined state in the wake of unaccountable transnational forms of capital 
22
 In essence to banish the myth of the discreet homogeneous community, according to Held, ―the fate of one 
country and that of another are more entwined than ever before‖ (1998, p24; 2004, p1) 
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relationship with the democratic political community: 
 
1. The notion of a self-determining national collective is becoming increasingly defunct 
given that many fundamental economic, social, cultural and environmental processes 
that are determinates of the 'political good' now lie outside the grasp of individual 
polities 
2. Nation-states are not the sole political force beyond territorial borders, but are 
embedded in complex networks of power at regional and global levels 
3. This does not entail the collapse of sovereignty, but the dispersal of power and shifting 
of authority to ensure that the state is no longer the owner of a territorial exclusive 
form of public power 
4. In order to enhance the public good, coordinated multilateral action is required to 
ensure that this is effective. Also, transboundary problems may pressurise and force 
domestic adjustments from states, creating the need for stronger global regulatory 
regimes to ensure a strengthening of local-global ties through multi-layered 
governance  
5. Finally, the traditional distinctions between domestic and international issues are 
increasingly blurred where states face issues of non-renewable resources, nuclear 
waste management, financial market regulation, AIDS crisis, spread of WMD etc...  
 
Although this analysis of the relationship between globalisation and democracy demonstrates 
an understanding of the need for the 'globalisation of democracy' as well as the 
'democratisation of globalisation' (understood as a form of control over the processes of 
globalisation as a spatial phenomenon), the cosmopolitan democratic project has moved 
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beyond the analytical understandings of globalisation, towards a more normative concern at 
how specifically the economic dimension is not just diminishing the potential for democratic 
control at a global level, but is in effect a deeply exclusive organising principle. This 
highlights one of the core themes running throughout the cosmopolitan democratic project; an 
explicit critique of the neoliberal form of globalisation. This critique can be divided along the 
liberal/critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy as briefly discussed earlier. Both 
dimensions recognise the negative attributes of neoliberal globalisation and its expansion 
under the Washington Consensus principles, yet their critique diverges in the ways in which 
they target these attributes
23
. 
 
The liberal dimension tends to focus on the one hand on the ways in which the spread of 
global markets and capital is largely bypassing the control of citizens who remain tied to the 
nation-state. Markets when left on their own can perpetuate economic and political 
difficulties, for example global financial flow can destabilise national economies, increase 
development asymmetries produced by SAPs
24
 and other unfettered market policies, reduce 
the role of welfare provision and dilute non-market social factors that can balance competition 
with cooperation especially with regard to public goods (Held 2005a, p15). There is clearly an 
emphasis on the need to establish a form of democratic control over markets, not to eradicate 
them, but to understand that the market is a ―good servant but a bad master‖ (Faulks 1999, 
p208). The liberal dimension specifically targets the 'market-orientated' agencies such as the 
WTO, World Bank and the IMF as needing to be challenged through not just opening them up 
further to public scrutiny and transparency but the strengthening of alternative global 
governance mechanisms to bolster the areas of the environment and social affairs to 
                                                 
23
 The neoliberal form of globalisation and its relationship to the Washington Consensus is outlined in chapter 
two.  
24
 See p122 
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counteract their dominance (Held 2003, p178). This leads to the second critique aimed at 
neoliberal forms of globalisation; the expansion of harmful market practices are seen as an 
impediment to the construction of more 'humane' forms of global governance (Falk 1995). 
This construction of a liberal framework, as discussed below, includes the privileging of 
universal human rights, justice and ecological sustainability at the heart of the democratic 
project to ensure human well-being
25
 (Koenig-Archibugi 2003).  
 
The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy attempts to undermine the neoliberal 
promotion of markets not necessarily because of the negative effects that they have on the 
human condition, but because the logic that drives them are formed with an instrumental 
purposive-rationality that seeks to restrict critical and reflective freedom of the subject 
(O'Byrne 2005, p4). Often within the literature this market expansion is equated with the term 
'capitalist modernity', yet it should be more be more accurately  understood as neoliberal 
modernity; a form of governance that is dominated by individualism and economism, 
concerned with the expansion of the market into all spheres of social life (Comeliau 2002, 
p73-80)
26
. Critical projects call for a specific form of democracy, deliberative democracy, to 
challenge contemporary forms of global governance, severely restricted by what they see as 
'systemic' modes of rationality; instrumental forms of rationality associated with the technical, 
bureaucratic and market expansion of neoliberal forms of governance. The framework of 
deliberative democracy is promoted as an attempt to dislodge this form of rationality 
representing a form of communicative domination; the conversion of subjects as consumers 
rather than citizens.  
 
                                                 
25
 Falk argues this is important in order to challenge the ―moral emptiness of neo-liberalism‖ (1999 p147) 
26
 The link between modernity and neoliberalism is revisited in chapter two  
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The liberal and critical interpretations of neoliberal globalisation will be expanded upon 
further within this chapter, however, despite these differences, they both recognise the 
'dualistic' nature of globalisation and advocate a strengthening of the 'positive' side of 
globalisation
27
; the emergence of non-state actors under a loosely defined conception of a 
'Global Civil Society
'
 to contest the exclusive nature of neoliberal globalisation, and expand 
democracy from the local to the global. Smith (2008) labels the duality of globalisation under 
two forms of networks; the 'neoliberal globalisation network' and the 'democratic 
globalisation network', of which the former can be characterised by the spread of markets, the 
latter; globalising networks of civil society actors.  
 
The focus upon these actors as contributing to global democratic reform, allows the 
cosmopolitan democratic project to avoid its critics and their charge of the impossibility of 
aligning representative democracy beyond the nation-state
28
, through a shift towards 
acknowledging the importance of participation as a democratic ideal and the promotion of 
voice rather than vote. Participation of non-state actors can function as an alternative source 
of representation that allows us to conceptualise a form of inclusion that does not have to be 
rigidly focused on the territorial dimensions of populations and constituencies, instead non-
state actors can offer a form of modified representation through the promotion of ideas and 
issues raised from domestic populations; thus voice rather than vote becomes elevated as the 
source of democratic legitimacy (see Young 2002; Keck 2004; Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin 
2008).  
 
                                                 
27
 Often referred to as political globalisation within this literature to contrast it with the unregulated economic 
modes of globalisation, however, this definition will be interrogated in chapter two.  
28
 For a critique of the cosmopolitan project  for the possibility of replicating representative democracy outside 
of national borders see (Sandel 1998; Kymlicka 1999; Dahl 1999; Saward 2000; Moravcsik 2005)  
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It is important to note here, however, that there are two very different understandings of 
democratic inclusion that emanate from the liberal and critical variants of cosmopolitan 
democracy, and this has an impact upon how they perceive the global democratic deficit. The 
liberal cosmopolitan position, despite placing an important emphasis on ‗voice over vote‘ 
through the participation of non-state actors into their global governance reform proposals 
(discussed below), still tend to rely heavily on electoral reform at a global level. Goodin 
labels this democratic reform that is highly centred around elections as ‗reform-act 
democracy‘29 and argues this adequately defines the liberal position who encourage the global 
reform of institutions with a strong role for electoral oversight (this can include the 
strengthening of civil society within these institutional designs). This is contrast to those 
theorists that Goodin  labels as ‗antistatists‘ for eschewing strong intergovernmental 
institutions and instead placing a primary focus on developing a strong participatory civil 
society; he alludes here to the critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy (Goodin 2010, 
p176). 
 
In contrast to the more liberal leanings of cosmopolitan democracy and its focus on the formal 
architecture of electoral governance, the critical dimension draws its inspiration from the 
republican notions of democracy where participation and dialogue form the basis of 
democratic legitimacy (although as will be discussed below, the critical dimension moves 
away from the problems inherent within classical republican thought towards a preference for 
a deliberative form of democracy at the global level). 
 
Republican thought is often directly linked to the classical Athenian model of democracy, 
                                                 
29
   This is in homage to the term used during the British legislature changes to expand the franchise in the 19
th
 
century 
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emphasizing the value of participation and decision-making of the citizenry within the 
political sphere. Though heavily criticised for its restricted citizenship
30
, this model represents 
one of the first uses of democracy to grant citizens not just political equality, but a direct say 
in the legislative and judicial functions of the state (see Held 1999, p13-35). Athenian 
democracy introduces the idea of civic virtue; the subordination of private life to the public 
sphere and a collective decision making process on the common good (Held 1999, p17).   
 
It is important to note, however, that there are two competing strands of republicanism 
according to Held (1999); developmental republicanism and protective republicanism. The 
former draws upon the Athenian polis and emphasizes the intrinsic value of political 
participation to the enhancement of democratic rule, whilst the latter draws upon the later 
Roman republic and subsequently modified the classical interpretation. Protective 
republicanism retains the core focus upon participation, but only in recognition of its 
instrumental value in order to protect the interests of citizens (Held 1999, p36-69), thus in this 
way it retains a close link as a predecessor to modern conceptions of liberal representative 
democracy. 
 
The critical cosmopolitan understanding of democracy draws closely upon the developmental 
strand of republicanism, and thus eschews the liberal representative model. According to 
Habermas, under a liberal model, the government is seen as an 'apparatus of public 
administration' in the sense that it employs administrative political power to serve private 
interests. The state's role within this model is simply to maintain a mediating function. On the 
republican conception, however, politics is 'the reflective form of substantial ethical life' and 
                                                 
30
   The original republican belief in deliberation for the public good was closely tied to practices of exclusion 
informed through racial and gender prejudices; citizenship was an exclusive club (Sunstein 1988, p1540). 
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involves an important shift towards forms of solidarity and the common good; the state is not 
simply about fostering administrative power and individual personal interests, it includes 
solidarity and an orientation to the common good (Habermas 1994, p1). The liberal 
conception of democracy utilises citizen's votes as a quantified expression of support for 
different 'strategically acting collectivities' (perhaps best viewed as elite bargaining) in this 
respect choice is equated with the market and aggregate demands
31
. Within the republican 
tradition, however, it is not the market that decides questions of preference but dialogue and 
communication orientated towards mutual understanding (thus the republican tradition can be 
seen as a culmination of administrative and economic governance mechanisms, steered by the 
solidarity public sphere of communication). In this respect they differ at the very fundamental 
basis of freedom and the distinction between positive and negative rights; the liberal 
democratic position prioritises freedom from the state (through liberty and free speech) whilst 
the republican democratic tradition prioritises participation and communication (Habermas 
1994, p2).  
 
The problems with the liberal democratic tradition can be highlighted further through an 
understanding of the way in which democracy is simply ―the legal institutionalisation of an 
economic society that is supposed to guarantee an essentially nonpolitical common good by 
the satisfaction of private preferences‖ (Habermas 1994, p5). Republican forms of democracy 
reflect a stronger use of public reason and a more active form of participatory citizenship 
within governance mechanisms. This republican form is, however, problematic in its strong 
focus on the ‗public use of reason‘, and tends to assume that a public citizen is automatically a 
‗virtuous citizen‘ in contrast to its private counterpart (Habermas 1994; Petit 2003). Active 
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   Hence authors such as Mansbridge, view this as a form of aggregative democracy (1990)  
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citizens therefore bring pre-conceived ethical convictions to the public sphere, yet their very 
publicity is deemed democratically legitimate within the republican framework. The lack of 
an adjudication mechanism within the public sphere is what leads the critical cosmopolitan 
project to interject a model of deliberation
32
 into the republican model in order for the active 
citizen to intersubjectively unsettle ethical norms from the private sphere. The shift towards 
deliberative democracy as an important correction to this problem of republican thought, can 
be seen as a form of ‗modern republicanism‘ with an elevated role for deliberative 
contestation within public spheres (see Bohman 2004)
33
  
 
Under the modern republican model, democracy can be seen as: 
 
―…that set of institutions by which individuals are empowered as free and equal citizens to 
form and change the terms of their common life together, including democracy itself. In this 
sense, democracy is reflexive and consists in procedures by which rules and practices are 
made subject to the deliberation of citizens themselves‖ (Bohman 2010, p2). 
 
This of course links to Habermas‘ argument earlier about the central importance of reflexivity 
and the ability for citizens to normatively engage in re-shaping democratic norms and steering 
systemic modes of governance in accordance with public (reflexive) reason. Accordingly, this 
is central to the concerns of a reflexive form of democracy, that the public sphere has the 
ability to produce enough ‗communicative power‘ in order to influence ‗administrative 
power‘; utilising civil society as the social basis of an autonomous public sphere. In the end, 
                                                 
32
   For a detailed discussion of deliberation, see p84-98  
33
   This form of republicanism attempts to rule out a general voting mechanism where participants privately 
form judgements about common interests and then base their votes on these assumptions. It entails a 
collective form of deliberation to avoid the Rousseauian notion of repbublicanism where votes are obtained 
without collective deliberation (Rousseau was concerned that group deliberation could lead to individual 
intimidation and thus distorted interest) (Petit 2003, p14).  
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this balance allows economic, administrative and solidarity spheres to form the basis of 
modern social integration (Habermas 1994, p5).  
 
The promotion of a particular form of deliberative democracy is important as a counterweight 
to the increasing democratic deficit that was briefly discussed earlier. In many respects the 
key concern revolves around the increasing visibility of ‗juridification‘; the ―tendency toward 
the increasing expansion of law and law-like methods of formal rules and adjudication to new 
domains of social life‖ (Bohman 2004, p321; see Habermas 1988 P12-34). The process of 
juridification can be observed in particular when the steering mechanisms of the state and 
market increasingly permeate and regulate the lifeworld; on a global level this can be 
observed through the unaccountable modes of regulation enacted by MEIs and the way this 
undermines the link with a democratic community (Bohman 2004, p321-322).  
 
The liberal cosmopolitan project recognises this element of the democratic deficit as a form of 
unaccountability, however, it resorts to a moral argument in its critique of neoliberal forms of 
governance that is pre-discursively constructed.
34
 As an inclusive democratic project, this 
position fails to recognise the monological dimension to its reform project. This pre-
discursive mechanism is deemed exclusionary by the critical cosmopolitan project that 
prioritises the democratic nature of reform as a direct antidote to neoliberal forms of 
governance; its focus on an intersubjective form of legitimacy requires a deliberative form of 
democracy to steer these forms of governance through below rather than above
35
. According 
to Bohman, whilst the critical project is: 
                                                 
34
   See p86-90 
35
   Governance from ‗above‘ means here that reform ideals are institutionalised through appealing to liberal 
moral codes built into the new legal system that emerges, whilst from below alludes to the construction of 
these reform ideals through an intersubjective process among the subjects of law within deliberative forums 
to assess legitimacy (See Bohman 2005).  
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―…entirely consistent with cosmopolitan moral concerns...[it]… is not directly justified by 
moral principles. Its political character can be manifested in its emphasis on humanity as a 
political status rather than merely a moral property of individuals. As such, humanity exists 
only if there is a political community for the right to have rights establishes justified claims 
[sic]‖ (Bohman 2010, p3)36  
 
According to the critical cosmopolitan project, the increasing juridification of global 
governance requires more than mere ‗reparliamentaization‘; it actively requires the 
deliberative participation of civil society anchored within global public spheres as the 
communicative and democratic link with contemporary global governance (Bohman 2004, 
p322). As stated previously, the critique of neoliberal forms of governance for exacerbating 
the democratic deficit, can be remedied through applying a deliberative model of democracy 
to prioritise the ‗forum‘ over the ‗market‘ (Bohman 2004). This therefore ensures that the 
construction of an authentic public sphere can allow ―the political aspect of collective life to 
escape the domination of technique and administration that rules so much of mass society‖ 
(Germain 2010, p10).  
 
Throughout both cosmopolitan projects, the concept of civil society is strongly invoked as a 
solution to the democratic deficit, and accordingly appropriated into their global democratic 
frameworks. 
 
                                                 
36
   Bohman refers to his project as juxtaposed to the cosmopolitan vision of a singular ‗demos‘ at the top of a 
hierarchical apex (especially linking to a formal electoral process), thus he labels his project as ‗transnational 
democracy‘. As stated previously, this is in line with the critical cosmopolitan label for reforming global 
institutions centred around a plurality of deliberative public spheres (see Bohman 2010). 
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This chapter will now turn to an analysis of civil society and in particular the concept of a 
‗global‘ civil society as an emerging buzzword within global politics, and to specifically look 
at how it is incorporated within the cosmopolitan democratic project.  
 
1.1.2 The role of Civil Society in Global Politics  
 
Civil Society is a highly contested concept, where few can rarely agree upon an exact 
categorisation. A useful starting definition can be extrapolated from the authors at the London 
School of Economics‘ Centre for Civil Society (CSS) as: 
...the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and 
values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family 
and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family 
and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly 
embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their 
degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by 
organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental 
organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based 
organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social 
movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group[s] (LSE 2009) 
 
This definition is helpful in situating the site of civil society as operating between the state 
and the market
37
, but it fails to capture the normative dimension of civil society and its 
complex relationship with particularly the market in contemporary usage. Two strands of 
thinking have evolved with regard to the role of civil society vis-a-vis the market; on the one 
                                                 
37
This was not always the case, the origins of civil society stretch back to the Romanic and Greek periods where 
civil society (translated as ‗Sociatas Civilis‘ and ‗Politike Koina‘ respectively) was used to describe a society that 
is rationalistic and law-governed by humans, contrasted with the 'natural society' of the animal kingdom (See 
Seligman 2002; Parekh 2004). This constructed civil society as a space that constituted the state, and was a 
conception used throughout the seventeenth century by various theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Grotious, 
Peffendorf and Montesquieu to demonstrate how a well ordered civil society was needed to protect free, equal 
and rational humans from the 'state of nature'. The Scottish enlightement thinkers followed a similar path in 
many respects, with a focus on contrasting rational civil society with a primative and irrational 'savage' society 
therefore to privilege the rule of law (Parekh 2004, p16). The distinction between 'political‘ society of the state 
and ‗civil society‘ of collective associations outside of the family begins with Hegel and effectively ends the 
classic period of civil society, towards its more modern usage as a sphere outside of the state  (See Taylor 2003). 
50 
 
hand it can be seen as an autonomous sphere that can potentially partner the market whilst 
balancing against the state, and on the other it is seen as an autonomous sphere that has an 
antagonistic relationship with the market whilst balancing against the state. Edwards 
recognises that these definitions can be seen in their extremes from the influential Cato 
institute of Washington DC labelling civil society as an apolitical force for market expansion 
and individual liberty, to the World Social Forum defining it as ―the single most viable 
alternative to the authoritarian state and the tyrannical market‖ (cited in Edwards 2008, p236). 
Implicit within these extremes lays a dualism that tends to construct civil society as either an 
autonomous sphere in the service of the market or an autonomous sphere against the 
expansion of the market.  
 
The first approach, linking a supporting role for civil society vis-à-vis the market, draws its 
inspiration from what Edwards has labelled ‗civil society as associational life‘. This approach 
has become one of the most dominant interpretations among, politicians, foundations and 
international agencies (2004, p10). Although this conception is outlined in more detail in 
chapter two, it is worth briefly stating here.  
 
The link between civil society and associationalism is largely indebted to a liberal reading of 
civil society, emphasising the plurality of voluntary associations that exist outside of state 
frameworks, often described as ―the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-
generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order 
or set of shared rules‖ (Diamond 1994, p5). From the liberal perspective, the main strength of 
civil society is its dense interconnectedness, regardless of individual group motivation 
whether for wealth, power, religious identity or public interest etc… (see Lomasky 2002, p55; 
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Walzer 2002, p35). In the 1990s the debate surrounding the importance of civil society to 
democracy exploded in American political science, drawing upon de Tocqueville and the 
pluralist understanding of collective associational life. Accordingly civil society fosters an 
autonomous civic culture that ―was believed to protect society against destabilizaing mass 
mobilization and [the] social atomization characteristic of totalitarian movements and states‖ 
(Castells 2008, p264). The emphasis in importance of fostering an autonomous civic culture 
was drawn upon by scholars such as Robert Putnam, to generate the much needed ‗social 
capital‘ for societal cohesion and the fundamental basis for a stable democracy. In more recent 
years, the idea of social capital has been explicitly linked with civil society as an important 
enabling environment for the market, seen as a ‗bridging mechanism‘ for economic 
development in the space between the state and the market.
38
 This ‗neoliberal‘ understanding 
of civil society is developed throughout the second chapter and represents the promotion of a 
synergy of interests between the state, market and civil society; it is heavily drawn upon by 
practitioners in the politics of aid as part of a strategy to promote stable liberal (market) 
democracies in developing countries. This practitioner understanding is juxtaposed with an 
alternative approach to civil society that tends to dominate in scholarly literature and raises 
important questions about its relation to the market and perceived neutrality.
39
 Both the 
practitioner and academic understanding of civil society, however, allude to similar spatial 
assumptions as a sphere that remains distinct from the practices of governance and economy; 
the former as a neutral collective association and the latter a ‗solidarity sphere‘ of progressive 
transformation of that collective association. 
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   For a discussion on social capital and its modern relation to the market see p149-154 
39
   The practitioner/academic divide is summarised in an interesting article by Amoore and Langley (2004) to 
highlight how both positions hold different ideals for civil society, though they argue the former is more 
restrictive in debate than the latter, a subject this thesis returns to. 
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The cosmopolitan project in both its liberal and critical guises ascribes to this interpretation of 
civil society as a sphere of progressive transformation that is found overwhelmingly within 
academic discourse, and is therefore largely critical of its positionality as a neutral terrain or 
being utilised in support of the market. This conception of civil society is not only distinctly 
separate from the state and the market, but a normative site of resistance against these 
perceived sites of exclusion. This distinction tends to emanate from the brief writings of Karl 
Marx on civil society whereby contrary to Hegel
40
 the distinction between state and civil 
society was an antagonistic dimension, through which civil society becomes a tool used by 
the bourgeois class to subordinate the proletarian class within civil society and maintain 
control of the state (see Marx 2008, Baker 2002).  
 
Civil society played only a small part of Marx's theoretical analysis, where he tended to focus 
on its relations with the material economic structures of society, however, his work was to 
inspire both Antonio Gramsci and Jürgen Habermas on their readings of a more positive role 
for civil society from which most of the contemporary work today tends to draw from for 
theoretical consistency (see Edwards 2009, p8-9). Apart from a few exceptions in the 17
th
 
century, civil society has always been seen as one half of the state/civil society dualism. The 
emergence of Marxian inspired Critical Theory, however, created another category to which 
civil society must counter; captialist economic relations (Chambers 2002, p90).  
 
Gramsci moved away from the dualism created by Marx between civil society and the state, 
towards a tripartite structure that involved the realm of civil society as juxtaposed against both 
the state and the market. Gramsci took Marx's critique of civil society as the realm of culture 
                                                 
40
 Hegel made a distinction in his work between the family and the state, whereby civil society operated between     
them both. The family produced humans imbued with love and altruism, whilst civil society allowed for 
individuals to follow their self interest and individual desires, albeit within the rules and laws established by the 
state as representing public authority and objective rationality (Parekh 2004, p17). 
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and ideology through which the state can command 'hegemony'
41
 through a mixture of 
coercion and consent, but recognised that there was potential within this sphere because civil 
society could also be the locus through which a form of counter-hegemony could be 
constructed thus to resist state and economic spheres that Marx argued was the inevitable 
folding of historical dominance (see Bobbio 1979, Texia 1979 Gramsci 2005, chp 2).  
 
Habermas in a similar perspective created an optimistic reading of civil society through 
combining a Marxist concern for exposing and eradicating sources of domination within civil 
society, with the Kantian belief in the possibility of finding sources of authentic autonomy
42
 
from which civil society can emerge as an emancipatory realm free from the exclusionary 
logics of power operating from the ‗system‘; the state and the market (Habermas 1990, 1993, 
1996).  
 
It is this understanding of civil society that informs the liberal and critical project of 
cosmopolitan democracy, as an autonomous ‗third sphere‘ that can be utilised as a normative 
critique of the exclusionary logics of the state and market. Despite this commonality, both 
projects have important conceptual differences that have implications for their views of 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
The liberal dimension tends to draw upon an ideal of civil society described by Edwards as 
‗the Good Society‘; an autonomous sphere imbued with strong normative values of tolerance, 
non-discrimination, non-violence, trust, cooperation, freedom and democracy (2004, p38). 
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 Hegemony in the original Gramscian sense can be defined as ―the ability of one class to articulate the interest 
of other social groups to its own‖ (Mouffe 1979, p183).  
42
 Kant argued that public reason was attainable within civil society as 'unprejudiced thinking' and able to offer 
reflective judgement according to his categorical imperative (Bohman 1997 p185) 
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From the perspective of cosmopolitan democracy advocates, these values are deemed missing 
in global politics, and are in fact essential in order to ‗tame‘ the expansionary economic 
practices that do tend to proliferate global networks and undermine democratic collective 
control.
43
 As stated previously, there is a strong Kantian bias here that leans towards 
monological constructions of the good life, where civil society is seen as a vehicle to channel 
these progressive ideals. In contrast to civil society as ‗Associational Life‘ and ‗the Good 
Society‘, the critical dimension tends to draw upon an ideal of civil society situated within the 
‗Public Sphere‘ (Edwards 2004). It is this idealisation of civil society that arguably provides 
the most inclusive and democratically legitimate building blocks to the project of 
cosmopolitan democracy. 
 
As stated previously, the critical dimension accepts that ―civil society is the cornerstone of 
democracy. Without an effective civil society capable of channelling citizen debates over 
diverse ideas and conflicting interests, the state drifts away from its subjects‖ (Castells 2008, 
p78). Civil society represents a ‗solidarity sphere‘ where communicative coordinating 
mechanisms are located that can effectively challenge the instrumental systemic practices and 
steering mechanisms of the state and market. Civil society thus can effectively represent the 
public sphere;  
 
―the arena for argument and deliberation as well as for association and 
institutional collaboration: a non-legislative, extra-judicial, public space in which 
societal differences, social problems, public policy, government action and 
matters of community and cultural identity are developed and debated‖ (Edwards 
2004, p55).  
 
As stated previously, the reflexive notion of democracy in its deliberative form relies upon a 
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   This is discussed further on p67 and includes a variety of perspectives on taming economic globalisation 
from Falk‘s ‗humane governance‘ to Held‘s ‗social covenant‘  
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strong civil society that nurtures communicative forms of power in order to influence 
administrative power that typically embody state and market governance mechanisms.
44
 This 
is different in conceptual understanding to both the liberal and neoliberal readings of civil 
society as ‗associational life‘, through the way it problematises the economy as an unreflexive 
steering mechanism that exudes an instrumental rationality that can be damaging to the 
lifeworld
45
, whilst its link with deliberation circumvents the liberal cosmopolitan problems 
with monological norms construction on the ‗good society‘. Before delving further into the 
link between democratic inclusion and the public sphere as articulated by the critical project, 
it is worth discussing how both the liberal and critical cosmopolitan projects have drawn upon 
a globalised understanding of civil society in order to supplement their projects for global 
democracy.   
 
How has the ideal of civil society become incorporated within these cosmopolitan projects?
46
 
An increasing literature on the emergence of a nascent form of GCS has attracted these 
scholars towards the possibility of reconciling the local spaces of citizen participation with the 
unaccountable global structures of governance. The normative dimension inherent within this 
vision of civil society, drawn upon by the cosmopolitan democratic project, is seen to contain 
the potential to ‗reclaim‘ the exclusive dimensions of neoliberal globalisation through 
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   The link between deliberation, the public sphere and civil society as articulated by Habermas and his 
contemporaries working on global deliberative frameworks is discussed in further detail on p83-98 
45
   See p93-95  
46
 It is important to note here that this thesis is specifically interrogating the usage of civil society from the 
cosmopolitan democratic perspective and therefore the work on global civil society emanating directly from 
the work of Gramsci is not discussed within the thesis. It is interesting in the way that the 'neo-Gramscians' 
parallel much of the cosmopolitan literature in their formulation of a third sphere that aims to resist  
neoliberal forms of governance much in the same way that the cosmopolitan project does. The difference, 
however, lies in the way that for the neo-Gramscians, global civil society is specifically the vehicle from 
which to end class exploitation, for the cosmopolitans the extension of democracy into governance structures 
is the primary goal, which is argued to then undermine the exclusivity of neoliberalism as a by-product. It is 
this concern with democracy and global governance that frames the thesis, however, for an interesting 
discussion on neo-Gramscian understandings and problematisations of global civil society see for example; 
Amoore and Langley (2004) Cox (1999), Ford (2003), Germain and Kenny (1998, 2005), Rupert (1998) 
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promoting democratic citizen control. 
 
There is a wealth of controversy trying to pinpoint where to situate thinking of GCS when 
there clearly is no global state to which we can delve into the debates of old surrounding civil 
society, to this end the usage of GCS is a complex one that has drawn from a variety of 
theoretical standpoints to debate not only the existence of such a term but also its role in 
global politics. Lipschutz argues that theorising over GCS has always been a bit of an 
'epistemological free-for-all'; even the classical theorists associated with civil society have 
failed to produce a consistent agreement, thus raising questions about the difficulty of 
agreement when we discuss the globalising of civil society (2005, p171). O'Brien (2005) and 
Scholte (2000b) argue that GCS is essentially any civic action that involves one or more of 
the following: addressing transworld issues, engaging in transborder communication, 
containing a global organisation, or forming a type of supraterritorial solidarity (Scholte 
2000b, p80; O'Brien 2005, p214). 
 
Discussions of GCS suggest that the concept can be positioned descriptively by the 
identification of a new growth in transnational actors and greater prominence to their effects 
on political reality, and secondly, normatively by prescribing a global future that involves a 
greater shaping of global governance through civic forces than the present dominance of 
state/market collaboration (Falk 2005, p69). The descriptive dimension contains those authors 
who have consciously attempted to avoid a normative bias in their analysis of GCS and 
instead incorporate a more descriptive/explanatory method. This approach allows them to test 
the globality of civil society, often through empirical analysis, and avoiding turning GCS into 
an 'ethical promise' (See Keane 2003 Anheier and Themudo 2002, Colas 2002, 2005, Keck 
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and Sikkink 1998, Chandler 2005). Stone argues that the literature advocating the 
democratisation of global governance such as the cosmopolitan democratic project and even 
the (critical) turn towards deliberation, tends to focus on what should be rather than what is; 
thus to put the (normative) cart before the (conceptual) horse (2009, p64)
47
. In contrast the 
normatively orientated cosmopolitan democratic project avoids relying upon the empirical 
globality of GCS and instead demonstrates its utility as 'a project to be realised' through its 
normative goals of expanding democracy and participation on a global (spatial) scale 
(Chandler, 2005, p17).  
 
This approach views GCS as a response to the perceived democratic deficit and problems of 
accountability in global governance structures; a normative shift from the older conceptions 
of international relations as primarily concerned with survival
48
 (relegating normative 
questions of the 'good life' to the domestic sphere) to an acceptance that non-state actors are 
introducing normative issues to the global sphere, no longer constrained by domestic 
boundaries (Chandler 2004, p3). This is of course more of a description of the liberal 
dimension of cosmopolitan democracy with its strong Kantian emphasis on the ‗good 
society‘. Baker and Chandler (2005) summarise the normative dimension of GCS as having 
three core aims; to extend the notion of political community beyond the nation-state, to re-
emphasize human agency in the face of economic determinism under the rubric of neoliberal 
globalisation, and to extend/deepen the notion of democracy and democratic participation 
through inclusive spaces such as deliberative forums. These three criteria represent the 
foundations of the cosmopolitan democratic project, however, though within each project 
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 Colas argues that even the attempted neutral position advocated by the editors of the London School of 
Economics' Global Civil Society yearbooks ―reproduce certain core liberal values including pluralism, non-
violent contestation, dialogue and debate through global civil society‖ (Colas 2005, p18).  
48
 For example the classic state-centric survival perspective of realist scholars in the discipline of International 
Relations (see Morgenthau 2005, Waltz 2001, Mearschemier 2001)  
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there is a discrepancy between which of the three are prioritised.
49
 
 
Previous discussions on the neoliberal underpinnings of civil society, drawing upon the 
associational approach, tend to lack this normative dimension in its idealisation of GCS, this 
is apparent within policy making circles where the neutral and pluralistic reading of civil 
society is key, indeed as Amoore and Langley note:  
 ―The policy prescriptions and commentaries of the principle international 
organisations have tended to treat GCS as a neutral category, populated in a 
pluralistic fashion by voluntary organisations, thereby depoliticising its 
significance in governing global political economy. By contrast academic 
discussion in IR/IPE has tended to assert the transformative potential of GCS, 
particularly in terms of groups to defy neoliberalism and democratise global 
governance‖ (2004, p90). 
 
The normative idealisation of a civil society that operates as a critique of neoliberal practices 
and as a vehicle to democratise global governance is in direct contrast to the depoliticised 
formation of civil society under the associational approach. Despite both strands of 
cosmopolitan democracy sharing this strong critique of neoliberalism in their global 
democracy projects involving CSOs, the former lacks the reflexive notion of democracy 
under a deliberative framework and thus its critique of neoliberal practices falls into liberal 
justice arguments that remain problematic from a Habermasian inspired understanding of 
intersubjectivity.
50
  
 
One of the key questions that needs to be addressed here, is what concrete CSO practices can 
the cosmopolitan project claim to draw upon when it extrapolates its theoretical understanding 
                                                 
49
 For example the third criterion, deliberation is used almost entirely by the critical dimension of  the 
cosmopolitan democratic project, albeit the increasingly liberal work of David Held draws upon it at times, 
this is a point that is returned to later within the chapter.  
50
   This point will be made more apparent when a thorough analysis is undertaken of both models of 
cosmopolitan democracy on p67-111 
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of civil society to the ‗global‘ level?  According to its advocates, the permeation of non-state 
actors across borders and the increasing influence they are beginning to herald within the 
global structures of governance, warrant enough evidence to be described as ‗global‘ and 
contain the potential for fulfilling the democratising role idealised under their frameworks. 
This definition of the global that I will use here is again a spatial rather than geographical 
distinction (see Wapner 1995; Friedman, Hochstetler and Clark 2005). Some authors 
purposely use the term transnational civil society, over global civil society, because of the 
associated problems with under-representation and the unequal concentration of civil society 
globally (see Florini 2000). The cosmopolitan democratic project semantically shifts between 
usages of transnational/global forms of civil society, yet tends to emphasize the spatial 
distinction and concentrates upon the notion of a project to be realised, against counter-claims 
of under-representation. In this respect unless otherwise stated I will assume transnational and 
global under semantic similarity as the spatial transcendence of the nation-state. 
 
The wealth of literature on the subject of global civil society seems to have emerged around 
the 1990s, though its practices long pre-date this modern scholarly interest
51
. Often within this 
literature there is a heavy bias towards Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as the 
vehicles for civil society
52
. The influential John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector 
Project defines NGOs as being private (in that they are separate from the state), non-profit 
(not aiming to provide returns to the owners), self-governing and voluntary (Salamon et al 
1999). This categorisation does, however, run into the problem of defining those NGOs that 
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  Note for instance the global role of religion, catholic missionaries or example, or movements to end the slave 
trade in the 19
th
 century (see Florini 2003, p7-10; Keck and Sikkink 1998, chp2) 
52
 The term NGO is still problematised by some authors who prefer to use the term 'civil society organisations' 
(Falk 1998) or 'civic associations' (O'Brien 2005) believing that  the term non-governmental creates a 
hierarchical dualism that privileges the state as a central focus, or that the term non-governmental can 
technically include corporations and market actors.  
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are funded by the state (especially common in post-conflict countries where the NGO sector 
can be heavily donor funded from Western states
53
), this however was recognised when the 
project released its 2004 edition, changing the conception of 'private' to include ―not part of 
the apparatus of the state, even though they may receive support from government sources‖54 
(Salamon and Sokolowski 2004, p8). Alongside this updated notion, the term 'non-profit' has 
shifted towards 'not profit-distributing' to reflect that NGOs operating in a financial capacity 
can use surplus income to be re-invested in the objectives of the organisation, but strictly not 
in the form of profit to shareholders, directors and managers
55
 (Salamon and Sokolowski 
2004, p8).  
 
The term NGO is used in a variety of ways that are at times complex and contradictory, 
reflecting the particular ideological standpoint of the author. They can be defined through 
their 'public interest' basis which is often taken at times to stand in for (universal) 
'humanitarian interests' and imbued with a moral sense of purpose, whilst at the other scale 
they can be seen as promoting (particular) specific interests through professional and efficient 
organisational structures
56
 (Hirsch 2002, p197).  
 
NGOs are often prioritised as the representatives of civil society in cosmopolitan frameworks 
because of their potential for acting in global capacity, and being able to globalise domestic 
issues through a form of representation and participation of those voices often marginalised, 
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  See chapter two.  
54
  For example the prefix 'non' is taken by most to mean outside somehow of the state apparatus, yet within the 
literature one can find examples of QUANGOs (Quasi-non-governmental-organisations) and GONGOs 
(government-organised-non-governmental organisations) demonstrating the ways in which NGOs can be 
partnered or even funded  by governments (Hirsch 2002, p197). 
55
 This is popular within the microfinance industry where NGOs often make a financial return on their loans to 
the poor, and reinvest according to their social missions.  This point is discussed further in Chapter Three.  
56
 These NGOs promoting specific interests through professional structures are often characteristic of neoliberal 
interpretations, the focus of chapter two.  
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or subordinated, in formal political channels. NGOs in their transnational capacity have 
exploded onto the global scene in the last few decades (Boli and Thomas 1999; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Cohen and Rai 2000;  Florini 2000;  Higgot, Underhill, and Bieler 2000;  
Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Milner and Moravcsik 2009). NGOs have carved out spaces for 
participation at key UN conferences
57
 (Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Clark Friedman and 
Hochstetler 1998; Pianta 2005) and the key Multilateral Economic Institutions (MEIs) such as 
the World Bank (Clark, Fox and Treakle 2003; Nelson 2000), the IMF (Scholte 1998, 2002) 
and the WTO (Scholte, O'Brien and Williams 1998). 
 
It should be noted here that alongside the term NGO various authors privilege social 
movements as an important dimension of civil society, defined ―as incoherent democratic 
struggles that are not homogeneous but internally fragmented, yet aiming to promote the 
voices of the subaltern and marginalised‖ (Fernando 2006, p10). These more informal 
mobilisations equated with social activists have become a presence on the global stage in the 
last few decades, from the anti-authoritarian movements in Eastern Europe and South 
America in the 1970s, to the 'new' social movements that emerged focusing on issues such as 
gender, the environment, human rights and peace, representing a new collective form of 
expression about the very 'grammar' of our forms of life (Habermas 1981, p33). These new 
social movements are often seen in self-defence of society against the exclusive logics of the 
state and market economy and involve ―a reflexive relation to the objective, subjective, and 
social worlds insofar as they thematize issues of personal and social identity, contest the social 
interpretation of norms, communicatively create and agree on new ones, and propose 
alternative ways of relating to the environment‖ (Cohen 1985, p708).   
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 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm in 1972 represented for many 
commentators the start of an 'unprecedented' inclusion of NGOs (Willetts 1996, p57) 
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At the beginning of this decade there has been an increase in attention to the spontaneous 
protests and mobilisations as part of an anti-neoliberal agenda, culminating in global protests 
at economic summits such as Seattle, Prague and Genoa. For some, the emergence of these 
social movements represent 'transnational advocacy networks' where activists can put 
pressure on governments to effect policy changes (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The presence of 
social movements on the global scene has led to the institutionalisation of organisations such 
as the World Social Forum (WSF)
58
 where activists and NGOs can make their presence heard 
in response to the perceived inaccessibility of the formal global apparatus of governance. 
Various authors tend to equate social movements that cross borders and operate outside of the 
state such as 'Transnational Social Movement Organisations (Risse-Kappen 1995; Smith, 
Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999; Florini 2000; Khagram, Riker and 
Sikkink 2002) and ‗Global Social Change Organisations' (Maclean 2003) with those 
International NGOs that normatively address humanitarian issues. I will attempt to use the 
umbrella term Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to include all of these organisational forms, 
and when appropriate, refer to their individual components. 
 
These examples are utilised from the cosmopolitan perspective, to demonstrate the capacity of 
CSOs to expand citizen participation from the local to the global and therefore the potential to 
democratise global governance. Scholte (2001) recognises that despite the myriad of 
examples available of the positive impact of CSOs within contemporary structures of global 
governance, very few authors analyse this through the lens of democratic potential.
 
The 
                                                 
58
 The WSF formed in Brazil in 2001, as a rival to the exclusive World Economic Forum (WEF) held annually 
at Davos. It aims to be an inclusive space for a variety of activists and NGOs that can come together in an 
open environment to discuss alternatives to the perceived neoliberal strategies at the WEF. Due to its 
popularity it has spawned a variety of regional social forums and attracts thousands of activists each year.  
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cosmopolitan democratic project engages with this very notion and relies upon the emergence 
of CSOs as the legitimising force required to create a truly inclusive global democratic 
governance project able to remedy the contemporary democratic deficit and 'reclaim' 
globalisation from the exclusionary neoliberal dimension. 
 
CSOs within the cosmopolitan democratic project are perceived to increase three aspects of 
democratic legitimacy; input-, throughput- and output legitimacy in an effort to remedy the 
democratic deficit.  Input-orientated legitimacy tends to be associated with the ideal of 
'governance by the people', therefore to privilege the quality of representation, opportunities 
for participation, and the openness of agenda-setting processes. Throughput-orientated 
legitimacy specifically focuses on the quality of the decision making process itself, thus to 
assess the role undertaken by participants. Finally, output-orientated legitimacy is concerned 
with the intended/unintended effects of 'governance for the people' hence the need to measure 
the performance, effectiveness and efficiency of decisions to ensure the legitimacy of 
constructed policies (see Scharpf 1998; Bekkers, Dijkstra, Edwards and Fenger 2007).  
 
Both the liberal and the critical strands of cosmopolitan democracy implicitly invoke these 
three questions surrounding democratic legitimacy, however, as will become apparent, the 
liberal dimension of cosmopolitanism tends to prioritise input-orientated legitimacy through 
its normative framework of inclusion by focusing on the ability for non-state actors to have 
greater levels of access and opportunities to participate within the structures of global 
governance. There is an attempt to shift focus towards questions of the actual decision making 
processes themselves, however, they remain largely vague and under-theorised. The more 
critical orientated strands tend to privilege the second dimension arguing that access, 
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representation, and participation for non-state actors is not enough to supplant the democratic 
deficit, genuine inclusion can only occur when certain criteria are established to measure 
legitimacy within deliberative engagement and the output of decision -making policies. 
 
This chapter will now turn towards the frameworks constructed by both the liberal and critical 
dimensions to demonstrate the differences between them and they way they incorporate CSOs 
within them; for the liberal project this tends to focus upon greater representation; a numerical 
form of inclusion within new democratic frameworks to control the spread of unregulated 
market forces. The critical dimension, however, attempts to interrogate exclusion and 
domination present within existing structures to analyse the potential for CSOs to expose and 
eradicate these forms through the construction of deliberative global public spheres. 
 
1.2The Liberal Cosmopolitan Democratic Project 
 
1.2.1 Introduction 
Discussions on Cosmopolitan Democracy often centre around a specific project formulated in 
the 1990s and associated with the work of David Held and Danielle Archibugi  and their 
reform proposals for the contemporary United Nations system  (Held 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002, 
2004, 2005, 2006; Archibugi 1995, 2004, 2008; Archibugi and Held 1995; Archibugi, Held 
and Koehler 1998, Held et al 1999) yet authors such as Richard Falk (1995, 1998, 2000, 
2005a, 2005b, 2008), Johan Galtung (1995, 2000) and Andrew Kuper (2004) have also 
constructed similar projects involving reformation of the UN system involving predominantly 
NGOs at the heart of a global democratic project. These proposals are imbued with a fusion of 
liberal principles and the radical democratic inclusion of voices in global governance 
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frameworks; the aim is to achieve what Falk labels ‗humane governance‘ (Falk 1995).  
 
This global project does not entail the collapse of the nation-state or its subsuming under a 
federal system, or even a world government, it is instead a new framework that attempts to 
diminish somewhat the role of the state to enable the voice of the citizen to be heard in the 
formation of transnational issues. At its most basic level, Cosmopolitan democracy proposes 
to construct a vibrant democratic society that is within, among and beyond the state system 
(Archibugi 2004, p438). The UN is privileged within these frameworks because it contains 
the potential to oversee this form of democratisation at the global level and is seen as the only 
actor ―with the authority to mediate among states and the scope to represent a point of 
reference for civil society‖ (Archibugi, Balduini and Donati 2000, p128). Democratic reform 
of the UN has often been rendered problematic; in 1996, UN Secretary General Boutros-
Boutros Ghali wrote an agenda for democratisation with the aim of major institutional reform 
including strengthening NGO representation at Economic and Social Council, the 
International Court of Justice, and an expanded UN Security Council (see Boutrous-Ghali 
2000). The proposals, however, were toned down by the incoming UN Secretary General Kofi 
Anan and the democratic element sidelined (Falk 1998, 2000; Archibugi, Balduini and Donati 
2000). The cosmopolitan democratic project see itself as attempting to add weight to this call 
for democratisation through offering further concrete proposals rather than abstract utopian 
frameworks.  
 
In one of the first attempts to establish the workings of a cosmopolitan model of democracy, 
Held (1995, p279-280) outlines a variety of short term and long term strategies to be pursued 
in order to achieve a more inclusive and fair system of global governance. Under political 
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reform, Held advocates the restructuring of the UN Security Council (UNSC) into a more 
inclusive structure that gives developing countries a stronger say in the decision-making 
processes, and scraps the veto that dominates the UNSC
59
 to be replaced by a near-consensus 
principle to allow for 'balance of voices' (Held 1995, p279,  2004, p,152)
60
. Secondly the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) would focus on issues of global importance such as poverty, the 
environment, global warming, and the reduction of WMDs instead of the more traditional 
security concerns and would be accompanied by the establishment of an Economic and Social 
Security Council in order to coordinate poverty reduction and global development policies, 
and a specific environmental IGO to coordinate multilateral approaches to sustainable 
ecology (Held 2004). Archibugi advocates the development of an expanded World 
Parliamentary Assembly (WPA) that aims at direct citizen elections to the UN, in order to 
advise the UNGA and SC, though without holding the executive power bestowed on these 
organisations. The WPA's role could be to decide upon matters of humanitarian intervention, 
debate boundary disputes, and identify the best methods of dispute resolution among cross-
border communities (Archibugi 2008, p172-173). The political environment of the UN system 
would effectively be used to regulate the economic environment and tame the unfettered 
spread of neoliberal market forces, according to Held: 
 
A bridge has to built...between international economic law and human rights law, 
between commercial law and environmental law, between state sovereignty and 
transnational law, and between cosmopolitan principles and cosmopolitan 
practices (Held 2004, p155).  
 
The expansion of issue areas on poverty and development at the UNGA and its 
complementary agencies are perceived as ―vital to offset the power and influence of market-
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 Or in Archibugi's recommendation; restrictions on when the veto can be used (2008, p163). 
60
   Held has also added the need to integrate 'credible threshold tests' and minimum conditions for the 
authorising of force from within the UNSC (2004, p148). 
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orientated agencies such as the WTO and IMF‖ (Held 2004, p112). In order to 'tame' 
neoliberal forms of globalisation requires the construction of a 'new coordinating economic 
agency' (Held 1995) or a 'world financial authority' (Held 2004). This has yet to be concretely 
formulated but would involve a greater capacity to regulate the spread of global markets and 
promote a development framework committed to debt cancellation among developing 
countries as well as introducing mandatory global labour and environmental standards (Held 
2004). The United Nations would be at the forefront of ―a new Bretton Woods agreement – an 
agreement which would tie investment, production and trade to the conditions and processes 
of democracy‖ (Held 1995, p256).  
 
Two important questions emerge here; firstly how can we expect states to adhere to these new 
frameworks given the recent historical trend of the dominance of 'power-politics', and 
secondly how can this new framework effectively incorporate the local into the global and 
transcend state-centrism. These two questions are answered through the establishment of a 
holistic 'cosmopolitan democratic law'
 
and the inclusion of non-state actors within 
governance frameworks to create the multi-stakeholder process required to implement the 
substantive content of the cosmopolitan democratic law. 
 
In its basic premise, cosmopolitan democratic law ―creates powers and constraints, and rights 
and duties, which transcend the claims of nation-states and which have far-reaching national 
consequences‖ (Held et al 1999).  This law would reflect the Kantian attempt to establish not 
just a (state) republican constitution
61
, but a 'people's law' that recognises the inviolable right 
of individuals as members of a universal community (Archibugi 2009, p119-121).  Held 
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 Kant's framework of law consisted of three parts, a law of the republic, a law between republics, and a 
cosmopolitan law for individuals as members of humanity (see Kant 2003) 
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defines eight core 'principles' that serve as the guiding ethical basis of cosmopolitan 
democracy and required for the legitimate construction of the cosmopolitan democratic law: 
1. Equal worth and dignity; this is to recognise that humankind belongs to a universal moral 
realm 2. Active agency; humans must have the capacity to self-determine their actions and 
choices 3. Personal responsibility and accountability; differences in choice must not prevent 
others from securing their basic needs 4. Consent; the basis of non-coercive collective 
agreement 5. Collective decision-making about public issues through voting procedures; 
consent must be linked to voting mechanisms of majority rule 6. Inclusiveness and 
subsidiarity; those who stand to be affected by a decision should directly or indirectly have an 
influence in its process 7. Avoidance of serious harm; the key principle of social justice to 
ensure urgent needs are met and that active agency and participation is not compromised 8. 
Sustainability all decisions taken on development must not disrupt ecological balance of the 
environment. These are accordingly categorised into three groups, the first three principles 
represent the ontological condition of cosmopolitanism as privileging an autonomous moral 
individual, the second set (principles 4-6) transfers this individual importance towards 
collective structures and regulatory regimes in order to safeguard the inherent autonomy of 
the individual. The final principles are to establish a moral framework that secures urgent 
needs and resource conservation, i.e. to ensure ecological balance and sustainable resources 
are prioritised whilst ensuring that the most vulnerable in society are imbued with the material 
capacity for them to act autonomously (Held 2004, p170-178; 2009, p538-539). Held's 
principles closely echo the Kantian conception of cosmopolitan law, defined as 'universal 
hospitality', though Held has gone further to attempt to institutionalise these values through a 
concrete legal structure that would define relations of global governance (see Held 1995, 
p226-233; Heater 2002, chp 4) 
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1.2.2 Cosmopolitan democracy and the participation of civil society 
 
In order for the substantive content of this cosmopolitan democratic law to be constructed in 
an inclusive environment, Held turns towards the importance of multi-stakeholder approaches 
and argues that the UNGA would only be legitimate when its policy consensus building 
involves a 'global constitutional convention' of states; IGOs, INGOs, citizens groups and 
social movements. 
 
Implicit here is the acknowledgement that the global cannot be adequately democratised 
without the inclusion of the local; citizens‘ voices are integral to the new cosmopolitan 
agenda. Held recognises that the promises of political globalisation bring the emergence of 
'new' voices of a 'transnational civil society' (1999, p108) that whilst creating new forms of 
public life within the debating and framing of global issues, also contain the potential to 
establish new methods of holding ―transnational power systems to account‖ (Held 1999, 
p108). The emergence of a nascent ‗global public opinion‘ stemming from a multitude of 
social movements, are said to represent the foundations of a truly inclusive cosmopolitan 
order that requires not just the safeguarding in international institutions but the nurturing of 
civil society from opinion shaping to more direct voices on policy frameworks within these 
institutions (Archibugi 2004). 
 
One of Held's most recent ideas for the direct role of NGOs within his cosmopolitan 
framework is for the creation of Global Issue Networks (GINs)
62
 that are designed to 
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 The idea originates from the work of former World Bank Vice-President for Europe, Jean-Francois Rischard 
(see Rischard 2002).  
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investigate specific global problems and search for solutions. These networks would be 
comprised of members from governments, businesses and international CSOs thus 
representative of a multi-stakeholder approach to governance. In the short term GINS will 
formulate policy recommendations and report to the key UN institutions, however, their role 
could increase in the long term as 'rating agencies' engaging in the naming and shaming of 
domestic governments that are not adhering to the policy prescriptions (Held 2005, p254-
258).  
 
It is important to note that within this framework the 'business' actors are far removed from 
those in operation today in global politics. In order to make them more 'public interest' and 
align them closely with INGOs, Held advocates a deeper embedding of cosmopolitan 
principles within the organisations themselves. Trans-national Companies (TNCs) are 
expected to integrate the core cosmopolitan framework within their articles of association to 
effectively internalise social justice through respecting employees as free and equal, having 
access to learning and welfare schemes as well as a greater level of access to the decision-
making opportunities within these organisations (1995, p251-253). This call for corporate 
responsibility goes further than Kofi Annan's  Global Compact
63
 because of the 
institutionalisation within the modus operandi of economic organisations, effectively a form 
of global compact 'with teeth' (Held 2004, p155). Archibugi explicitly privileges the role of 
'global civil society' through the creation of new permanent global institutions to oversee 
specific issues, such as the environment, development and disarmament, or tasked with the 
observation of human rights (2008, p112). His  proposals for the actual role of NGOs as the 
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 The Global Compact attempts to align the objectives of the international community and those of the 
business world, involving an established list of ten principles that TNCs should adhere to in order to promote 
corporate social responsibility. For a list of these principles and more information see 
www.globalcompact.org 
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formal representatives of civil society are quite vague,  though he  argues that they need to be 
'reinforced' and 'formalised' within the permanent institutions of the UN, citing that perhaps a 
separate assembly of 6,000 recognised NGOs may be one such solution (2008, p176-177). 
 
Johan Galtung
64
 (1995, 2000) takes a slightly different approach to the cosmopolitan 
democratic project through the construction of a 'World Central Authority', based upon three 
UN organs; the existing United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and two separate 
chambers to be constructed under this, the United Nations People‘s Assembly (UNPA) and the 
United Nations Corporate Assembly (UNCA). This tripartite structure would ideally over time 
shift in executive power from the UNGA to the UNPA, as the people‘s parliament become the 
democratic global voice of legitimacy.  One of his project ideas is a new reformulation of the 
UN system to include a more inclusive role for the consultation of 'International People's 
Organisations' (IPOs)
65
 as a counterweight to the low accountability and economistic culture 
of TNCs, through the establishment of a 'World Assembly of IPOs' similar to the Conference 
of Non-Governmental Organisations (CONGO) existing today thus acting in consultative 
capacity (1995, p207-8). Galtung recognises that global democratisation requires the 
strengthening of civil society because unlike the state and the market it is the only site of 
power that reflects the very foundations of democracy; ―moral power, legitimacy and 
decision-making‖ (1995, p202).  Civil society under this model is promoted as a legitimate 
form of governance that privileges empowered citizens rather than market consumers and in 
order to be an important force for inclusion and democracy, there is a need to expand the 
restricted accreditation policies in place today to allow a greater variety to engage in a more 
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 Galtung has written extensively in the field of peace studies, and whilst most of his early work was focused 
on elaborating a critique of imperialist world systems from a Marxist conception, he has recently moved 
towards a more moral cosmopolitan position in his attempt to find post-Westphalian democratic reform based 
upon a utopian reading of the extension of liberal humanitarian values (See Lawler 1995) 
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 Essentially a preferred term for NGOs (Galtung, 1995, p215).  
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open and fair structure (Galtung 2000, p155).  
 
Richard Falk attempts to reformulate the UN system in line with a form of cosmopolitan 
democracy that represents a departure from the work of Held, Archibugi and Galtung through 
a critique of their projects for remaining too close to the principles of Westphalia and not 
pushing further ahead with the de-centring of the state in global democratic governance. 
Instead, Falk focuses squarely on the drive of 'globalisation from below'
66
; GCS as the 
democratising force to bring greater levels of democratisation, participation, accountability, 
transparency and autonomy to these institutions
67
  (1995, 2005a, 2005b). The role of GCS 
then in its humane, progressive and moral form, is to inject greater levels of substantive 
democracy, as opposed to constitutional democracy in order to challenge the 'moral emptiness' 
of neoliberal globalisation (Falk 2000, p171). This form of 'humane governance' represents 
the building of frameworks that firstly protect and nurture the full realisation of human rights, 
whilst extending democratic participation into spheres previously dominated by political and 
economic actors (1995, p125). The linking of GCS within this ethical framework is seen as a 
form of 'compassionate globalism' (Falk 1995, p212).  
 
Falk is critical of contemporary reform proposals at the UN for essentially reaffirming its 
statist dimension, and argues that the 'rudimentary glimmering of civil society' that has 
become influential in recent UN summits and conferences
 
needs to be nurtured and protected 
through an appeal to democratic structures promoting the values of ―peace, economic well-
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 Also known as 'moral globalisation' (Falk 2008, p31) and seen as a challenge to 'globalisation from above' in 
order to avoid the 'unhealthy predominance of influence' that business and finance have at decision-making 
levels beyond the state (Falk 2000, p164).  
67
 This normative role of civil society is privileged as a form of 'civic globalisation' that not only directly 
counters what he calls 'corporate globalisation' but can construct a truly participatory form of global 
governance (2005b) 
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being, social and political justice, and environmental quality‖ (1998, p323-4).  In order to 
successfully institutionalise these actors, there needs to be a 'global democratic forum' in the 
form of a weak assembly that can consider issues of environmental standards and economic 
justice, eventually forming a democratic oversight over the core IEOs of the IMF, WTO and 
World Bank (Falk and Strauss 2003, p15). Within this forum, civil society actors and 
businesses could work together to further the cosmopolitan principles required for a more just 
cosmopolitan democratic order, eventually they may be able to establish formal powers 
alongside the UNGA and form a ―bicameral world legislative‖ (Falk and Strauss 2003, p18). 
Furthermore, and in a more ambitious tone, the construction of this 'global democratic forum' 
could help to construct a more inclusive form of UNGA into a Global People's Assembly 
(GPA) where citizens would become vote-holders rather than states (See Falk and Strauss 
2000).  It is noticeable here that in a similar gesture to Held, Falk allows businesses into this 
post-Westphalian framework, but assumed to be tamed through their inclusion alongside civil 
society. For Falk there is a dualism growing at the heart of contemporary global politics, 
between two sets of equally opposed actors; TNCs and their business allies who further the 
neoliberal agenda of profit, capital and trade, and INGOs that represent the marginalised 
through concerns of poverty environmental sustainability and human rights (1998, p320)  The 
rise of non-state actors have created contemporary shifts in governance towards multiple 
layers of authority alongside the state and allowing elements of cosmopolitan principles to 
filter throughout and actively challenge the economic heart of neoliberal globalisation 
(2002b). 
 
The projects outlined so far demonstrate the importance attached to GCS (and in particular, 
NGOs) as a democratising and moral force when they are able to effectively participate within 
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new cosmopolitan structures, whether 'top-down' structures advocated by Held, Archibugi and 
Galtung, or the more 'bottom-up' approach of Falk. Representation here is the key to ensuring 
the input-orientated legitimacy of the democratic project. On this account cosmopolitan 
democracy is seen as more inclusive when NGOs are visible within these frameworks 
effectively undermining the exclusionary nature of the global system. It is worth interrogating 
the second dimension of throughput-orientated legitimacy and the quality of participation that 
the liberal project also alludes to within their frameworks, but as it will be demonstrated this 
analysis tends to be more vague and rendered with a distinctly liberal bias; the effect is to 
expose a layer of exclusion built into this dimension of cosmopolitan democracy 
 
1.2.3 Cosmopolitan democracy and the quality of participation  
 
Andrew Kuper (2004) formulates a theoretical model of 'institutional cosmopolitanism' that 
like Falk, remains deeply sceptical of the way that civil society has been incorporated under 
the 'top down' model of cosmopolitan democracy. He analyses the work of Held, Archibugi 
and Galtung and their attempts to formulate a more inclusive model of the UN through a 
broadening of its institutional format to include a greater number of non-state actors, and 
argues that their work, although imaginative, fails on two accounts. Firstly, all three authors 
tend to reproduce a form of statism/territoriality within their projects and although they 
recognise the supplementary and consultative role for non-state actors, serious questions are 
raised as to the influence that these actors can have within these frameworks. Secondly, they 
all recommend an increase in the size and internal plurality of the United Nations yet this 
numerical extension tends to overlook how non-state actors can ―improve the quality and 
efficiency of process and decision‖ (2004, p162).  
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In response to these shortcomings, Kuper advocates a representative global assembly that 
accepts that ―non-state actors-such as IGOs and NGOs as well as local and regional territorial 
authorities-are sometimes better placed than states to operate decisively over crucial 
functions, and should be formally empowered to do so‖ (2004, p164). Kuper (2004, p166-
168) attempts to remove the territorial preferencing of the contemporary UN general assembly 
to include state and non-state actors in an executive role so long as they meet nine criteria in 
order to 'sieve' good from bad candidates. These criterions include:  
1. The criterion of basicness: ensuring that the actor is concerned with basic human 
interests such as basic human needs and rights. 
2. The criterion of inclusiveness: ensuring that actors within an organisation represent a 
substantial cross-section of society including gender. There is an element of exclusion 
here in that actors representing views ―couched in purely cultural relativist terms 
would not gain entry‖. 
3. The criterion of Distributive Subsidiarity: ensuring that actors reflect a shared global 
interest (otherwise actors' interests could best be served at lower levels of 
governance). 
4. The Criterion of Democratic Control: to ensure that organisations are internally 
democratic through either elections or a system of checks and balances. 
5. The Criterion of Permanence: to ensure that an organisation has a track record of 
successful action, thereby enhancing debate and policymaking . 
6. The Criterion of Non-Deception: to ensure that an organisation is fully transparent and 
accountable in its mission statement and intentions . 
7. The Criterion of Audit: ensuring that an organisation can survive financial scrutiny by 
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both independent private auditors and accountability agencies. 
8. The Criterion of Non-Dependence: ensuring that an organisation receives a multitude 
of funding sources so as not to be entirely dependent upon one source of finance and 
the undue influence this could entail. 
 
Clearly Kuper has attempted to conceptualise a more central and executive role for non-state 
actors in his attempts to reform the exclusionary structures of global governance. There is an 
important recognisable shift in Kuper's formulation of 'institutional cosmopolitanism' that he 
argues separates his work from the previous authors who all establish civil society as an 
homogeneous 'moral' force and therefore privilege civil society as able to solve the 
democratic deficit, simply by being a presence within these new cosmopolitan frameworks. 
These authors tend to focus on the first criteria of democratic legitimacy; input-orientated 
legitimacy, whereas Kuper's model appears to ask questions about the identities of NGOs and 
the consequences for the quality of their participation, through a mechanism of adjudication 
(2004, p166). Despite his criticism of the previous authors, he fails to acknowledge that this 
questioning of the quality of participation is also apparent within the cosmopolitan democratic 
project of Held, who similarly establishes a framework to test the validity of democratic 
decision-making within his project.  
 
Held argues that within his framework of global governance (for example GINs) there must 
be a method to determine the legitimacy of decisions among these multi-stakeholder 
discussions, in effect he argues for a form of deliberation as the form of adjudication
68
. This 
model recognises that ―there can be no adequate specification of equal liberty, rights and vital 
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 The usage of deliberation by Held is rarely commented upon in the cosmopolitan literature and its critics, this 
could be due to its vague application and also to the way that Held's book Models of Democracy only 
introduces a section on deliberation in the third edition (see Held 2006, chp 9).  
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interests without a corresponding institutionalization of 'the public use of reason' in uncoerced 
national and transnational forms of dialogue and debate‖ (Held 2002, p313). Public reason 
and justification of decisions are tied towards the Kantian conception of testing validity 
through open-ended interaction, uncoerced agreement, and impartial judgement. This 'meta-
principle of impartialist reasoning' according to Held, is achieved through participants 
offering normative claims that are defensible from universal rather than particular standpoints, 
in this way he claims that his notion of deliberation is 'not as rigorous' as the Habermasian 
conception
69
  (Held and Patomaki 2006, p118).  
 
Both Kuper and Held ask important questions surrounding the role of decision-making within 
these global democratic structures, and that determine that the simple inclusion of NGOs may 
not in fact be enough to determine the democratic legitimacy required for a more inclusive 
order. Kuper creates a set of criteria to limit which actors can participate within his framework 
in order to determine what he regards as a more legitimate democratic framework, thus to 
increase the quality of democratic decision-making, whilst Held's notion of deliberation 
allows all CSOs within his framework, but the substantive content of their deliberation is to 
be 'guided' through his liberal cosmopolitan principles and therefore limits acceptable 
discourses prior to deliberation. For example Held suggests that decisions within deliberation 
can be subject to the notion of 'reasonable rejection' which he argues could include decisions 
that violate the avoidance of serious harm and the amelioration of urgent need (Held 2002, 
p312). This links to his 7
th
 principle of the avoidance of serious harm; establishing a 
'prioritising commitment' that creates a moral framework for privileging the most vulnerable 
in society, and his 8
th
 principle of sustainability; ecological privileging against damages to 
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 The Habermasian notion of deliberation will be discussed below and serves as the model from which the 
critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy draws from. 
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irreplaceable and non-substitutable resources (2005, p266).  
 
Both Held and Kuper effectively introduce a liberal bias of selectivity into their deliberative 
frameworks, reflecting their intellectual debt to John Rawls in contrast to the deliberative 
project of Jürgen Habermas; in essence they construct frameworks of legitimacy through an 
appeal to monological self-reflection. This attempt to select the criteria of inclusion will be 
returned to below and exposed for being exclusionary and marginalising to those actors not 
conforming to liberal cosmopolitan principles.  
 
The liberal cosmopolitan model offers a variety of projects to democratise global governance, 
and attempts to incorporate the local into the global through the elevation of CSOs in order to 
remedy the democratic deficit. Throughout these models there is an implicit belief that civil 
society can not only bring a more inclusive form of democratic governance, but a moral form 
through the challenging of neoliberal notions of globalisation understood as the spread of 
unregulated markets and unjust economic policies. Within all of these frameworks there is an 
expectation that NGOs can work alongside states and TNCs as a 'taming' force within a more 
inclusive and 'humane' global structure.  
 
1.3 The Critical Cosmopolitan Democratic Project 
 
1.3.1 Introduction 
As stated previously, the liberal literature tends to privilege democratic legitimacy through an 
input-orientated approach, the 'critical' dimension, however, pays particular attention to the 
throughput-orientated approach, and its central concern becomes the role of the actor within 
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participatory mechanisms. The liberal literature tends to privilege an increase in the visibility 
of CSOs within new formalised structures, seen as an inclusive advantage to counter the 
exclusionary practices of contemporary state-centric and market dominated global practices, 
yet the critical literature tends to recognise that elevation into these structures does not 
necessarily guarantee a greater level of participation unless it is combined with a deeper 
integration of democratic values within global governance frameworks. 
 
The critical dimension of cosmopolitan democracy contains a multitude of authors that are 
broadly sympathetic to the notion of expanding democracy beyond the state, though unlike 
the liberal dimension they draw upon the work of the Frankfurt school of 'Critical Theory'
70
 
and particularly the work of Jurgen Habermas, to engage with a dialogical democratic 
structure outside of the state. As will be discussed, this focus on the dialogical interrogation of 
global frameworks, rather than the (liberal) monological construction is more inclusive 
through opening up the substantive content of democratic discourses to an open deliberative 
process, where exclusion is generated within intersubjective dialogue rather than prior to it. 
This approach views civil society as democratic, participatory, inclusive and legitimate when 
it is situated within a 'global public sphere' and that interactions between the agents of global 
governance (whether state, market or civil society) will only produce democratic, 
participatory, inclusive and legitimate outcomes under a process of 'deliberation'
71
 
 
One of the main distinctions between the liberal and the critical understandings of civil 
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 The Frankfurt school of Critical Theory is associated with a plurality of neo-Marxist scholars concerned with 
elevating the humanist work of Marx from his economic determinism in order to expose social sites of 
exclusion and domination thus contributing to a more emancipatory form of politics.  
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 There is an interesting amount of scholarship produced that argues for creating more deliberative space for 
citizens within participatory institutions, however, this has not been included in this chapter because it tends 
to look at localised spaces for citizens, whereas this chapter is concerned at the global dimension where 
citizen participation tends to be equated with civil society for inclusionary strategies, however, for interest 
see Fischer (2006), Goetz and Gaventa (2001), Santos (1998) 
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society is that the liberal position tends to see individual voluntarism as the defining feature; 
whilst for the Critical Theorists it is 'communicative autonomy'. Similarly, liberal notions of 
civil society recognise threats to autonomy as threats to individual choice
72
, whilst Critical 
Theory recognises threats to autonomy as threats to the way interaction is possible 
communicatively (Chambers 2002, p93). This dualism can also be seen through the liberal 
privileging of freedom as non-interference, where an actor can block another's ability to 
choose, versus freedom as non-domination, where an actor can interfere with another actor's 
choice without considering the interests of those affected (Young 2002, p258-259, Petit 1997). 
Taking their theoretical insights from the work of Jurgen Habermas, they have applied his 
notion of communicative action in order to determine the validity/invalidity of contemporary 
global frameworks based on a theory of deliberation. 
 
1.3.2 Deliberation and Communicative Inclusion  
 
The deliberative model of democracy has been at the forefront of discussions in democratic 
theory over the last two decades
73
, arising out of a critique of aggregative notions of 
democracy
74
 for basing democratic legitimacy on a shallow notion of numerical 
representation (producing passive democratic voters) and modes of discussion focused around 
strategic voting and bargaining. In its place, the theory of deliberative democracy attempts to 
go beyond this model by placing the focus of legitimacy on the quality of voice and 
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  Held explicitly links the cosmopolitan democratic project with its liberal dimension ontologically privileging 
the individual as a moral agent that demands equal worth and liberty; democratic self-determination becomes 
the overriding concern to allow the individual to ―make independent choices‖ (2002b, p311). 
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 James Bohman declared that the popularity of deliberation for democratic theory has led to  'the coming age' 
of deliberative democracy (1998)  
74
 Also known as interest group pluralism, the term used to describe contemporary democratic politics centred 
around democratic decision making as the simple aggregation of citizens' preferences, thus creating a 
competitive and strategic ethos among a political elite vying for popular strategies  (see Macpherson 1977, 
Mansbridge 1990). 
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discussion over simple representational voting.  
 
Despite the variety of approaches to deliberative democracy
75
, Elster attempts to stitch a 
commonality among them; primarily they are democratic through a belief in the importance 
of collective decision making including the participation of all who stand to be affected by the 
decision, and deliberative through these participants being committed to the twin values of 
rationality and impartiality with collective decision-making (1998, p8). Furthermore one of 
the most cited definitions of deliberation comes from the work of Joshua Cohen who argues 
that it is ―focused on the common good, requires some form of manifest equality among 
citizens and shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute to the 
formation of a public conception of the common good‖ (1989, p17).  
 
Deliberation is at the heart an inclusionary ideal, allowing those usually marginalised in 
expressing moral dissatisfaction a chance to participate in the negotiation of a genuine moral 
consensus (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). It thus raises the stakes of accountability further 
than procedural and constitutional democracy (including the liberal project of cosmopolitan 
democracy), citizens must give reasons that can be accepted by all those ―who are bound by 
the laws and policies they justify‖ as well as addressing the claims of all those who are 
significantly affected. (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 129) 
 
This brief notion of deliberation allows for a reconsideration of the work of Held and Kuper 
who as noted previously, allude to the dimension of deliberation within their work as a 
dialogical forum where civil society actors can debate on issues of the common good whilst 
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 There are roughly two main historical traces of deliberative theory that are influential today often associated 
with either John Rawls (1996, 1999) or Jurgen Habermas (1990, 1991, 1993) though their contemporaries 
have applied these insights in a variety of styles and directions.  
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ensuring that all those affected by the decision get a chance to participate. Their frameworks, 
however, introduce substantive constraints on the issues to be debated, and an a priori 
selective criteria on who is to be included within deliberative processes. The result is a 
leaning towards the Rawlsian notion of deliberation rather than a more Habermasian notion 
that remains deeply critical for the monological self-reflecting construction of these 
boundaries of exclusion (both content of deliberation and access to deliberation).  
 
Both Habermas and Rawls are deeply inspired by Immanuel Kant and the attempt to construct 
legitimate universal moral standpoints within society. The Kantian project of morality 
constructed a belief in the universal obligations of humanity under the categorical 
imperative
76
, as a way of demonstrating that impartial judgement on right and wrong was 
obtainable despite cultural differences (Rehg 2003, p83-85). Rawls in a similar gesture to 
Kant, attempts to formulate a universal theory of 'justice' that can be created impartially and 
acceptable to everyone, his infamous usage of an 'original position' demonstrates a method 
through which universal moral outcomes can be tested and validated (1998, 1999). The 
original position is a hypothetical situation where individuals come together and debate the 
principles of justice without being constrained by 'social forces' (Rawls 1999, p107). In a 
similar vein to Kant, and what separates him from Habermas, is the way in which Rawls 
constructs the 'hypothetical' original position as a monological form of validity testing.  
 
Habermas, however, accepted the criticisms of Kantian cosmopolitanism from Hegel, as a 
monological formulation of morality from a metaphysical method of reasoning that 
determines the rights and obligations of individuals from a priori principles;  'transcendental 
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 ―Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law‖ (Kant cited in O'Neill 1998, p104) 
 
83 
 
deductions of cosmopolitan right' (Fine and Smith 2003, p481).  This was therefore to accuse 
Kant of formulating false notions of universality from the ―totalising accomplishment of the 
transcendental subject‖ (Habermas 1996, p337).  
 
Hegel was critical of the way that an autonomous examination of the human mind could 
supposedly discover universal forms of morality, and instead argued that this failed to respect 
the particularistic moral reasoning attributed to different communities and that moral norms 
produced are constitutive of the community. In Hegelian terms they are nicht hintergehbar; 
there is no going behind them (O'Neill 2000, Rustin 1999, 176)
77
. In response, Habermas 
attempted to weave between the theoretical positions of both Kant and Hegel to construct a 
universal form of morality that was based upon a dialogical method of validation; 
intersubjective communication. According to Hutchings, Kant's formulation of the categorical 
imperative is undertaken by an individual testing his or own maxims to decide the legitimacy 
of moral content,  this is, however, unacceptable for Habermas, who instead advocates the 
testing of moral maxims through an intersubjective procedure that draws upon the universal 
properties of argumentation rather than the self-reflective mind (1996, p75). In essence 
Habermas ―shifts the frame of reference from Kant's solidarity, reflecting, moral 
consciousness to the community of moral subjects in dialogue; and it replaces his Categorical 
Imperative with a procedure of practical argumentation aimed at reaching reasoned agreement 
among those subject to the norms in question‖ (McCarthy 1994, p46).  
 
The work on deliberative democracy that is inspired by Habermas is strongly critical of the 
Rawlsian attempt to formulate universal maxims from an internal a priori validation 
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  This critique heralds the starting point of the communitarian position that denies the universality of moral 
values (see MacIntyre 1984,Taylor 2006, Sandel  1998) 
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mechanism, especially the consequences this has with regard to substantive constraints placed 
upon acceptable dialogue and access within deliberative forums. Rawls places a strong 
emphasis on the idea of the 'reasonable citizen' to ensure that universal maxims constructed 
are legitimate, his work has been criticised for introducing liberal biases within the 
construction of the reasonable citizen, thus those that situate themselves outside of the liberal 
framework of justice are to be excluded as unreasonable (see Mouffe 2005, p41-59). This 
form of reasonableness is tied into his liberal theory of justice and according to Friedman ―by 
excluding from the legitimation pool exactly those persons who do not accept the political 
values and basic tenets on which Rawls grounds political liberalism, Rawls rigs the elections 
in advance‖ (2000 p22).  
 
Dryzek (1994, 2000) is equally critical to the Rawlsian notion of deliberation for its 
contaminated relationship with liberal constitutionalism, whereby deliberation becomes a 
process that exists under the guidance and institutionalisation of liberal principles. Liberal 
notions of deliberation that stem from Rawls are problematic because dialogue is deemed 
authentic when it conforms to a notion of 'public reason' and therefore to a liberal notion of 
justice, this in effect privileges a certain ideal format to be adhered to in deliberative forums 
in order to guarantee an authentic outcome. Essentially the problem with defining authenticity 
in terms of public reason is that it becomes a ―set of commitments that individuals must adopt 
before they enter the public arena, not what they will be induced to discover once they are 
there‖ (Dryzek 2002, p11). Habermas argues that once a normative theory, like Rawls‘ theory 
of justice, strays into more substantive issues, it simply becomes one of many issues that 
contribute to practical discourse for consideration among people (Habermas 1993, p122). 
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The Rawlsian construction of cosmopolitanism clearly lingers within the liberal cosmopolitan 
democratic project, where despite the appeal to deliberation as an 'open' adjudication device 
of legitimacy, there are still liberal obligations emphasized as constraints to access and 
acceptable discourses
.
 As stated above, Kuper tends to privilege access criteria based on 
personal preference inspired by liberal frameworks of justice; his model is therefore arguably 
constructed from a monological self-reflective standpoint.  For example, non-state actors are 
to excluded for being culturally relativist,  not associated with basic human needs,  
unsuccessful (without analysing why this may be so) or those dependent upon a single source 
of funding. These principles are seemingly constructed from a partial viewpoint that is 
representative of the author, and thus can be deemed guilty of a move towards a form of 
Rawlsian selection within the 'original position'
 
through Kuper's liberal self-reflective bias 
posing as a universal set of criteria for inclusion/exclusion strategies. Indeed as Coles argues: 
 
Kuper, like Rawls, decides from on high and completely prior to any engagement 
with all persons involved, not only the content of principles but also the form 
within which their material specificities are to be further deliberated on—that is, 
the logic of the original position and an ethically neutral public reason (Coles 
2003, p21).  
 
Held in a similar way owes a debt to Rawls for his concept of 'reasonable rejection' (Held 
2002b, p312), and as discussed earlier, tends to base the validity of deliberative outcome on 
his cosmopolitan principles to ensure that a 'fair' and 'reasonable' outcome is obtained. This 
Rawlsian inspired framework is recognisable within the work of Gutmann and Thompson 
(1996) whose influential work incorporates a similar embedding of liberal principles through 
ensuring that basic liberty, basic opportunity and fair opportunity are established in order to 
govern the content of deliberation and the outcome of policies (1996, p12). Gutmann and 
Thompson, unlike Habermas, believe that the content of deliberation is just as important as 
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the conditions of deliberation. The inclusion of all discourses under the ideal speech 
situation
78
 is not enough in their eyes to be legitimate and acceptable as potential public 
policies, the shift towards an emphasis on the content of deliberation leads the authors into 
constructing criteria that must be followed during the act of deliberation itself, thus actors 
must also have pre-deliberative intentions, for example:   
 
No matter how earnestly citizens carry on deliberation in the spirit of reciprocity, 
publicity, and accountability, they can realize these ideals only to the extent that 
each citizen has sufficient social and economic standing to meet his or her fellows 
on terms of equal respect (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, p149).  
 
This 'social and economic' standing is left to be decided prior to deliberation, thus creating a 
monological form of inclusion/exclusion at the whim of those constructing the deliberative 
spaces. The liberal understanding of deliberation ultimately creates a layer of exclusion within 
its framework through the a priori construction of the parameters for legitimate deliberation, 
and the guiding of discourses prior to deliberation. This chapter will now turn to the critical 
interpretation before outlining the influence this has had on contemporary cosmopolitan 
democratic projects.  
 
Habermas' dialogic form of argumentation, often known as 'discourse ethics' suggests that in 
an ideal community of communication, participants are autonomous yet embedded in a 
communication context. Discursive agreement depends upon the participant being able to 
independently say yes or no, and the participant being able to overcome his/her egocentric 
viewpoint (Habermas 1993, p202). This relates to what Habermas describes as the 'ideal 
speech situation' a list of criteria to allow for an unrestricted communication community, 
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 A  regulatory principle present within deliberation, see p91 
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stipulated under four basic premises: 1. All subjects with the competence to speak can take 
part in discourse, 2. All assertions are open to challenge, 3. Any assertion may be introduced 
to the discourse, 4. All subjects can express their desires and needs (Habermas 1990, p89). In 
order to ensure the validity of accepted assertions, Habermas argues that the process of 
argumentation must insure ―that all concerned in principle take part, freely and equally, in a 
cooperative search for truth, where nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better 
argument‖ (1990, p198). The force of the better argument holds consensus rather than 
compromise as its goal, therefore 'non-communicative' aspects of language (utterances, 
expressions) cannot help in constructing a rationally motivated agreement, and are therefore 
potentially normatively inappropriate (Habermas 1996, p317-328).
79
 In essence deliberation 
within democracy privileges rational argumentation as the basis of consensus-forming whilst 
displacing the attempts to achieve consensus through either bargaining or voting. 
 
Nancy Fraser agrees that despite the ideal speech situation a seeming utopian ideal, this 
should not reduce its value. Autonomous subjectivity as an ideal can be used as an argument 
against dominating asymmetrical forms of power where communication has been distorted 
(1989, p47). The distortion of communication is extremely important for Habermas and his 
contemporaries who, actively attempt to use the ideal speech situation to expose these 
negative forms of power and domination that marginalise actors within dialogic interaction. 
Communication can be seen as one of a triumvirate of modes of coordination of human life, 
the others being state (administrative)
80
 power and market economies, the latter two being 
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 This is probably one of the most controversial of statements from Habermas among his supporters, who have 
strongly criticised him for exclusionary restrictions to dialogue that he himself had previously labelled at 
Rawls. Criticisms emanating from the so called 'difference democrats' have challenged the exclusivity of 
argumentation and seek to expand it to include rhetoric (Young 1996, p123-4), and testimony (Sanders 1997, 
p346-349). 
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 In essence administrative power is associated with the state through a specific mode of steering that attempts 
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non-discursive modes of coordination that tend to lean towards strategy and domination; the 
antithesis of deliberative democratic outcomes (Habermas 1985 p85-88; Calhoun 1991, p6).  
 
Actions that are coordinated by money/profit and administration are aimed at the ―cognitive-
instrumental organisation of the production of exchange and goods on the basis of monetary 
profit (economy) and the formation of government to reach binding decisions in terms of 
bureaucratic efficiency‖ (Deflem 1996, p5; Fraser 1996, p133). These two modes of 
coordination are further defined as exhibiting 'instrumental rationality', a form of rationality 
that distorts the authenticity of communication among subjects, indeed Dryzek (1994, p4-7) 
offers an interesting discussion as to its relationship with domination: 
 
 1. Instrumental rationality can destroy the more spontaneous, egalitarian and meaningful 
aspects of human association through the administration of technical expertise in the 
service of private profit or political power. 
 2.  Instrumental rationality is seen to be anti-democratic; bureaucratisation involves a 
concentration of power among an administrative elite, it is also considered threatening to 
democracy when individuals acting as automatons and 'calculating machines' can be 
subsumed under totalitarian appeals. 
 3.    Instrumental rationality can lead to the suppression of individuals, creativity and 
forms of artistic expression through the increased dominance of technical experts. 
 4.    Bureaucratisation cannot comprehend complex phenomena and tends to disaggregate 
social problems into its component parts and resolved instrumentally. 
                                                                                                                                                        
to ―assemble, distribute, evaluate and organize‖ (Adorno 2001, p107). Administrative power often residing 
within the bureaucracy of a state, is linked to technical forms of rationality associated with efficiency and 
productivity. It should be noted that when Habermasians discuss civil society as a critique of the state and 
market dominated spaces within governance, it is the steering mechanisms that arise from these institutions 
rather than the institutions themselves that are the focus of critique.  
89 
 
  
This instrumental mode of reasoning stems from egocentric calculations of utility based upon 
differing interest groups rather than attempting to reach an understanding through 
intersubjective dialogue (Habermas 1985, p101). Habermas places the two forms of 
rationality (communicative/instrumental) into two realms;  the 'lifeworld' and the 'system', and 
argues that under the conditions of capitalist modernity
81
 the lifeworld is becoming 'colonised' 
by the system through an increasing penetration of market logic in contemporary society, and 
the increasing bureaucratisation of the state. Habermas describes the ‗system‘ as a form of 
network society where social relations of exchange and interaction are undertaken through 
market and administrative based decisions of instrumental rationality, whilst the lifeworld 
operates at the opposite end of this spectrum; a social form of interaction ―based on mutual 
understanding, intersubjectively shared norms and collective values‖ (Habermas 2001, p82).  
 
Habermas‘ predecessors, Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, analysed the penetration of 
systemic rationality through the reification
82
 of economic and political systems on the subject, 
arguing that the result was immense damage to human behaviour, needs and instinct. In 
response to the perceived closure of the subject through a ‗false objectivity‘ (Adorno 1983, 
p190) there was little offered as a counteraction within their work other than critical 
expressions found within the form of art, the only site which seems to be able to avoid the 
extension of systemic modernity (Habermas 2001, p141). Habermas was in agreement with 
the way in which modernity can be seen to extend the logics of bureaucratisation and the 
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 The First generation of Frankfurt School authors such as Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, tended to 
equate modernity with the rise of industrial capitalism and its commodification of the subject (see Adorno 
and Horkheimer 1997). This was echoed by the work of Herbert Marcuse and his notion that economistic 
rationality was constructing society alongside the lines of 'one dimensional man' (2002). Habermas is equally 
as critical of modernity, however, he depicts it as an 'unfinished project'; the colonising tendencies of the 
system can be challenged through communicative practices present within the lifeworld (see Habermas 1990)  
82
 Reification is conceived by Adorno as ―the progressive monetarization and bureaucratisation of a society's 
infrastructure‖ (Baxter 1985, p39).  
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market into our collective social domain, and that its promotion and reification of 
‗instrumental rationality‘ seeks to eradicate any form of intrinsic counterforce rooted within 
the concept of rationality itself (Habermas 2001, p141). Modernity's preoccupation with 
bureaucratisation and economisation is clearly recognisable within its contemporary form; 
neoliberal forms of governance. According to Habermas, neoliberal orthodoxy ―advocates the 
subordination of the state to the imperatives of a market-led integration of global society, and 
pleads for an ―entrepreneurial state‖ that would abandon the project of decommodifying labor 
power and, more generally the role of protector of lifeworld resources‖ (Habermas 2006 p79). 
As the next chapter outlines, the twin steering mechanisms associated with systemic forms of 
governance have combined to create a formidable global discourse
83
 under the neoliberal 
project of governance.  
 
The response, however, is more optimistic from Habermas, recognising that the lifeworld 
represents a source of counter-rationality that cannot be wholly colonised, and can be drawn 
from by competent individuals against systemic processes. Individuals can effectively avoid 
this contamination of the subject through drawing upon ―distinct modes of symbolic 
interaction...that continue to protect the lifeworld against the functionalist rationality of their 
agents‖ (Cook 2004, p11). For Habermas, this symbolic interaction is reproduced through 
cultural tradition, social integration
84
 and socialisation and can ―only operate in the medium 
of action orientated towards reaching an understanding (Habermas 1993, p102).  
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 The usage of discourse has previously centred around a form of communication and language, as in the 
Habermasian form of 'discourse ethics' its usage here, however, expands upon the narrow confines of 
dialogue towards a more ideational understanding typified by by Hajer's definition as: ―a specific ensemble 
of ideas, concepts and categorizations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of 
practices and through which meaning is given physical and social realities‖ (cited in Berejikian and Dryzek 
2000, p207). The expansion and permeation of neoliberal practices globally represent a powerful form of 
discourse that will be discussed in chapter two. 
84
 Or 'solidarity formation' according to Fraser's interpretation (1985, p107).  
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The lifeworld can be defined as the social background to communicative action, our 'stock of 
knowledge' that contains taken-for-granted background assumptions, when these come to the 
fore and are drawn upon by participants within shared horizons of meaning (such as cultural 
standards), they lose their taken-for-granted status and are opened up to communicative action 
(Baxter 1985, p46).  
  
In order to understand how resistance against the imperatives of systemic rationality can take 
place, the discussion of civil society re-emerges within the context of the 'public sphere'. 
Habermas describes the public sphere as ―a network for communicating information and 
points of view (i.e. expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of 
communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesised in such a way that they coalesce 
into bundles of topically specified public opinions‖ (1996, p360).  
 
Habermas recognised the importance of the public sphere that began to gain prominence in 
the 18
th
 century, attributed to the decoupling of the state from the fabric of everyday life. The 
resulting decouplement combined with higher levels of centralisation and political authority, 
created an increase in calls for accountability from the newly emerging public sphere. 
Individuals began to meet away from the private spaces of their own homes/work, to public 
arenas such as coffee houses where politics was freely discussed in a collective capacity. The 
emergence of this public sphere, however, was seen as bourgeois in that it reflected the 
interests and rationality of a predominant number of white, middle class men (Roberts and 
Crossley 2004, p3-5; Fraser 2003).  
 
Despite the bourgeois connotations it was seen as important, firstly because a form of societal 
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gathering had risen that created a distinction between the private domain from state authority 
(constructing a form of 'public interest' through increased numbers of participants), and 
secondly, this form of public interest involved the communicative use of reason to debate on 
issues greater than private particular interests (Habermas 1991 p14-30). Contemporary forms 
of the public sphere are seen as more inclusive given the advances in the infrastructure of 
communication; examples include 'micro' public spheres such as book clubs, citizen's juries, 
to more global public spheres such as the World Social Forum and internet sites such as 
openDemocracy (Edwards 2009, p66). According to Edwards, these spaces are deemed public 
in so much as they do not attempt to silence or exclude alternative viewpoints, or allow one 
set of voices to dominate others (Edwards 2009, p64). The construction of these spaces are 
seen as the pinnacle of the inclusive critical cosmopolitan project, an open and pluralistic 
dialogic structure that can generate social norms and moral agreements free from the 
interference of the instrumental forms of reasoning, a product of self-interested forms of 
administrative or economistic modes of steering.  
 
Habermas' early conceptualisation of the public sphere was as an oppositional space that 
could draw upon the resources of the lifeworld to create communicatively legitimate norms 
that would then feed into the political realm of state and market, the systemic modes of 
governance, to steer political outcomes (Habermas 1991 ch8). As a realm of communication, 
however, the public sphere is just as susceptible to the steering mechanisms of instrumental 
rationality from systemic imperatives, civil society
85
, however represents the solution because 
it can ―anchor the communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of 
the lifeworld‖ (Habermas 1996, p360). Civil society here is seen as the antidote to systemic 
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 Habermas follows Cohen and Arato's notion of civil society as a space demarcated from the state and 
economy, whilst being anchored within the communicative sphere of the lifeworld, comprised of non-
governmental and non-economic actors (Habermas 1996, p367-70).  
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forms of rationality, and can keep the public sphere from becoming rationalised by the core 
institutions of capitalist modernity. 
 
Civil society actors such as social movements are held as integral to expand and revitalise the 
critical foundations of the public sphere, both Habermas (1996) and Cohen and Arato (1992) 
elude to the 'dual orientation' that civil society undertakes of pursuing both offensive and 
defensive goals. Offensively they promote a variety of social issues, mobilising those deemed 
positive and criticising those deemed negative aiming at influencing political will-formation 
(the formal site of politics), whilst defensively they aim to preserve the critical nature of the 
communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld through generating subcultural counter-publics 
and consolidating new identities (Arato and Cohen 1992 p519-532; Habermas 1996, p370-
372).  
 
The critical cosmopolitan democratic project incorporates this dualistic notion of civil society 
as both a defender of the public sphere from instrumental rationality, and a ―vehicle for 
marshalling public opinion as a political force‖ (Fraser 2007, p7)86. The usage of deliberative 
frameworks therefore allows actors within civil society the ability to 'steer' political and 
economic forces along more inclusive and legitimate lines; democracy is intertwined with 
unrestricted communicative rationality.  
 
1.3.3 Critical Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Public Sphere 
 
The public sphere as described above, is clearly not synonymous with the concept of civil 
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 Simply put, civil society for Habermas is to be found on the borders of the lifeworld and the system, 
attempting to preserve the former and limit the intrusion of the latter (Ray 1993, p60). 
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society, though at times the usage of global civil society and the global public sphere tend to 
be used interchangeably
,
 especially when used within the cosmopolitan context; public 
spheres tend to stand in for civil society as the actual framework for democratisation (see 
Delanty 2000).  Despite this differentiation, Delanty argues that the construction of normative 
frameworks involving GCS must be based upon a cosmopolitan public sphere
87
 in order to 
create the framework necessary for a fundamental change in the values of contemporary 
global governance (2001, p49). Bohman demonstrates in a similar way the integral link 
between the two for the critical cosmopolitan project, arguing that ―the formation of a 
cosmopolitan public [sphere] requires the development and expansion of a transnational civil 
society‖ (1998, p201).  
 
The actual site of the public sphere within global governance frameworks is, however, more 
of a contentious issue among the strands of critical cosmopolitanism, and can be drawn upon 
here to demonstrate key differences between them and the consequences this has on the 
formation of their projects. Hendricks (2006) has recently attempted to distinguish between 
two types of deliberative action; micro-deliberation, that assumes a more formalised role for 
civil society within the decision making structures of governance and effectively collaborating 
with the state, and macro-deliberation, that categorises civil society as a more informal sphere 
situated outside of these decision-making structures and in a contestatory relationship with the 
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 Some authors label these transnational elements of civil society such as the growing numbers of dissident 
social movements and influential international NGOs as part of a 'transnational public sphere', however, it 
should be noted that they do not invoke the same theoretical criteria as the critical cosmopolitan approach. 
For them, it is analytically defined as ―a space in which both residents of distinct places (states or localities) 
and members of transnational entities (organisations or firms) elaborate discourses and practices whose 
consumption moves beyond national boundaries‖ (Guidry, Kenedy and Zald 2000, p6-7). The public sphere 
is therefore home to all types of actors without critical adjudication of inclusion/exclusion (see Keane 1995, 
Kohler 1998; Koopmans and Erbe 2004). This is an integral part of the normative cosmopolitan project and 
as Fraser highlights, the growing literature on the international public sphere fails to ask about the critical 
dimension and asking whether these new spaces can aid in ―checking domination and democratising 
governance‖ (Fraser 2007, p15).  
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state. Hendricks does, however, tend to simplify micro-deliberation to those theories of 
deliberation that are less concerned with civil society
88
 and more concerned with the process 
of deliberation, whether state actors or TNCs, what Chambers (2009) calls democratic 
deliberation as opposed to deliberative democracy.  
 
The examples of micro-deliberation that I outline below are explicitly concerned with civil 
society, whilst at the same time situated within formal decision-making institutions, thus, they 
tend to concentrate on the ability of NGOs to operate as steering mechanisms alongside state 
actors and TNCs. This micro-political form of public sphere encapsulates both the lifeworld 
(drawn on from by NGOs) and the system (represented by state actors and TNCs) but where 
NGOs are able to effectively operationalise communicative power and challenge the 
instrumental modes of power within global structures.  
 
This shifting of the public sphere, runs counter to the earlier work of Habermas (1962, 1990) 
where the public sphere operated as a counter sphere to the operational logics of formal 
governance (thus it can be labelled as a theory of macro-deliberation); a sphere of opinion 
formation. Habermas was criticised for creating a  dualism between an overtly agential 
reading of civil society and the structural characteristics of the system, which had the effect of 
isolating reflexivity and critical associationalism within the public sphere but without 
seriously analysing how this can 'steer' the latter spheres of interaction (see Fine 1997).  
 
This criticism is taken up by Steffek and Nanz who depart from Habermas' earlier conception 
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 For example a number of projects that are concerned with deliberation but less on the emphasis of civil 
society involvement include deliberative polls (Fishkin 1997; Fishkin and Luskin 2000), citizen's juries 
(Crosby 1998; Eriksen 2000; Smith 2000), parliaments (Bessette 1980; Uhr 1998), consensus conferences 
(Joss and Durant 1995) and even the idea of having a deliberation day (Ackerman and Fishkin 2003). 
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of the public sphere as being de-centred and outside of political decision making bodies, in 
that for them CSOs
89
 can function as an integral part of a transnational public sphere that 
interacts with both the public and within global governance structures to open them up to 
public scrutiny and create more inclusive forms of decision making structures (2005, p197; 
2008, p8). They recognise that CSOs can act as a 'transmission belt' between the global 
citizenry and the institutions of global governance to fulfil the promise of inclusion and 
participation. This transmission belt operates in two directions; firstly civil society gives voice 
to citizens concerns and channels them through deliberative processes into international 
organisations. Secondly, they open up the decision making apparatus of international 
organisations and disseminate the technical issues to the wider public in a more transparent 
way (Steffek and Nanz 2008, p8).  
 
Eckersley similarly advances a notion of the public sphere as an intermediary structure in 
order to help 'channel-up' democratic participation to contribute to alternative problem-
framing, agenda setting and the formulation of legal norms (2007, p335). NGOs are 
privileged in the formation of this type of global public sphere because it is seen as a more 
inclusive model than states and markets within international politics, having the ability to 
transcend borders whilst at the same time being capable of recognising generalisable interests 
for the good of collectives rather than narrow self-interest (Payne 1996, p132).  
 
According to Risse, NGOs can also attempt to communicatively persuade states and firms 
through deliberation as a non-hierarchical mode of steering, allowing not just greater 
participation within these institutions as privileged by most theories of GCS, but an effective 
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 CSOs are defined in this context as ―all the non-governmental, non-violent, non-profit seeking actors that 
have legal personality recognised by at least one country‖ (Steffek and Nanz 2008, p29).   
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voice that can overcome hierarchical modes of steering typified by the rational choice 
approach of states and markets (Risse 2000 p11-13).  
 
The micro-deliberation approach tends to focus upon the role of regimes in global politics as 
the potential site of global public spheres. Samhat and Payne (2003, 2004) argue that regimes 
represent a shift from the 'top-down' cosmopolitan conception of constructing an ambitious 
global parliament or reforming UN internal structures, through the combining of a formalised 
state and market dominated architecture with more informal spaces available for civil society 
to interact within a deliberative steering process, transforming them into models of 
transparency, participation and uncoerced dialogue (2003). They argue that we must be 
careful in advancing the use of a global civil society to democratise these frameworks due to 
the problems for NGOs often lacking accountable structures and inconsistent strategies, 
however, the authors tend to point out that these are simply obstacles to be overcome and new 
waves of democratising measures aimed at NGOs are helping them to fulfil their potential as 
―countersystemic pressure‖ (2004, p45).  
 
Bohman in a similar way, points towards the importance of global regimes as harbouring the 
necessary communicative potential, through an informal power base of international publicity 
rather than coercive state or (neoliberal) market interventions; global forms of civil society 
play a critical role in this and when coupled with a greater level of democratic deliberation, 
can offer the solutions to the democratic deficit in global politics (1999). Bohman eludes to 
the emergence of the global human rights regime, environmental regimes and even 
trade/financial regulatory regimes that are often driven by civil society pressure and represent 
a form of publicity lacking in contemporary practices (1999, p506). Contemporary global 
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institutions fail to offer the democratic potential required in order to steer global economic 
processes, yet there is potential within existing forms of cosmopolitan public spheres 
associated with civil society that if institutionalised more effectively, can represent a more 
inclusive form of cosmopolitan governance. Public spheres can only become global in scope 
alongside the development and expansion of a global form of civil society (Bohman 1998, 
p201, 2004, p138). NGOs can act as intermediaries between the local and the global, not as 
'expert communicators' for the local, but as facilitators of public spaces, allowing for critical 
and reflexive communication among citizens under deliberative frameworks (Bohman 2007, 
p81).  
 
Habermas has recently attempted to engage more closely with the role of democracy outside 
of the nation-state albeit in the form of a 'cosmopolitan Europe' (2001, 2003). Nonetheless, it 
is recognisable within his work that the role of civil society is paramount to the construction 
of a more inclusive order to elevate the strength of the lifeworld in response to the perceived 
systemic forces of neoliberal globalisation, and consists of a global organisation that is 
loosely connected through multiple transnational regimes (2003, p99 2001, p55). Within these 
transnational regimes there needs to be a stronger institutionalisation of NGOs to create the 
spaces for deliberation, allowing for a more inclusive process of decision making whilst at the 
same time rendering the process more transparent for national public spheres and grassroots 
decision-making (Habermas 2001, p101). Civil society has a functional process here as the 
intermediary network between transnational regimes and national public spheres involving a 
plurality of interest groups, NGOs and citizen's initiatives (Habermas 2003, p98). This link 
between national public spheres and political regimes demonstrates Habermas' dual track 
approach to civil society linking the ability for communicative opinion-formation within the 
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public sphere, and the permeation of this communicative power directly into political making 
structures at the transnational level. 
 
Iris Marion Young argues similarly that the global democratic project requires a higher level 
of global coordination through 'democratic federated regimes of global regulation' which 
―enable the formation of public spheres composed of active citizens in global civil society‖ 
(Young 2007, p36). Young envisions seven global regulatory regimes that organise around the 
specific issues of peace and security, the environment, trade and finance, direct investment 
and capital utilisation, communications and transportation, human rights (including labour 
standards and welfare rights), citizenship and migration (2002, p267). Young's conception of 
civil society follows a similar pattern to the micro-deliberative framework in that despite its 
virtues as ―promoting inclusion, expression and critique for deep democracy‖ (Young 2002, 
p156) it cannot be seen as a preferred alternative to the state; the state is regarded as essential 
for democracy in the way that it excels at ―co-ordination, regulation and administration‖ 
(Young 2002, p156). Young invokes Habermas' and Arato and Cohen's notion of the dual 
track purpose for civil society, as a steering mechanism for systemic forms but not as an 
alternative. In doing so, she relies upon the same distinction of system and lifeworld, where 
civil society ―corresponds to associative activities of the lifeworld‖ (2000, p159). 
Interestingly she relies upon a close link between civil society and the state in order to regain 
control of the political realm from what she sees as the greatest threat to democracy; private 
economic power. This again serves to demonstrate that critical cosmopolitan democracy is not 
antithetical to the state and the market, it is the steering mechanisms associated with these 
institutions that render democratic decision making problematic.  
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Empirical investigations analysing the role that civil society can an undertake as part of a 
global public sphere, are often found lacking within the literature, authors who invoke 
deliberation tend to discuss the potential for a global public sphere in more abstract terms 
(Kissling and Steffek 2008, p216). Despite this there have been recent attempts to undertake 
an empirical analysis of the potential construction of a global public sphere, for example a 
number of studies have sought to highlight the potential for deliberation at the WTO; one of 
the most exclusive of international regimes. The WTO is seen as a significant target of 
critique by these authors because its rules ―increasingly determine the environmental, 
agricultural, health and food safety rules of democratic communities, and, thus, affect the 
fundamental welfare of their citizens‖ (Nanz and Steffek 2005a, p190). Eckersley (2007), 
Higgott and Erman (2008), Kapoor (2004) and Krajewski (2001), have all engaged with 
attempts to recognise deliberative possibilities and problems inherent within internal WTO 
mechanisms, whilst using deliberation as a yardstick to assess the deficits still present within 
the organisation. 
 
Krajewski  draws upon a deliberative framework to analyse the legitimacy of the WTO, 
arguing that its contemporary form suffers from a democratic deficit through its lack of 
deliberative legitimacy; negotiations within the WTO lack transparency and openness and are 
―dominated by bargaining instead of arguing‖ (2001, p177). Three recent models have 
recently been proposed that Krajewski scrutinises; increasing the national role of parliaments, 
establishing a form of parliamentary assembly, and opening the WTO to the participation of 
NGOs (2001, p183). The first two however fail to stand up to deliberative criteria because 
both preclude a form of exclusion of 'global public discourse' (and the former proposal would 
very likely be based upon strategic gains of bargaining rather than argumentation). Krajewski 
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recognises the similarities to Held's project of a global assembly but argues this would not 
stand up to deliberative legitimacy without opening up the parliament to further global public 
discourses. The model of increased NGO presence within WTO policy-making represents the 
best method of equating democratic legitimacy on deliberative grounding as ―there seems to 
be little disagreement about the deliberatory functions of NGOs by enhancing societal 
deliberations about WTO matters within or across national borders‖ (2001, p185). They are 
also able to promote the all-affected principle through stake-holder functionality.
90
 NGOs are 
valorised here as enhancing the legitimacy of decisions through their ability to promote 
argument and rational deliberation. 
 
Ilan Kapoor (2001) argues that the WTO also suffers from a democratic deficit because its key 
decision making procedures are imbued with a form of 'western hegemonic neoliberalism' that 
is deeply exclusive for a lack of accountability and legitimacy. The WTO establishes that all 
decisions on global trade rules must be by consensus (or majority vote if this fails to apply), 
however this takes place within an exclusive framework that seems to favour a significant 
presence of 'friendly' TNCs whilst the numbers of sceptical environmental based NGOs are 
significantly lacking. NGOs are allowed to attend ministerial meetings but access is restricted 
and controlled. According to Kapoor this is problematic for deliberation because NGOs 
represent not just a counter-weight to states and TNCs, but as a counterweight to economic 
and technological arguments; the hallmark of neoliberal discourses (2001, p 532-534). He 
concludes that NGOs need to be incorporated into a framework where the state loses its 
membership privilege, and TNCs are to be limited and regulated to ensure the incorporation 
of greater transnational issues such as human rights and the environment (2001, p537).  
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 The deliberative ideal of all-affected is difficult to reproduce globally thus NGOs represent a variety of 
specific interest groups, mixing representation with participation under deliberative criteria  
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Similarly for Higgott and Erman (2008), there needs to be a shift away from what they label 
Global Governance type I (GG1) to Global Governance type II (GGII), at the WTO, in 
essence to move from economic/technocratic solutions of governance to more political 
solutions however: 
Assumptions about how to advance the GGII agenda, emanating from essentially 
cosmopolitan views of global civil society, have simply assumed an extension of 
the ‗domestic analogy‘ to the extra-territorial, or global, context (2008, p6) 
 
In order to remedy this apparently neutral categorising, the authors add the need to instil 
deliberation at the heart of this project in order to include a wider range of participants and 
exclude ―coerced decision-making, false consensus and inequitable outcomes‖ (Higgot and 
Erman 2008, p9).  
 
On the more positive potential of creating a truly inclusive public sphere at the WTO,  Robert 
Eckersley (2007) analyses a recent mechanism in use at the WTO, the amicus curia brief
91
, 
and demonstrates how it has led to the development of a form of ‗green public sphere‘. One 
particular case outlined (surrounding the biotechnological uses of GM food), demonstrated 
the ways in which non-state actors had combined to pressurise the WTO into adopting an 
environmental over economic/technocratic stance thus demonstrating the reflexive potential 
of non-state actors to challenge dominant technocratic (state) and neoliberal (market) 
‗instrumental‘ proposals. Although this example ended up being ultimately unsuccessful92, 
                                                 
91
  Literally ‗friend of the court‘, this mechanism allows non-state actors to intervene in the dispute resolution 
arm of the WTO by publishing ‗amicus briefs‘ that outline their views and expertise on the dispute, which is 
openly available alongside member state briefs and has been used to inform panels 
92
 The EU took up the case on the side of amicus briefs submitted by non-state actors, but was defeated by the 
US opposition stance.  
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demonstrates the potential for public spheres that have emerged in response to the ‗system‘93. 
 
The WTO is not the only regime that has been analysed from a deliberative perspective, 
indeed Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler (2005) and Dany (2008) look at the potential of 
deliberation within the UN system of global conferences and summits. Clark, Friedman and 
Hochstetler in their previous work argued that the state was dominant within the UN system 
despite an increase in the numbers of NGOs participating (1998). Their latest work has 
included a shift towards using the term deliberation, albeit in a vague context, and suggests 
that NGOs can in effect create a deliberative sphere through their effective inclusion and 
participation in a variety of UN conferences and summits (2005). Conversely, Dany looks at 
the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and determines that despite the 
initial optimism at the increased level of access for NGOs, these organisations were inevitably 
made to 'adjust' their positions in the face of state interests and therefore found deliberative 
standards lacking (2008, p67).  
 
The empirical evidence tends to suggest that within these micro-deliberation studies the 
global public sphere is often blocked by systemic forces despite the inclusion of 
communicative minded NGOs attempting to steer these forces. Despite the pessimistic 
readings of some of these authors, their work serves to demonstrate the problems of 
contemporary frameworks and highlights how despite the increased interest in the higher 
levels of inclusion of NGOs within global structures, there is much to be done before a 
genuine level of democratic participation can be said to exist at the global level.  
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 An interesting comparison can be observed between Eckersley's deliberative criteria for observing 
inclusion/exclusion of NGOs using the amicus curia brief, and Kuper's more liberal discussion on allowing 
non-state actors a role in a transformed international court of justice, where NGOs are to be granted a similar 
amicus curia status; the difference here is that Kuper's model has a rigorous selection process based upon his 
own 'nine criterion' (Kuper 2004, p154, n298).  
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The pessimistic readings of the role of NGOs within micro-public spheres is a view supported 
by the recent work of John Dryzek (2006), who has attempted to formulate a theory of the 
global public sphere that is situated outside of formal frameworks and aligning closely to the 
early Habermasian formulation of its role in public opinion-formation rather than direct (will-
formation) political influence. Habermas (and the other micro-deliberative supporters) are 
criticised here for presuming that the communicative power present within civil society can 
effectively steer administrative and economic power in order to create more inclusive forms 
of legislation within these frameworks (2000b p82, 2000c p244). Instead, Dryzek's model of 
deliberation accepts that the public sphere is ―constituted in large part by social movements 
and actors in confrontation with the state‖ (2000b, p81). Dryzek is not critical of the role of 
civil society as the vehicle for a reflexive communicative power, drawn from the lifeworld, 
merely the site of where this can be most effective; outside of the instrumental strategies of 
political will formation. Reflexive action is seen as more straight forward for civil society 
actors (he eludes to NGOs and activists here) than political  and corporations, however, they 
are seen as disadvantaged vis-a-vis more conventional and strategic forms of power, yet they 
are the 'wellsprings of transnational democracy' and therefore should be nurtured outside of 
the formal political arena (2006, p123). Formal institutions are tied to an executive decision 
meeting the demands of market liberalism, the global public sphere, however, is less 
constrained and can easily act as a form of 'counter globalisation' bringing communication 
across borders (Dryzek 2006, p104). 
 
In terms of actual transnational sites for deliberation, Dryzek is often vague, arguing that there 
needs to be a loose connection with structures of authority in order to influence them in a 
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strategy similar to a siege, but without conquering the system (2006, p62). In an article about 
local strategies of deliberative democracy, he alludes to the potential of 'mini-publics' such as 
consensus conferences, citizens juries, deliberative polls, that are relatively unconnected to 
the state administrative and economic apparatus, and therefore autonomous opinion-forming 
institutions that can feed from and shape public opinion particularly having a potential soft-
power impact of discourse production (2006b). In this respect the form of deliberation 
proposed by Dryzek is also known as 'discursive deliberation'
94
 because of his emphasis on 
the role of discourses rather than actors within deliberation, effectively attempting to solve the 
problems associated with the 'all-inclusive principle' that is often raised when attempting to 
globalise democratic decision-making.
 
 The idea of including all individuals affected by a 
decision within decision-making structures is seen as absurd within the real-world attempts to 
construct deliberative forums, thus Dryzek suggests that analysing the contestation of 
discourses can allow for a more legitimate form of inclusion (2000, 2001). Bohman takes a 
similar line of response through his notion that ―Size is not the issue as much as 
multiperspectival inquiry into innovative democratization‖ (Bohman 2004, p40).  
 
Dryzek's deliberative globalisation95 operates at the opposite end of the logic of 'There Is No 
Alternative' (TINA) by subjecting the dominant discourse to critical scrutiny and reflexive 
contestation through a more direct form of democratic engagement. It is seemingly difficult to 
manipulate discourses that are often heavily embedded in social belief systems, yet through 
the use of reflexive action, located within the public sphere,  they can be bent in various 
directions (Dryzek 2006b, p106). The construction of anti-globalisation discourses to counter 
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 Though he argues that the two terms 'deliberative democracy' and discursive democracy' are often used 
interchangeably (2006, p167) 
95
 Deliberative globalisation is in itself another form of globalisation in that deliberative public spheres can 
transcend national boundaries through the expansion of communication (Dryzek 2006, p104).  
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the contemporary neoliberal project relies upon the development of a vibrant global public 
sphere to allow the production of reflexive citizens capable of fulfilling the ideals of 
deliberative competency. This form of macro-deliberation tends to be more abstract than the 
former emphasis upon micro-deliberation, however, perhaps an interesting avenue would be 
to concentrate on the potential for global institutions such as the WSF as a macro-deliberative 
site that exists outside of systemic structures
96
 
 
1.4 Concluding Thoughts: Civil Society as a Panacea  
 
The Cosmopolitan democratic project in both its liberal and critical variants, has sought to 
extend democracy to the global level through a de-centring of the Westphalian system of 
governance in response to an increasingly perceived democratic deficit. The elevation of civil 
society as an inclusive intermediary space connecting the local with the global, is 
romanticised by the cosmopolitan democratic project for its ability not just to globalise a more 
participatory form of democracy, but to democratise the exclusive forms of (neoliberal) 
globalisation.  
 
For the liberal dimension, the permeation of a form of global civil society into the 
contemporary unaccountable and exclusive structures of governance represents the reclaiming 
of a humane form of governance that places individual worth rather than state or market 
interests, at the heart of governance. The focus is attempting to tame the exclusive practices of 
                                                 
96
 The WSF tends to be drawn upon from a variety of literatures often to emphasize the inclusive role of civil 
society in the formation of neoliberal counter projects in the Gramscian sense (see Fisher and Ponniah 2003, 
De Sousa Santos 2006). Those that draw upon it for its democratic potential usually equate this with plurality 
in a liberal form (see Smith 2004, Della Porta 2004), however, there are a few sources that begin to raise the 
question of its deliberative potential as an inclusive global public sphere (see Glasius 2005, Ylä-Anttila 2006, 
Glasius and Timms 2005).  
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globalisation 'from above' through a greater level of control by globalisation 'from below', in 
order for this transition to occur, however, there is a need to instil a form of Cosmopolitan law 
to safeguard the extension of democracy in its post-Westphalian form. This is essential for the 
liberal project and its battle with the 'predatory' form of globalisation under the Washington 
Consensus that prioritises the extension of capital over human well-being.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the construction of a universal form of cosmopolitan 
morality present within the liberal dimension, attempts to incorporate pre-negotiated 
substantive principles of democracy into its global frameworks. The appropriation of an 
increasingly Kantian form of morality, leads the authors to construct global frameworks in a 
monological fashion; civil society is included into a democratic structure that is essentially 
predetermined. Indeed, as Urbinati argues:  
 
―theorists of cosmopolitical democracy hope for a bottom-up movement while 
proposing a top- down strategy. If cosmopolis will succeed, it will hardly be 
through democratic means‖ (Urbinati 2003 p75, see also Cochran 2002) 
 
The result is to strive for a more inclusive order that appears to be based upon the liberal 
plurality of representation, yet this is actually deeply exclusionary because the frameworks 
and substantive content of democracy is prescribed through a form of monological self-
reflection that is cloaked in impartiality; the name of humanity. The critical cosmopolitan 
project, emanating from Habermas, recognises the inherent forms of domination present 
within this mode of reasoning. Ironically, Held summarises the Habermasian conception of 
domination rather well: 
 
...whenever an individual's choices, goals, purposes and the means of attaining 
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them are prescribed, domination can be said to exist (Held 2003, p149)  
 
The liberal project clearly fits into this category with its prescribed democratic forms of 
participation, marginalising democracy as a legitimation strategy under a totalising universal 
morality. In response the critical dimension focuses upon the dialogical method of morality, 
substantive issues are debated upon freely by individuals within intersubjective dialogue to 
produce a more inclusive form of decision-making where consensus relies upon the all-
affected principle.  
 
The critical cosmopolitan project aims to extend the intersubjective dialogic structure of 
deliberative democracy into the decision-making structures of global governance with the 
intention of similarly linking the local with the global; civil society as a localised participatory 
ideal holds the potential to eradicate sources of domination within global governance. These 
sources of domination include the systemic forces associated with neoliberal globalisation as 
administrative and economic forms of 'instrumental' rationality within decision-making 
structures. This of course does not mean that individuals exuding administrative and 
economic forms of instrumental rationality are to be excluded from all forms of decision-
making at the global level, merely to suggest that when attempting to formulate inclusive 
debates on the common good within democratic frameworks, this must according to the 
Habermasian framework, be undertaken by actors from outside of the steering mechanisms of 
political and economic authority, hence the promises of civil society.  
 
The global democratic project remains a distant ideal for most of those associated with the 
critical dimension, yet their work serves as a critical yardstick to analyse both contemporary 
and (potential) future frameworks for their inclusive potential. What is important here, and 
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serves to frame the rest of this thesis, is the way in which the critical cosmopolitan project 
draws upon the notion of civil society as the idealised form of communicative inclusion 
within contemporary/future frameworks. If Habermas' concept of the lifeworld is to be 
accepted as the irrepressible background of an open plurality of communication, and the 
system as an attempt to subsume communication to the instrumental dimension of profit, 
efficiency and productivity
97
 (associated with administrative/bureaucratic state actors or 
market actors), then civil society is drawn upon from the former, to steer the latter.  
 
The global democratic project associated with deliberative democracy, constructs an idealised 
notion of civil society as 'anchored' within the communicative realm of the lifeworld. The 
next chapter will problematise this theoretical assumption of civil society as the vehicle for 
communicative forms of rationality, specifically the contemporary usage of CSOs as conduits 
for reflexive action, through an interrogation of the expansionary systemic project of 
neoliberal globalisation that has engaged in a collaborative role with concrete practices of 
civil society, raising serious questions as to the perceived unreflexive privileging of CSOs 
within cosmopolitan frameworks
98
. The problems of colonisation as raised by Habermas‘ 
reflections on modernity, will be invoked as a contemporary condition facing many CSOs 
under neoliberal external ‗civil society building‘ techniques. As stated previously, this 
colonising tendency recognises that: 
 
―As the institutions specialized in socialization, social integration, and cultural 
transmission are increasingly functionalized to serve the imperatives of 
uncontrolled and ever-expanding subsystems and as communicative coordination 
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 This concept will be further elaborated upon in chapter two, where it is demonstrated to be tied closely to the 
neoliberal forms of socio-organisation.  
98
   In the literature, only Dryzek has acknowledged the potential for civil society to be ‗invoked‘ in support of 
market-orientated governance,  which he deems ‗problematic‘ for the deliberative project in a footnote, but 
without further interrogating the important implications of this argument (2006, p167). 
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of action in the relevant areas is replaced by the media of money and power, there 
will be more pathological consequences‖ (Cohen and Arato 1994, p449) 
 
 
The consequences of colonising tendencies within CSO identity production discussed in the 
second chapter (and concretely examined in the third chapter; an empirical case study of 
external ‗civil society building‘ effects in Cambodia), demonstrates the problems of assuming 
a bounded reflexive CSO sphere in critical cosmopolitan projects; identities matter.  
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 2. THE NEO-LIBERAL PROJECT OF DEMOCRATISATION  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Cosmopolitan interpretations of civil society have, according to the previous chapter, 
privileged an autonomous space that is not only analytically separate from the state and the 
(neoliberal) market, but is also crucially a normative interpretation that incorporates civil 
society as a vehicle to resist the exclusive spaces of governance, generated by the neoliberal 
expansion of unregulated markets. Accordingly, the local is panegyrized as a solution to the 
global effects of neoliberal policies and modes of rationality, through the conduit of civil 
society. The placing of civil society onto a pedestal of inclusion, as the de facto solvent for the 
democratic deficit and eliminator of neoliberal modes of rationality within governance, runs 
into severe problems when an interrogation of the dynamics underlying the neoliberal 
democratic project and its contemporary relationship with civil society is undertaken.  
 
Habermas' original concern regarding the 'colonisation of the lifeworld' by systemic 
imperatives, has been overlooked by the contemporary generation of critical theorists in their 
global democratic project. They focus on the ways in which CSOs as exclusive conduits of 
the lifeworld within the public sphere can steer systemic/instrumental modes of reasoning, 
therefore neglecting a fundamental dimension; contemporary practices of civil society, as an 
anchor within the lifeworld, can just as easily become co-opted under these instrumental 
modes of reasoning.  
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This chapter will demonstrate how the neoliberal form of globalisation is inherently a political 
project that has constructed new spaces for civil society through the fusion of economic 
market principles with a new emphasis upon inclusion, democracy and civil society and 
extended through development discourse globally.  
 
The World Bank and its global (neoliberal) development strategies are interrogated within this 
chapter because of the way in which it has shifted from a traditional position of excluding 
civil society within its frameworks, to one where civil society has become seemingly integral. 
This is important because the World Bank, seen by some as the 'mother of all governments' 
(Cammack 2002) has in recent decades, enacted its own global democratic project by 
attempting to replicate globally a specific model of development involving the intertwining of 
democracy and the free market that now includes civil society as the crucial enabling 
environment through which this project can be deemed a success. The rise of a new 
development paradigm centred around 'good governance' focuses upon the democratic 
potential of civil society as a participatory mechanism within developing countries, yet it is 
not just limited to the World Bank as a multilateral donor, and in fact includes the majority of 
bilateral donors who have recently attempted to harmonise this new orthodoxy within their 
frameworks. 
 
In this respect neoliberalism has become a powerful global discourse that constitutes an 
ideological apparatus as much as an economic theory and as discussed within this chapter, 
proves to be expansive or ‗colonising‘ in the way in which it has reconfigured the idea of civil 
society and participation along systemic lines.  
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What is of fundamental importance, is that their focus on civil society has resulted in the 
construction of not just new spaces for civil society, but a new identity under a neoliberal 
ideal-type. In this respect the chapter will show how the previous dualism constructed of civil 
society as a communicative dimension that effectively challenges the instrumental logic of 
neoliberal governance, is actually reversed under the neoliberal democratic project, where 
civil society is exposed directly to the systemic forms of rationality associated with (state) 
bureaucratic efficiency and (market) economic logics
99
, the result is the potential permeation 
of instrumental forms of rationality at the very heart of a supposed communicative ideal.  
 
2.2 Neoliberal Globalisation: The rise of the Washington Consensus 
 
Neoliberalism was first coined in 1932 at a conference in Dresden by Alexander Rustow 
whose speech Freie Wirtschaft, starker Staat
100
 established the founding principles of the 
economic theory as maintaining a strong non-interventionist state to allow for a self-
regulating market (see Hartwich 2009). His ideas failed to gain popularity until they later 
resurfaced within the work of Milton Friedman, who is often seen as the architect and 
figurehead of neoliberal economic theory through his promotion of a form of 'lassez-faire' 
economics that involved the reduction of the state from economic intervention in order to 
increase the freedom of the individual to pursue their economic ambitions through the private 
sphere of the market
101
. This term is often synonymous with 'classical economic liberalism' 
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 It should be reiterated here that I am interested in the systemic steering mechanisms (or logics) associated 
with the state and the market that permeate the identity of civil society, not the actual physical entities 
themselves.  
100
 Free Market, Strong State  
101
 This concept was in direct contrast to the economic principles established by his rival, John Maynard Keynes, 
for which the interventionist state was required to guide markets and take an active role in macroeconomic 
policy. Keynes, became extremely influential and his work formed an economic paradigm around the 
development of most post-war economies, leading Time Magazine in in 1965 to declare; ―we are all 
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because it represents, according to Friedman, an early reading of liberalism prior to the 19
th
 
century before it became 'corrupted' through state expansion in welfare and equality 
programmes to supposedly protect liberties (Friedman 1962, p47-51). Friedman's central 
claim was for a reduction in state intervention to allow the market to operate freely and that 
the only place for the state was to become an 'umpire' to make sure that all players stick to 
―the rules of the game‖ (1962, p56).  
 
Friedman and his associates came to be known as the 'Chicago Economic Tradition' attracting 
interest in the early 1970s as major economies went through an economic crisis of 
stagflation
102
. Their expertise was called upon by the US government under the Reagan 
administration to help economic structural reform of the Chilean state following the 1973 US-
backed coup of General Pinochet (see Silva 1993; Valdez 1995). It is here that the first 
coherent economic policy prescriptions that have come to be known as 'neoliberal' were 
practised, exported by the 'Chicago Boys'
103
 who attempted to dismantle the macroeconomic 
policies within the country in favour of a neoliberal approach.   
 
The transformation of the Chilean state represented the start of a shift towards a new global 
economic paradigm, and a shift away from the economic structures populating the post-war 
international system of 'embedded liberalism' (Ikenberry 1992; Ruggie 1983) under the direct 
nurturing influence of  the Bretton Woods institutions
104
. In contrast neoliberal practices have 
                                                                                                                                                        
Keynsians now‖ (Time 1965). The rise of neoliberal economics in the 1970s effectively ended this era of 
'embedded liberalism'. For further reading on his economic ideas see Keynes (2007). 
102
 Essentially a combination of inflation and a stagnant economy, it was particularly descriptive of the effects of 
the 1973 oil crisis when the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placed an embargo 
of oil on the US. 
103
 A group of Chilean economists that had worked under Friedman at Chicago and who became the technocrats 
responsible for designing and implementing the neoliberal reform programmes under the Pinochet regime 
(see Silva 1991).  
104
 The Brettons Woods institutions included the IMF (1946), World Bank (1946) and the GATT (1947), and 
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been rigorously pursued, not just within national borders but across national borders (Jessop 
2002). Throughout the 1970s, neoliberal economic reform spread
105
 accompanied by the 
globalisation of financial markets, production, capital and labour across increasingly 
permeable borders (See Levitt 1983; Mittleman 1996; Castells 2000; Scholte 2000).  
 
The debate over the empirical reality of globalisation as a truly 'global' project has led to the 
divergence of two main strands of thought between the 'hyper-globalisers' and the 'sceptics'
. 
Both schools of thought debate the role of the state within the rhetoric of globalisation, for the 
hyper-globalists, the globalisation of  markets have circumvented the control of nation-states, 
leaving them at the mercy of capital (see Ohmae 1990, 1995, Cox 1996). The Sceptics, 
however, argue that the unmitigated spread of capital is an exaggeration and that empirically 
globalisation is unevenly distributed, with a key role still played by the state (see Hirst and 
Thompson 1996; Sutcliffe and Glyn 1999) Although important, this debate is not interrogated 
within this chapter and instead aims to focus on what tends to be mutually accepted by both 
schools of thought, that despite questions of empirical globality, economic globalisation can 
still be seen as synonymous with a neoliberal form of ideology in its attempted expansion (see 
Gill 1995; Rupert 1995). Hay (2004, p508) usefully outlines seven traits that can briefly 
summarise and define the common principles of neoliberalism that were applied: 
 
 1. Promotion of the market as an efficient mechanism for allocating scarce resources. 
                                                                                                                                                        
were created to stabilise the global economy through state based cooperation and backed by a regulated 
system of fixed exchange rates. In the early 1970s, the economy went through a period of stagflation 
resulting in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system as a regulator of the global economy, instead many 
countries began to float their currencies and left markets to determine exchange rates. 
105
 Very few countries globally have resisted the shift towards some form of neoliberal economic strategy, from 
the often cited Thatcher and Reagan administrations in the UK and US (see Hall 1988; Prasad 2006; Hunt 
2007), the Scandinavian traditional social democracies (Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999), post-apartheid 
South Africa (Bramble and Barchiesi 2003) and even China (Wang 2003) has embraced elements of this 
doctrine 
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 2. The attempt to globalise a regime of free trade and capital mobility. 
 3. A non-interventionist role for the state, except as facilitator or market mechanisms. 
 4. The rejection of Keynesian demand-management techniques in favour of monetarist or 
neo-monetarist supply-side economics. 
 5. The removal of those welfare benefits that could be perceived as disincentives to 
market participation. 
 6. A defence of labour-market flexibility and the promotion of cost competitiveness. 
7. The promotion of private finance in public projects, and market mechanisms in  
the provision of public goods. 
 
Whilst many of these neoliberal reforms were introduced as a response to the economic crisis, 
or because of the perceived benefits to a closer integration with the 'global economy', 
neoliberal policies shifted from an economic response to a crisis, towards an explicit political 
project that sought to expand the logics of its economic doctrine globally through the core 
MEIs, under the rubric of development and poverty reduction.  
 
During the 1982 debt crisis that hit South America, the US administration under Reagan 
offered a helping-hand through the granting of loan packages from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
106
, attached with strict conditionalities requiring states to 
reformulate their economic policies along neoliberal lines, known as Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs). SAPs were loans designed to stimulate structural adjustment of a 
country's economic sector and became a 'good development practice' framework that was 
replicated globally to those countries that had high levels of debt and inefficient centralised 
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 Although it is usually seen as the IMF as the institution that initates loans to developing countries attached 
with conditionalities, the World Bank in the 1980s moved closer to this model and the two were often drawn 
upon simultaneously (see Bird 1994) 
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economies. Both the World Bank and the IMF lend through SAPs, though the former tends to 
be more project based and the latter on a macroeconomic scale to reduce fiscal imbalances. 
The Bank also lends through Structural Adjustment Credit (SACs) from its IDA department, 
which are interest free. For the purposes of this chapter it is worth noting that despite the 
different intentions, they all have the same conditionalities in their structural application.  
 
SAPs lent under the IMF's Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 became synonymous 
with the expansion and penetration of neoliberal policies within developing countries, and 
involved the re-structuring of  macroeconomic systems alongside monetarist lines to ensure 
the 'opening up' of the economy through a de-restriction of trade, state deregulation of market 
mechanisms, fiscal and budgetary austerity, reduction of social welfare, and the increased 
privatisation of key industries away from the bureaucracy (IMF/WB 1987a; IMF 1997; 
Milward 2000). These loan packages were globally reproduced without interrogation of 
country specificities and  resulted in a wave of criticism from within and outside of the policy 
environment aimed at the systematic intensification of the 'Washington Consensus
107
 policies 
that were permeating societal structures under 'dogmatic neoliberal ideology' (Fine 2003, p2).  
 
Before discussing these criticisms and the policy response, it is worth reiterating here the 
ideological role of neoliberalism as a specific project that incorporates the market as its 
primary referent and the economistic formulation of instrumental rationality that it imposes on 
social models of organisation. At its basis neoliberalism has become a dominant economic 
paradigm, premised upon Rational Choice Theory (RCT) and the assumed consequential 
reproduction of instrumental rationality of bureaucrats, politicians and electors as self-
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  First coined by John Williamson (1990) to categorise the policies coming out of the key financial 
institutions,  such as free trade, fiscal restraint, deregulation and privitisation as integral to growth and 
stability (see Williamson 1990, 1993) 
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interested, economistic agents (Hay 2004, p509). RCT therefore valorises the progressive 
rationalisation of western society through the 'colonisation' of rationality under a single 
universal mode of human decision-making; homo economicus  (Archer 2000, p36, Petit 2001, 
Hollis and Nell 1975, Williams 1999).  
 
The turn to homo economicus, or 'rational economic man', as the idealised rational actor 
under neoliberal frameworks, assumes the separation of scientific facts from values in order to 
obtain objective decisions
108
, in doing so, the attempted separation and subversion of values 
seeks to eradicate those modes of reasoning representing instability, spontaneity and 
unpredictability within economic frameworks such as what Flam describes as 'emotional man' 
(1990, p42), or homo sociologicus (Archer 2000, Anderson 2000). Rational economic man is 
a calculating, consistent, competitive, selfish  utility-maximiser that disregards social context 
as a distortion
109
, this of course relies upon observing the human model as imbued with a 
certain egocentric quality and a level of instrumentality centred around 'self-centredness' 
through which action is only undertaken in response to desire (Petit 2001, p77)
110
. These 
desires are to be nurtured through the construction of frameworks ensuring the freedom and 
autonomy of homo economicus; the market
111
. The ideal concept of a free market is one that 
is isolated from social contexts of any significance. There is therefore no political regulation 
                                                 
108
 Clearly this form of reasoning is based upon a positivist epistemology that is purely descriptive and 
determines objective truth through the separation of distorting values from scientific evaluations (Popper 
1976, p97). In this respect a model of human nature was constructed that allowed the dispensing of social 
distortions from the natural capacity to be selfish and utility maximising (Hollis and Nell 1975, p49). 
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 The eradication of the social dimension, includes cooperation, altruism and creative questions of normativity 
(Anderson 2000). The separation of 'is' and 'ought' suggests the law of nature and the law of social norms are 
autonomous spheres, one of facts, the other of values and in true positivist fashion, the aim of theory is to 
elevate the neutral whilst rejecting the normative (Habermas 1976, p144, Nicholson 1994, p140) 
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 Various feminist authors have challenged these assumptions of rational economic man for its inherent 
masculine bias present within the construction of the subject, consistent with a model of human nature that 
valourises Hobbesian man as an unemotional economic actor associated with the logic of the competitive 
market (see Tickner 1992 chp3, Hewitson 1999; Runyan 1997, Waylen 2000, England 1993) 
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 Of course this can be seen as the paradox of RCT; frameworks to nurture the autoonomy of individuals to 
make free choices, yet the only choice available according to this model is the rational one (Hay 2002, p103-
104) 
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from the state and no influence on market exchanges from the social and cultural values of the 
surrounding society (Dawson 2000, p1). Under the neoliberal model, forms of governance are 
constructed that are driven by 'objective' technocrats
112
 and professionals in order to create the 
right conditions for the free market to function at its optimum levels; competition, 
transparency and efficiency become the criteria of governance in order to allow the 
flourishing of homo economicus and by (atomistic) proxy; firms.  
 
It is here that we encounter the project of neoliberalism as an explicit attempt to expand not 
just the free market, but the values of the free market into society. As Harvey argues, 
neoliberalism is ―an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and 
substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs...It holds that the social good will be 
maximised by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to 
bring all human action into the domain of the market‖ (Harvey 2005, p3). The notion of the 
market as a social good, detracts from the idea of neoliberalism as simply an economic theory, 
and allows economists to link the pursuit of self-interest with a wider more normative 
ambition to re-construct the social (Williams 1999). Gill argues that this represents a form of 
'disciplinary neoliberalism' through an attempt to re-model society through a form of market 
civilisation (1995, 2002). There is an explicit attempt here through the expansion of neoliberal 
policies and frameworks to ‗de-politicise' forms of social organisation to be replaced by a 
technical, neutral and rational subject that can express freedom through the economic market, 
perhaps best summarised through Margaret Thatcher's belief that ―economics are the method; 
the object is to change the soul‖ (1981).  
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 Technocrats are seen as individuals who tend to lack electoral experience and instead derive their expertise 
from the more positivistic and 'hard' elements of social science- economics, business administration etc... 
(Schneider 1998)  
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This links back to the Frankfurt School's critique of modernity and specifically Habermas' 
colonisation of the lifeworld thesis where instrumental modes of rationality attempt to subvert 
critical and social forms of organisation. The neoliberal production of an economistic form of 
subjectivity creates an autonomous economic system that is importantly supported through 
the (state) administrative sphere in a complementary role (Habermas 2001, p15). It is within 
Habermas' dualistic conception of the system that one can observe both the profit and 
competition driven logics of the economic sphere and its supporting 
administrative/bureaucratic sphere of productivity and efficiency utilised under the neoliberal 
model as a consumption smoothing process for the market.
113
 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the critical literature acknowledges the problems of 
domination and exclusion present within the forms of economic rationality that are produced 
and intensified under the neoliberal project, however, it clings to the solutions offered by a 
communicatively competent model of civil society that can effectively steer these 
instrumental modes of rationality present within contemporary structures of global 
governance. What this analysis lacks is a recognition that neoliberal forms of global 
governance have recently actively engaged with the concept of civil society under its new 
approach to democracy and participation, and this global-local link raises important concerns 
regarding the continued idolisation of a form of the local that is deemed communicatively 
homogeneous and able to steer these systemic forms. The Neoliberal democratic project 
essentially expands these systemic forms of rationality into the very identities of CSOs. In 
order understand how this is occurring, it is worth interrogating the emergence of the good 
governance development paradigm from the perspective of the World Bank and its 
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 This idea of the state as an administrative steering mechanism in compliment to market logics is 
demonstrated within the discussion on New Public Management on p116 
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relationship with the localities of civil society, and then demonstrate how this has been 
replicated through the frameworks of the majority of bilateral donors.  
 
2.3 Good Governance and Development 
 
The IMF and World Bank recognised in the late 1980s that the SAPs introduced through 
'external shocks' throughout developing countries were not met with the level of success that 
they had been expecting, reasons given were the limited flexibility of governments to react to 
the proscribed economic changes (IMF/WB 1987b, p20). Governments in non-democratic 
governments for example, faced great difficulties in persuading inefficient and stubborn 
bureaucracies to accept change (IMF/WB 1987b, p495; Stern 1991, p3). This was particularly 
acute in Africa where there was a lot of state resistance to the reform packages being 
implemented, resulting in an 'unmitigated failure' of economic management of the economy 
(Apter and Rosberg 1994; Jilberto and Mommen 1996, p8)  
 
In 1989 the Bank released its report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 
recognising an important new role for the state, not in its minimal and reductionist form 
outside of development as had been advocated under SAPs, but as a better state within 
development frameworks. The report implicitly invoked the need for a democratic state that 
could be of use in supporting the market rather than separate from it (World Bank 1989). 
Although the term better governance was used in this capacity, it wasn't until 1992 that a new 
paradigm began to develop that has risen to unflinching orthodoxy today; good governance.  
 
The term was arguably first coined by head director of the IMF in 1992 when he referred to 
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the need for countries to open up internal democratic mechanisms as a form of 'good 
governance' to ensure ―accountable and active governments that enjoy the trust and support of 
their societies‖ (cited in Woods 2000, p824). In the 1992 World Bank report 'Governance and 
Development' this idea was emphasized further to include the need for good governance to 
implement 'sound development management' and sustain an enabling environment for 
development projects to take root (1992a). Good governance was seen to be introduced into 
policy discourse to combat two main concerns that were plaguing countries in the developing 
world – undemocratic governments and inefficient non-market economies (Weiss 2000). The 
World Bank as expressed in its own articles of agreement cannot set political criteria within 
its development model, and has often loaned to both democratic and non-democratic 
governments in the past, however, the two key shifts emanating from the problems of SAPs in 
authoritarian governments and the collapse of communism in the post-cold war context have 
allowed a more implicit expansion of democratic ideas. Good governance in its early format, 
therefore, tended to refer to the application of public management reform within developing 
states in order to merge free market reform with a model of liberal democracy to promote 
efficient and accountable public administration
114
 (Nelson and Eglington 1992; Leftwich 
1993). 
 
Development assistance became embedded in the political discourse of good governance to 
the extent that conditionalities were attached to aid projects ensuring these two problems were 
directly challenged in order to ensure developing countries would progress economically and 
politically. The absence of good governance was seen as damaging for poverty alleviation 
projects which can be undermined through a lack of public accountability, corruption and elite 
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 According to Leftwich, this approach was novel in that previous attempts to modernise developing countries 
assumed that democracy could arise once economic development had been fulfilled, this approach to good 
governance however brought democratic reform alongside neoliberal market reform (Leftwich 1993).   
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capture (World Bank 1992a, p10). Governance here was concerned primarily with 
concentrating on public sector management reform since the early 1990s, to emphasize the 
need for a smaller state that is enmeshed with a professional and accountable bureaucracy to 
provide an enabling environment for private sector led growth (World Bank 1994). There was 
therefore a  shift towards a strategy of 'New Public Management'  that  arguably reflects a 
strong model of neoliberal rationality designed to improve the overly bureaucratic 
frameworks of donor-recipient states to a more efficient, accountable, decentralised form of 
governance. 
 
New Public Management is an important field of policy making practice and scholarship that 
has rapidly risen in importance since the late 1970s. The growth in interest of this field largely 
stems from the national economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s which suggested a need for 
stricter control over public agencies, implemented in accordance with the neoliberal ideology 
of state minimal-bureaucratic reform (Lynn 2006). NPM became billed as a new form of 
public sector administration that has re-invented the modern state, synonymous with the idea 
of an 'entrepreneurial government
115
 (Osbourne and Gaebler 1992, p328). According to Ketl, 
there are six core components that the NPM draws upon; increasing productivity, encouraging 
market-style incentives, improving service provision through market choice, decentralising 
public ministries, improving policy-making and oversight capacity rather than delivery, and 
incorporating results-driven systems of accountability rather than traditional rule-based 
systems (2005, p1-3). These attributes represent a more private sector oriented approach to 
government with its preference for quality and performance management (Lynn 2006, 
Polidano 1999) and shifted towards greater levels of auditing to ensure that governments 
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 Note how this is similar to Habermas' notion of the entrepreneurial state as the hallmark of systemic modes 
of rationality, administrative and market logics combined (Habermas 2006, p79).  
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remain responsive and accountable, an effect that Power (1997) has dubbed 'the audit society'.  
 
Competition forms an important tenet of NPM deriving from the theoretical basis of rational 
choice theory designed to motivate departments within organisations through internal 
competition and incentives (Gruening 2001). The underlying management strategy parallels 
neoliberal economics, whereby public organisations are equated to a theory of the firm acting 
within market structures. Firms are formed and dissolved according to market opportunity, 
being led by external structures (for example shareholders require firms to act on market 
conditions in order to be efficient and have the highest performances). Public institutions are 
being managed according to these same market strategies; focusing upon performance, 
accountability and efficiency as the core values of NPM best practice (Lynn 1998, p234). 
NPM is therefore more than simply a set of management techniques because it implies the 
transition to a certain administrative culture towards a more entrepreneurial form of 
management (Gow and Dufour 2000, p579). This form of administration represents an 
interesting coupling of the systemic imperatives criticised by the Frankfurt school for 
colonising the lifeworld, what NPM represents is the merger between an administrative form 
of governance that operates under market logics; thus there is a synergy between the 'state' 
and 'market' functions of instrumental rationality.  
 
NPM as administrative practice became increasingly popular on a global scale seen as a ‗best 
practice‘ ideology to be implemented throughout various public organisations (Aucoin 1990; 
Osbourne and Gaebler 1992; Hughes 1998; McCourt and Minogue 2001), to the extent that 
some authors have labelled it a 'managerial revolution' (see Clarke and Newman 1993, 1997; 
Kettl 2005; Lane 2000). This managerial revolution is a global phenomenon that ―has gone 
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around the world, affecting all countries, although to considerably different degrees‖ (Lane 
2000, p3). The exporting of SAP best practices globally by the World Bank reflected a strong 
emphasis of these NPM principles on public organisations within developing countries in 
order to remedy the inefficient bureaucracies that were seen as obstacles to macroeconomic 
reform (Ferlie 1996; Polidano 1999; McLaughlin et al 2002). 
 
The NPM drive for good governance exported a decentralised market rationality on 
developing states in order to streamline neoliberal macroeconomic structural reform. This 
narrow focus was, however, to receive much criticism in the mid 1990s, the World Bank in 
particular as the perceived global debt manager became a 'lightening rod' (Brown and Fox 
2000; Nelson 2000)  for these criticisms from both inside and outside of the institution. The 
former World Bank Vice President Joseph Stiglitz criticised the Washington Consensus 
principles for their simplistic market economic outlook (see Stiglitz 1998).  
 
Furthermore, studies of the impacts of SAPs have demonstrated the adverse affects on 
standards of living in developing countries (see UNRISD 1995). Social costs had been 
overlooked and a general ignorance of the urban/rural divide within many developing 
countries where the rural poor have a lack of access to foreign exchange markets and tend 
instead to rely upon subsistence production (Sahn 1994; Zack-Williams 2000). Environmental 
repercussions were also overlooked, where the poorer sectors of society that had now lost 
social safety nets, engaged with 'coping strategies' and ended up over exploiting the natural 
resources now freely available through new markets (Cruz and Repetto 1992; Kaimowitz et al 
1999; Mohan 2000).  
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In response to these criticisms there began to be a shift in emphasis towards a broader notion 
of good governance to include something the Bank had often neglected to consider in its 
formation of development projects; inclusion of non-world bank actors. The Bank recognised 
that it had to pay closer attention to the individuals and groups affected by these development 
projects and so a key aim became the attempt to involve them as stakeholders within the 
design and implementation stage (Adams 1999, p70).  
 
The focus of lending to more accountable governments was combined, following the Portfolio 
Management Review Task Force's 1992 'Next Steps' action programme, with a need to shift 
towards more local ownership of development projects including Country Assistance Strategy 
(CAS) plans (World Bank 1992b). In this respect the World Bank were announcing that 
―participation116 is intrinsic to good governance‖ (World Bank 1994, p42). The rationale 
behind this was that through the inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders, Bank projects 
would be seen as more legitimate and responsive to the needs of communities; ultimately they 
would be more successful (Adams 1999, p70). This is significant as previously the World 
Bank has historically been antithetical towards notions of public participation (see Cahn 
1993). Previous projects at the Bank were implemented via an 'external expert stance' as 
opposed to the new focus that has developed throughout the mid 1990s turning towards a 
'participatory stance', the former representing the construction of projects through outside 
experts applying their knowledge to local contexts, whilst the participatory stance shifts 
development project construction towards the local context for preparation (World Bank 
1996, p3-4).  
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―Participation is a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development 
initiatives and the decisions and resources which effect them‖ (World Bank 1996, pXI)  
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This is important because it represents a shift in the recognition that democratic governance is 
not simply about reformation of government actors within bureaucratic frameworks (and thus 
reformation of the representative democracy model) but towards an understanding of 
participatory forms of democracy that are held as key to the success of development projects. 
 
This approach was not simply concerned with state-centric notions of participation as 
formulated by an elite in the donor-recipient country, but to be effectively combined at a 
community level. The strategy to involve greater levels of community participation in these 
projects is designed to ensure the smooth functioning of their implementation, the bank learnt 
in the wake of criticisms for its externally enforced development policies that it would need 
local participants to ensure support. Former World Bank President James Wolfensohn
117
 
stated in 1996 that moving towards support for more participatory mechanisms within its 
projects was a new direction and integral as, ―those people affected by development 
interventions must be included in the decision-making process‖ (cited in World Bank 1996, 
pIX). This more inclusive definition of good governance moves away from the narrow state 
administrative definition of the early 1990s, and mirrors closely the more social definition 
promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as:  
 
Participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective 
and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that 
corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that 
the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is 
also responsive to the present and future needs of society (cited in Richards 2003, 
p1) 
 
The shift here towards an acceptance of a multi-stakeholder approach to good governance, 
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 Wolfensohn is an important figure in this shifting perspective from the Bank, his appointment was seen as a 
reaction against the unpopular image of the bank in the wake of the criticism of SAPs, thus his mission was 
to carve out a new mission for the bank and re-build its legitimacy (see Pender 2002)  
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retains a core emphasis upon the eradication of corruption and the need for an efficient and 
effective form of development, however, it reveals a new emphasis upon the community and 
decisions undertaken by the local populace; in effect there is an acceptance that a 
participatory form of democracy is required in order to ensure that good governance will lead 
to a sound poverty reduction framework. This 'democratic good governance' mirrors the 
previous cosmopolitan project by accepting an implicit form of 'the all-affected principle' as 
fundamental to development. 
 
The introduction of a more inclusive stakeholder approach to development under democratic 
good governance strategies, creates what Mohan and Stokke call a 'revised' neoliberalism 
(2000) that accepts that markets cannot be the sole responsibility for social equality and 
determinate of welfare, thus there is a need to consult with local actors within civil society to 
construct more inclusive and participatory approaches.  As a consequence many began to talk 
about a new, ‗Post-Washington Consensus' (PWC) that emerged; a new institutional approach 
that recognised the need for non-market means to deal with market imperfections (Fine 2001, 
p142). This in some respects represents a break from the Washington Consensus because it 
recognises that market imperfections can occur, therefore actors such as the state and civil 
society are required to intervene, particularly in the sphere of public goods and welfare 
provision. This emanates from a new form of macroeconomic thinking that accepts an 
important role for welfare provision within the dominant NPM framework: New Institutional 
Economics (NIE). NIE attempts to expand the role of institutions within development 
frameworks, questioning the perceived notion that the market left to its own devices will 
produce a more beneficial outcome (Stiglitz 1989; North 1990, 1997; Williamson 2000). The 
perceived problems with implementing SAPs led to a new interest in NIE and towards 
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constructing a more comprehensive framework surrounding broader notions of poverty 
reduction and good governance in order to make markets work (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p12).  
 
This shift away from the narrow market confines of neoliberal macroeconomics, has been 
reflected within the popular discourse of 'Third Way' politics
118
, representing a compromise 
between the overly centralised state and the laissez-faire practices of the market (see Giddens 
1998, Blair 1998).  Stiglitz attempted to expand the core values of the Washington Consensus 
through a broader analysis of the quality of the institutions that underpin markets, 
privatisation and market liberalisation cannot be seen to work in the interests of the poor 
unless they are accompanied by a strong regulatory structure (1999, p587-588). Welfare 
economics are seen as important within developing countries where privatisation has failed to 
create the competition necessary for a thriving economy, and to this end the state and civil 
society must play a more collaborative role as a ―complement to markets, undertaking actions 
that make markets work better and correcting market failures‖119 (Stiglitz 1998). This 
approach encapsulates a new consensual relationship between the public and the private under 
the form of 'welfare pluralism' (Cook and White 2001, p26). The World Bank's 2002 
development report 'building institutions for markets' reflects the organisation's shift towards 
a broader framework that accepts markets cannot operate along and require the (limited) 
intervention of the state in a supporting capacity to facilitate a healthy market structure 
(2002).  
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 The Third Way represents a form of politics that dominated the late 1990s agenda of the UK under Blair, the 
US under Clinton, and Germany under Schroeder. Billed as a way to reinvigorate social democracy in the 
wake of neoliberal economic dominance of the previous decade, the Third Way suggests that a synthesis can 
be obtained between social justice and neoliberal economics.  
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  It is somewhat ironic that the first to coin the term neoliberalism, Alexander Rustow, envisaged a form of 
third way politics that involved a greater institutional role for the state (see Hartwich 2009)  
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The shift emphasises a more socially orientated infrastructure, pluralistic forms of 
governance, the promotion of partnerships between the public and private sector, and greater 
stakeholder participation within institutions (Edwards and Gaventa 2001, p2-3). Ultimately, 
and what is important here, is that the broadening of non-market solutions to welfare now 
includes a greater engagement with civil society under this notion of welfare pluralism, and as 
will be outlined below, this has combined with a new participatory role for civil society within 
poverty reduction frameworks (Burki and Perry 1998; Fine et al 2001; Edwards and Gaventa 
2001).  
 
However, despite the rhetoric of a broader development agenda, the inclusion of civil society 
arguably represents another layer of this 'enabling environment' for the market, and has 
steadily come to be perceived  as being essential to the continuation of a more pluralistic form 
of the Washington Consensus (Edwards 2001; Weber 2004; Mercer 2003; Crawford 2003). As 
a consequence it can still be seen as 'economic reductionist' through the application of 
neoliberal principles that attempt to ―aggressively...colonise the other social sciences by 
extending its methods to them, treating non-economic or non-market relations as if they were 
economic‖ (Fine 2003b, p8, see also Harriss 2002; Ferguson 1990).  
 
The close link with NIE under the post-Washington consensus is seen here as a simple 
progression from the previous neoliberal economic paradigm because it ―builds on, modifies, 
and extends neo-classical theory to permit it to come to deal with an entire range of issues‖ 
(North 1997 p17). The popularity of the NIE inspired Third Way politics, and the linking of 
public/private partnerships,
120
 is still recognised as embracing the logics of private sector 
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 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are services that are joint funded by both the public (state) and private 
(market) sector, often to promote urban and rural regeneration and shift away from an exclusive public 
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rationality and thus reflecting a neoliberal form of economic reductionism (Moore 1999; 
Callinicos 2001; Ryner 2002; Dent, Chandler and Barry 2004; Cutler 2004). We should be 
careful not to equate post-Washington extension with transformation; NPM principles are still 
eagerly applied to public agencies, and as this chapter will outline, they have simply expanded 
into new avenues that include civil society.  
 
There may be a shift in emphasis towards broader notions of participation, democratisation 
and civil society, yet at the core the same authoritarian principles apply that treats the political 
as an economic realm. For example, the World Bank approach to initiate new Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)
121
 as a way of increasing participation from the donor 
recipient, is still described by a variety of authors as simply a more subtle way to legitimise 
the continual exposure to neoliberal market led reform strategies
.
(Cooke and Kothari 2001; 
Craig and Porter 2003; Cooke 2004; Chakravati 2005). The PWC can be seen as a further 
saturation of neoliberal market mentality in that the previous preoccupation of a sole focus on 
the role of the market  (vis-a-vis the state and civil society) is to be fully implemented 
throughout the triadic structure in a more inclusive and pluralist framework.  
 
It is important to now analyse what this supposed new role is for civil society that the World 
Bank has forged in its participatory and democratic turn under the post-Washington 
consensus.  The Bank's initial interaction with civil society occurred in the 1970s through 
open dialogue with NGOs
122
 concerned about the environment (World Bank 2009). The 
                                                                                                                                                        
funded service industry (see Osbourne 2000)  
121
  PRSPs are the new form of SAPs introduced in 1999, designed to be more inclusive through the designing, 
implementing and monitoring being undertaken by the recipient donor state. They are also supposed to 
include a greater variety of stakeholders such as civil society in their consultation stages (see World Bank 
2009) 
122
 In the 1997 development Report the World Bank identifies NGOs as the 'missing middle' between active 
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potential for closer interaction with NGOs working within the development context in the late 
1980s was recognised by former World Bank President Barber Conable who argued that 
―government policies and public programs play a critical role in poverty alleviation. But 
governments cannot do everything. Non-governmental organizations in many developing 
countries have enormous potential for flexible and effective action‖ (Conable cited in Salmen 
and Eaves 1989, p1). World Bank-NGO meetings at this time placed a priority on expanding 
NGO services towards attempting to mitigate the negative effects of structural adjustment 
loans (Salmen and Eaves 1989, p3). At this stage however, interaction with NGOs was 
minimal
123
, and tended to reflect the dominant ideas at the time that NGOs were a separate 
humanitarian phenomenon that could prove useful as supplements to those drastically effected 
by welfare state reduction strategies.   
 
In 1994, the World Bank began to recognise the role that NGOs could play within this new 
good governance architecture and that although they were not seen by the bank as ensuring 
greater levels of participation within projects at this time, ―they are nonetheless likely to 
continue to play an intermediary role in channelling information to and from beneficiaries‖ 
(World Bank 1994, p44).
124
 The reliance upon a narrow understanding of NGOs as 
supplements to structural adjustment began to transform with this new emphasis of a broader 
notion of good governance to include democratic frameworks that recognised the integral role 
of civil society within development. Alongside the World Bank's new terminology of 'Civil 
                                                                                                                                                        
citizens and the state (1997, p114) 
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 Between 1973 and 1988 only 5.6% of World Bank supported projects involved NGOs (Salmen and Eaves 
1989, p7), this had significantly increased by 1993 to an involvement in around 30% of World Bank projects 
(World Bank 1994, p44). 
124
 NGOs campaigning for greater participation in the Banks poverty reform agenda have framed participation as 
the inclusion of stakeholders in the decision making process. The Bank has responded in similar fashion to 
the IMF (see Scholte 2000) by seeing problems of project implementation being smoother integrated if 
communities have a voice in the process (Nelson 2000, p157). 
133 
 
Society Organisations' (CSOs)
125
 there became an understanding within the organisation that 
civil society could be at the forefront of democratic reform, essential for the smooth 
integration of an efficient market economy.  
 
A useful summary can be found within the 2007 World Development Report in outlining that 
the reform of governance within developing countries requires: 
 
The reinforcement of civil society as a way of increasing the resilience of social 
institutions...A rich associational life may enable communities to maintain local 
law and order, support a safety net, and resist official corruption and exploitation 
(World Bank 2007a, p160).  
 
Two key roles are highlighted here for CSOs that are important; supporting a safety net, and 
resisting corruption and exploitation. The first describes the long established role of NGOs as 
service providers, however, under the broadening of the good governance framework ―they 
are now seen as the preferred channel for service provision, in deliberate substitution for the 
state‖ (Edwards and Hulme 1996c, p2). The roles for NGOs in development have 
significantly shifted over the last few decades from offering emergency relief, to now a more 
formal role within service delivery. This links into the good governance agenda and involves 
the contracting out of welfare services to NGOs as part of a more democratically 
decentralised and participatory state structure.  
 
The Second role highlights civil society as a democratic watchdog in order to hold corrupt 
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 defined as ―...non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, 
expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, 
religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of 
array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, 
indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and 
foundations‖ (World Bank 2009) 
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governments accountable. NGOs are incorporated here alongside other forms of community 
based organisations (CBOs)
126
 into local governance frameworks in order to in order to tackle 
corruption and demand accountability from government actors. Both roles represent the 
fusing of neoliberalism and democracy through attempting to reformulate a more 
decentralised and participatory form of democracy in the service of the market, in effect 
―...the World Bank valued democracy and pluralism less in their own right and more as a 
means to economic reform and development‖ (Crawford 2001, p14).  
 
This role for civil society in the support of a neoliberal democratic state, is not just associated 
with the World Bank as the key multilateral donor agency in the development context, in fact 
I will argue throughout the rest of this chapter that the majority of bilateral donor agencies 
operating globally have formed an homogeneous understanding of this form of democratic 
good governance, the consequences of which are the construction of what Robinson (1993) 
coins the 'New Policy Agenda' and a specific neoliberal promotion of civil society.  
 
2.4 Donors, civil society and the rise of the New Policy Agenda  
 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there was very little coherence in the development projects 
of International NGOs (INGOs) and bilateral donor agencies, where the latter tended to see 
the former as helpful in aid emergencies but not as development partners (Lewis 2001, p63). 
Donors
127
 throughout the 1980s began to recognise the potential role of NGOs as key to the 
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 This term is increasing in popularity particularly within donor institutions; the World Bank tends to recognise 
that one of the key differences between NGOs and CBOs is the relationship to the community. NGOs are 
often seen as serving a wider variety of individuals, whist CBOs are tied directly to the community from 
which they emerge (see Gibbs et al 1999).  CBOs can therefore be equated with a variety of local 
associations, self-help groups, and committees etc..  
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 There are four main types of donors that fund NGOs within the development context, bilateral donors, 
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internal development of developing countries, being perceived as more efficient, locally 
active, and a cheaper alternative than supplying aid directly to host governments (See Drabek 
1987, Sogge 1996). With the ending of the Cold War and the perceived victory of capitalist 
democratic governance, development aid became increasingly linked with conditionalities 
that challenged authoritarian donor-recipient states to adopt SAPs and conform to Western 
economic models (see Crawford 2001). New forms of conditionality began to be imposed due 
to the perceived problems of authoritarian corruption that led to the collapse of SAPs as the 
stalwart of development, and instead promoted ―the idea that a more democratic and 
accountable state could foster economic growth and development and allow the market to 
operate freely‖ (Howell and Pearce 2001, p40)  
 
Early analysis of the role of donors in this new attempt of democracy promotion through aid 
channels demonstrates a bias in the implementation of formalistic procedural notions of 
democracy as a quick fix solution to the inherent problems within the state structures in 
developing countries (see Stokke 1995). It is important not to reify the image of a highly 
homogeneous set of actors known as the 'donor community', however, development co-
operation centred around democratic reform became the objective of all major donors 
throughout the 1990s, and despite the heterogeneity of projects enacted, all tend to focus on 
liberal democracy and an efficient market economy as the overriding framework that includes 
good governance as the mechanism from which to achieve this (see Crawford 2000; Ottaway 
and Carothers 2000; Hearn 1999; Mohan 2002)
128
. In the contemporary climate with the shift 
towards a more post-Washington conception of development, the differences between the 
donor agencies appears ever more marginal, as the buzzwords 'good governance', 
                                                                                                                                                        
multilateral donors, foundations, and Northern NGOs (Rooy and Robinson 1998).  
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 According to Robinson (1996) civil society was hardly ever mentioned within donor conceptions of good 
governance in the early 1990s 
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'participation' and 'civil society' merge into a dominant paradigm. 
 
This coordination can be observed in the way that donors have developed strong institutional 
linkages for example in 1960, the Development Assistance committee (DAC)
129
 of the 
Organisation for Economic cooperation and development (OECD) was established as ―the 
venue and voice of the world's major bilateral donors‖ (DAC 2006). In 1989 the DAC first 
acknowledged the existence of ―a vital connection between open, democratic and accountable 
political systems, individual rights and the effective and equitable operation of economic 
systems‖ (DAC 1997a).  
 
The emerging post-Cold War environment allowed the opportunities to promote democratic 
governance and resulted in 1993 with DAC approving a working party on Participatory 
Development and Good Governance (PDGG) with the intention of mainstreaming this theme 
into development cooperation
130
. The shift towards PDGG introduces an overarching 
framework that permeates all of the key development goals among various donors, from 
poverty reduction to the reversal of environmental degradation (DAC 1997b). Good 
governance within this framework includes strengthening the rule of law, reforming public 
sector management, fighting corruption and reducing military expenditure, and necessitates 
that the means to this reform stems from a multi stakeholder approach involving civil society 
as a supporting institution for a more participatory development process (DAC 1997b). 
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 The DAC serves as an international hub between not just major bilateral donors, but the World Bank and the 
UNDP, and includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
 Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States 
130
 The DAC became aware in the early 1990s that the low levels of development and increasing poverty in 
Asia, South America and Africa were attributed towards 'bad governance' (Van de Sand 1996, p23). 
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The DAC has been instrumental in helping to implement key donor alignment strategies such 
as the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003) and the subsequent Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness (2005) that have attempted to harmonize aid policy among donors and acts 
as a best practice for donor policy coordination. This includes 'eliminating duplication of 
efforts', 'rationalising donor activities' and 'defining measures and standards' (see OECD 
2009a). These moves to harmonize development practices reflect the 'growing convergence' 
between donors on the priority of good governance towards these objectives (OECD 2009b, 
p11), and the role that civil society plays as fundamental to this attainment (OECD 2009b, 
p15).  
 
Civil society has since the 1990s emerged as an important political force within the New 
Policy Agenda, which is driven around two core sets of beliefs; neoliberal economics and 
democratic theory (Moore 1993; Robinson 1993; Edwards and Hulme 1996b) where various 
bilateral and multilateral donors recognise civil society's potential to ―enable choice, 
scrutinise errant governments, and ultimately lead to regularised, plural democracy‖ (Mohan 
2002, p125). The twin roles of service provision and democratic watchdog under this 
framework serves to create the ideal model of a decentralised liberal democracy that is 
responsive to the demands of its citizens but as will be argued in this chapter, subverts these 
actors under a form of market rationality in the service of democracy. The shift towards 
promoting democratic decentralisation, contains a supply side reformulation of public 
administration including improving service delivery, and a demand side that places an 
emphasis upon civil society as integral as a pressure point to demand accountability from the 
state.  
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This PDGG strategy and the dualistic role of civil society under the NPA can be observed 
throughout the majority of bilateral donor mission statements, themes and funding priorities. 
The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) has created a multitude of 
Partnership Programme Agreements (PPAs) to ensure 'strategic' funding agreements with 
major INGOs
131
 including the encouragement of projects to support service provision and 
building voice and accountability mechanisms within developing states. Those INGOs that 
are not part of the PPA process can apply to an annual competitive 'Civil Society Challenge 
Fund' (CSCF) that also encourages 'voice and accountability' and 'service delivery' and 
generally those NGOs that are involved in opening up stronger avenues of participation 
within the state (see DFID 1999)
132 
   
 
United States Aid (USAID) released its 'New Partnership Initiative' in 1995 with an 
acknowledgement that 'civil society' could play an integral role in development as an 
important enabling mechanism for the institutionalisation of the free-market, voluntary 
associations are to have a privileged role in not just the eradication of poverty through service 
provision, but in a supporting capacity to help developing countries 'graduate' from US 
government assistance (USAID 1995). USAID also recognised from 1996 onwards the 
potential that civil society could play under the banner of 'civic advocacy organisations' where 
they would be ―serving as watchdogs in ensuring accountability in government‖ (1996).  
 
Other Donors have a similar understanding of how civil society can be integral to 
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 There are currently 18 PPAs formed through DFID including influential INGOs such as Oxfam, Christian 
Aid and the WWF (DFID 2006). As of 2006, DFID has increased its funding to CSOs by 50% since the 
founding of the organisation in 1997 (2006, p3) 
132
 Funding for NGOs within the developing country context tends to follow two patterns; either NGOs will 
create project proposals to submit to INGOs and bilateral funding agencies  for example DFID‘s Joint 
Funding Scheme (JFS) or Sida‘s NGO Programme, or INGOs and Bilateral funding agencies can subcontract 
the work out to local NGOs and give them the funding required (Lewis 2001, p66) 
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development projects associated with good governance, for example the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) recognising this important link 
where NGOs can act as 'civil society monitoring bodies' and become involved in 'anti-
corruption efforts' (BMZ 2009, p26-28). The Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (Sida) recognises the importance of CSOs as service providers of health and 
education (Sida 2009a) as well as a role in observing anti-corruption to counter balance 
against the state (Sida 2009b). 
 
In the context of development, civil society is seen to have descended from the ivory tower to 
become absorbed into an international aid system as they become ―the topic of the day‖ 
(Rooy 1998, p1). The previous chapter described a specific conceptualisation of civil society 
as analytically distinct from the state and the market, with a normative critique of both for 
their perceived sites of democratic exclusion. The promotion of civil society under 
contemporary development frameworks appears to be starkly different; there is no 
problematisation of the market as a socio-organising principle, in fact this can be deemed part 
of the 'neoliberal school' of civil society due to its emphasizes on democratic good 
governance reforms in order to create market-friendly institutions (Mohan 2002).  
 
The liberal theories of civil society tend to be seen as synonymous with voluntary association 
as the core defining feature, thus including all forms of social groups regardless whether they 
are motivated by wealth, power, religious identity, public interest etc... in essence no groups 
are excluded so long as they are free and consensual voluntary membership organisations 
(Lomasky 2002 p55; Walzer 2002, p35). Larry Diamond describes this form of civil society as 
―the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, 
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autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules‖ (1994, p5).  
 
Under this conception, civil society reaches into both the political and economic domain 
alongside the more typical social notions associated with the term and crucially; ensuring the 
protection of civil society from an interventionist state. Furthermore this relies upon the 
fostering of a 'pluralised network of associations' between the citizen and the state, where the 
state is required to be held in check by an active citizenry (O'Donnell and Scmitter 1986; 
Putnam 1993; Halpern 1999; Anheier and Kendall 2002). The idea of a plurality of 
associations stems from Alex de Tocqueville's influential book Democracy in America, who in 
his research on society in America discovered that: 
 
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form 
associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in 
which we all take part, but associations of a thousand kinds, - religious, moral, 
serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive (1864 p129).  
 
The development of overlapping networks of associations within a democratic society was 
seen as helping to combat the problem of excessive individualism
133
; individuals engaging 
and cooperating with each other offers the best method to ensure a check on the interfering 
powers of the state (Tocqueville 1864). In recent years there has become a revival of the 
Tocquevellian understanding of civil society and its fundamental link with democracy. 
Interest has emerged alongside an important trend occurring in global politics at the time; the 
increasing spread of democracy within many of the ex-Soviet satellite states throughout the 
early 1990s, dubbed at the time as the 'third wave' of democratisation (Huntington 1991, 
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 Individualism here was seen as a product of the democratic system, de Tocqueville was concerned following 
the French Revolution where the feudal structures of the French state that served as intermediaries between 
individuals and government, were eliminated. His analysis of America demonstrated that the atomisation of 
social life under the French democratic system need not follow the same pattern given the emerging complex 
web of associations developing (Watson and Morris 2002, p263-254)  
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1993, 1996, 1997; Fukuyama 1992; Diamond 1996, 1999, Diamond et al 1997). The third 
wave literature emanates from Huntington's analysis of the waves of democratisation that 
have occurred globally, starting in the period 1828-1926, then 1943-1964, and finally the third 
phase from 1974 onwards
134
. The twin pillars of democracy and capitalism were seen as 
triumphant in the face of authoritarianism, and their ideological supremacy has been eagerly 
promoted through 'pressure and conditional assistance' globally (Diamond 1996, p35). Civil 
Society in its liberal dimension was seen as integral to this phase of democratisation; its 
Tocquevillian revival as a bulwark against the authoritarian state (Diamond 1994, 1999). 
 
This revival is often closely associated with Robert Putnam and his work on social capital to 
describe the essential ingredients to a successful and vibrant democracy, founded upon a 
dense network of CSOs. Social Capital is defined by Putnam as ―features of social 
organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate cooperation and 
coordination for mutual benefit‖ (Putnam 1995, p67)135. The importance of fostering networks 
of trust and coordination among CSOs was demonstrated through his research in Italy where 
he argued that communities with high levels of social capital created a form of trust and 
activism that was largely redundant within communities with low levels of social capital, 
characterised by higher levels of corruption (1993). Putnam found that ―the quality of 
governance was determined by longstanding traditions of civic engagement (or its 
absence)...these networks of organised reciprocity and civic solidarity, far from being an 
epiphenomenon of socioeconomic modernization, were a precondition for it‖ (1995, p66). 
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 Huntington recognised that there were empirical patterns emerging in 'waves' where countries would go from 
being undemocratic to democratic and sought to trace the chronology of these occurrences. 
135
 Putnam is only one of a number of authors that have engaged closely with the notion of social capital, 
including Coleman (1988, 1990) and Bordieu (1985), however, the debates on social capital are vast, and for 
the purposes of this chapter it is Putnam's usage that has been drawn upon by development practitioners, and 
therefore warrants further investigation  
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The point here was that communities needed to engage in greater networks in order to create 
forms of overlapping solidarity as fundamental to the health of not just a community but 
democracy itself, thus the importance of localised CSOs was highlighted in order to generate 
extra-community links. High levels of social capital garnered through forms of solidarity, can 
therefore help to balance against the interfering nature of the state (Hadenius and Uggla 1996) 
and represents the very ―sine qua non of stable liberal democracy‖ (Fukuyama 2001, p7).  
 
Putnam's analysis of social capital began to filter through donor discourses on development, 
recognising not just the role that local communities and CSOs could play in ensuring a check 
on the state, but also merged with a specific neoliberal understanding of the importance that 
communities and civil society could play in the nurturing of an enabling environment for the 
market.  
 
Neoliberal economic theories tend to focus on either states, firms or individuals yet the new 
emphasis on civil society is seen as an important bridging mechanism for economic 
development as an institutional arrangement that mediates the space between states and 
markets (Woolcock 1998, p153). Accordingly, the problems of SAPs and the attempt to 
stimulate a private sector can be solved through an understanding that communities require 
high levels of social capital in order to have the confidence, trust and mutual understandings 
to invest in collective economic activities (Pretty 2003, p1912). According to Fukuyama, 
social capital among community groups has an important relationship to the development of a 
healthy free market because it can help reduce the transaction costs ―associated with formal 
coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic rules, and the like‖ (1999, 
p3). The attempt to reduce transaction costs links closely to the economic parameters of game 
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theory, such as the prisoner's dilemma model
136
, aimed ultimately at fostering trust, 
cooperation and transparency to create a more efficient and optimum operation of market 
logics. The opposite occurrence associated with the absence of strong extra-community 
networks between civil society actors creates inward looking community groups that build 
their relations on kinship ties and other familial attachments, this has been blamed for 
problems with integrating the market due to the increase in transaction costs caused by a 
mistrust to outside influences (Woolcock 1998, p171-172). In effect, social capital in its 
highest form requires enough intra-community solidarity in order to produce a bonding 
mechanism between individuals (though too much will create an inefficient inward looking 
community that increases market transaction costs based upon loyalties and kinship bias), 
whilst generating enough extra-community links to ensure that members can expand their 
access to other markets and remain competitive and efficient (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). 
Communities that are linked with a diverse stock of social networks and CSOs are are seen as 
being in a stronger position to alleviate poverty and undermine vulnerability, whilst having 
the opportunities to participate in the market (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, Moser 1996)  
 
It is here that one can find the neoliberal underpinnings of civil society that has combined a 
'tacit acceptance' of this liberal notion of civil society as an integral ingredient for democratic 
association, whilst combining it with neoliberal political discourse emphasizing free market 
economics (McIlwaine 1998, p654). The moral domain of this interpretation of civil society 
suggests that the good life is to be found only within the market place, ―where individual men 
and women, consumers rather than producers, choose among a maximum number of options‖ 
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 A model in game theory that demonstrates that in some instances only suboptimal outcomes are possible 
under market logics requiring the construction of an enabling environment to guarantee optimal outcomes 
(see Axelrod 1984).  
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(Walzer 1998, p296)
137
. This of course elevates the idea of freedom and choice, those core 
pillars of liberal thought, however, the neoliberal 'twist' situates these values within the 
domain of the market as a moral good in itself. Taken to its extreme, the neoliberal view of 
democracy views the role of government as an apparatus of public administration, and society 
as a ―market-structured network of interactions among persons‖ (Habermas 1999a, p135). 
 
The World Bank became interested in social capital debates following Putnam's 1993 
publication, inviting him as a frequent advisor to various projects, recognising that the social 
agenda being promoted could complement the overtly economistic reputation of the Bank 
(Bebbington et al 2004, p41). The World Bank's acknowledgement of social capital first 
appeared in the 1997 development report where it was defined as ―the informal rules, norms, 
and long-term relationships that facilitate coordinated action and enable people to undertake 
cooperative ventures for mutual advantage‖ (World Bank 1997, p114). Wolfensohn's emphasis 
upon a new direction for the Bank of including non-market actors within a post-Washington 
consensus understanding of development, under the new broader understanding of democratic 
good governance, was seen as  ―critical for effectively tapping social capital's development 
potential‖ (Fox and Gershman 2000, p173). Although there were a variety of social capital 
debates within the internal departments of the Bank
138
, the most popular conception 
acknowledges social capital as attempting to create a more efficient and equitable exchange of 
service provision, thus to draw upon a notion of social capital that is highly embedded in a 
neoliberal economic understanding (Bebbington et al 2004, p40).  
 
The second dimension of social capital is that the distribution of public goods such as those 
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 Indeed the state can be seen as having a negative impact on the accumulation of social capital, ―when they 
start to undertake activities that are better left to the private sector or to civil society‖ (Fukuyama 1999, p11).  
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 For an interesting discussion on these debates see Francis (2002).  
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involving NGOs and state ministries, can be strengthened and made more accountable when 
communities have a greater participatory role in informing public officials of problems arising 
in their distribution, and pressurising them to improve the situation (World Bank 1997, p117). 
Again this links with the role for civil society as a democratic watchdog of a decentralised 
state to ―match public services more closely with local demands and preferences and to build 
more responsive and accountable government from below‖  (World Bank 1997, p120). The 
role of the state under these frameworks is to provide an enabling environment such as 
implementing the rule of law to ensure individuals have full access in the designing and 
implementation of development projects, in this way the state is deemed responsible for 
―safeguarding the right of people to organise, to gain access to information, to engage in 
contracts, and to own and manage assets (World Bank 1997, p120).  
 
The literature on social capital that is emerging within key development institutions such as 
the World Bank, reflects the linking of the democratic good governance agenda with the 
community itself, and demonstrates how neoliberal conceptions of civil society can link 
explicitly with the grassroots basis of civil society as well as the more formalised NGOs that 
have come to populate the new policy agenda. The development narrative thus far generated 
within this chapter, describes a path of neoliberal  governance that has shifted from excluding 
civil society as unimportant to development, to an understanding that a strong civil society is 
the fundamental precondition for development. It is here that an important link between the 
global and the local is created; neoliberal economic policies emanating from a global 
collaboration of multilateral and bilateral institutions have permeated national borders and 
incorporated the formal entities of civil society under the NPA,  even shifting recently with 
the re-invigorated interest in social capital, to the very grassroots community groups 
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themselves. As I have described previously, there tends to be two important roles involving 
civil society here, firstly in the role of service providers to communities under the new interest 
in welfare pluralism and secondly, in the role of monitoring the state (including service 
provision) to ensure stronger levels of accountability between citizens and the state.  
 
The chapter will now turn to a brief abstract analysis of the effect these two roles under the 
NPA have on the identity of CSOs, before moving towards a more contextual analysis within 
the case study on Cambodia in the succeeding chapter. I will argue that  
these new spaces created for civil society result in a more professional, efficient and technical 
sector, a direct result of the administrative transformations occurring specifically within NGO 
identities, and a greater enmeshment within the logics of the market. Both represent systemic 
interventions in the production of CSO identities and raise questions as to their representation 
as communicative actors under this framework.  
 
2.5 Service Provision: NGOs and the 'Magic Bullet'  
 
According to Clayton et al (2000) there are arguably two 'major global policy changes' that 
have been instrumental in the construction of an NGO-led industry in service provision, firstly 
the increased interest in civil society following the democratisation trends in the early 1990s 
and the new good governance agenda designed to consolidate these transitions. Secondly the 
emergence of the NPM paradigm led to the contracting out of service provision to the private 
sector as part of a bureaucratic overhaul (Ferlie 1996, Knapp et al 2001, McLaughlin et al 
2002). These changes created a proliferation of NGOs within development policy and a new 
role for them within decentralised welfare systems. NGOs have traditionally played a vital 
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role in providing social services in the wake of 'complex political emergencies' (Clayton et al 
2000, p5), however, the difference in the contemporary development climate is the way in 
which they are being incorporated within the mainstream development policies as a 
substitution for the bureaucratic state; part of a new 'shadow state' (Karim 2008, p6).  
 
NGOs have often been recognised by donors as ideal models to deliver services to the poor
139
,  
often equated with the idea of a 'magic bullet' (Vivian 1994), specialist quick-fix solutions to 
humanitarian emergencies and more recently, cheap effective and viable alternatives to state 
sector service provision. NGOs are seen as having a comparative advantage in low-cost 
service provision when compared to the overly bureaucratic public sector, and can reach the 
most vulnerable and inaccessible groups of beneficiaries more effectively than government 
counterparts (Salmen and Eaves 1989; World Bank 1993). They are seen as flexible and 
specialised, thus donors feel they can pick and choose those that suit particular projects whilst 
dispensing with those that do not (Smith and Lipsky 1993), as well as being closer to the 
community in order to understand the needs of the people (Ullah et al 2006). They are seen as 
an effective 'ideological antidote' for the failures of previous development aid that had merely 
reduced welfare programmes without looking at the role civil society could play in offering 
alternatives (Belloni 2001, p178). Furthermore, NGOs within this service provision role 
become 'intermediaries'; linking community needs and interests, with external funding sources 
(Tijl 1987, p53).  
 
The result of renewed interest under good governance strategies is that NGOs have become a 
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 This is, however, still a debatable claim, and very little evidence is available to analyse the long term ability 
of NGOs to bring about poverty reducing services to the poorest groups (see Biekart 1998, Oakley 1999, 
Ridell et al 1997, Gilson et al 1994)  
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dominant force within service provision throughout much of the developing world
140
, highly 
centralised state systems have been significantly reduced through decentralised bureaucratic 
reform; disposition of state based welfare responsibilities has led to the contracting out of 
work to a more professional sector, one where NGOs have been seen as ideal to fulfil this gap 
(White 1999). What has been the effect of this increase in funding opportunities and spaces 
for NGOs within a new framework of neoliberal governance? The effect, as I wish to outline 
here, is that their engagement with mainstream neoliberal notions of development, has had a 
transformatory effect on the internal structures of NGOs and that their very identities as 
(quasi) autonomous
141
 organisations have become intertwined with the neoliberal valorisation 
of homo economicus; professional, competitive, efficient, and separative from the social 
context within which they interact. 
 
The increase in funding and spaces available for NGOs has created a 'development 
marketplace' within the service provision industry
142
, this has combined with an increased 
effort on the behalf of donors to 'improve' the efficiency and structures of  NGOs to ensure 
that they can fulfil these roles in the absence of the state. Donors have sought to make NGOs 
more accountable as a fundamental criterion within funding initiatives, through the infusing 
of New Public Management strategies directly into their frameworks to create a 'professional' 
form of NGO that can implement donor projects more smoothly (Dichter 1999, Silliman 
1999, Alvarez 1999; Jad 2004; Bradshaw 2006; Fernando 2006b, Gideon 2008). 
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 There are numerous studies of this new service provision role for NGOs, for example in Africa (Semboja and 
Therkildsen 1995; Gary 1996; Abrahamsen 2001, Mohan 2002; Pfeiffer 2004) South America (McIlwaine 
1998; Schild 2002) and Asia (Freizer 2004)  
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 It must be reiterated here that CSOs in the development context, and in particular NGOs, are often indirectly 
funded from the state, however their role has always been outside of the domain of the state and the market 
within a developing country.  
142
 NGOs that work within the development context are increasingly dependent upon official bilateral and 
multilateral sources for their income, it is generally accepted that those not dependent upon these sources are 
becoming more the exception rather than the norm (Edwards and Hulme 1996c, p3) 
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Accountability within this context has been narrowly interpreted to link closely with NPM 
through accountancy, evaluation and audit procedures in an attempt to be responsible for the 
funds that are channelled through them (Frumkin and Andre-Clark 2000 p405; Frumkin 2003; 
Sievers 2004; Dixon, Ritchie and Siwala 2006 ). As a consequence a culture of audit appears, 
where NGO's attempt to appear 'fundable' to their donors
143
, often instilling projects that can 
be quantitatively measured, monitored and evaluated in order to have the best chances of 
demonstrating success (Vivian 1994; Guthman 2008).  
 
NGOs, unlike businesses within the private sector, have no 'bottom-line' against which 
performance can be measured and therefore are not subject to the same judgement criteria, 
however as demonstrated here, they are now integrating private sector notions of 
accountability resulting in, ―imposed systems of accountability deriving from linear world 
views, with targets and sanctions to be imposed in the event of non-achievement‖ (Desai and 
Howes 1996, p84). The results of course ultimately lead to what Edwards and Hulme 
recognise as a ―tendency to ―accountancy‖ rather than ―accountability‖, audit rather than 
learning‖ (1996c, p13). In essence new forms of participation and inclusion within service 
provision have been restructured under NPM principles towards performance based 
measurement and management improvement (Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999, p348).  
 
Public administration reform is traditionally associated within the confines of the 
developmental state, however the rise of a new development culture surrounding an inclusive 
NGO community involved in service delivery has simply shifted what Cooke calls 'neoliberal 
modernity' away from statist variants to a more decentralised form (2004, p610). Fyfe labels 
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 Often NGOs must succeed to donor demands because if they are not deemed fund-able, they will more often 
than not cease to exist as a viable organisation, whilst donors can simply find a more efficient and obedient 
NGO to fund (Walker et al 2007).  
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these professional NGOs as demonstrating a more 'managerial' model towards poverty 
reduction through good practice frameworks that tend to reinforce a form of economic 
rationality within the organization (2005, p544). This creates a separation between more 
informal organizations that concentrate on community input, and 'corporatist' groups that 
concentrate heavily on vertical conceptions of accountability to donors and consequently 
construct more professionalised audit mechanisms (Fyfe and Milligan 2003). NGO 
accountability mechanisms have been at the forefront of discussion under the NPA and their 
elevated status within development projects, and whilst there has been much (needed) talk of 
self-regulation standards as fundamental to good organisational practice
144
, there is still a 
dominant focus on vertical accountability towards donors and external funding sources 
(Fisher 1994; Edwards and Hulme 1996b; Dagnino 2007; Dolinhow 2001).  
 
These corporatist organisations are the result of NGOs 'scaling-up' in order to meet the new 
demands required by donors in terms of management efficiency and also in order to 
effectively expand operations in order to meet the increased supply. How can NGOs 
effectively scale-up? Wils (1996) establishes five different strategies; the transformation to 
BINGOs
145
, through increasing the size and scope of the organisation; multipliers, combining 
a multitude of CBOs in order to expand;  diffusion, the attempt by NGOs to expand their 
knowledge through seminars and publications in order to focus on particular audiences; multi-
actor programming, essentially working alongside political and business actors to increase 
their impact area and finally; mainstreaming, where NGO models are directly incorporated 
into official policy frameworks (1996, p68-73). The consequences are that those NGOs 
attempting to be more professional and expand or establish links with larger development 
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 For a general discussion on internal NGO accountability structures see Jordan and Tuijl (2006) 
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 BINGOs or Big NGOs, are seen here as having more than 500 members and engaging with a budget that 
exceeds one million dollars.  
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players, often a lack of accountability vis-à-vis the very grassroots communities of which they 
aim to serve.
146
 
 
NGOs may be idealized as intermediary organizations, between the local (communities) and 
the global (donors), but rather than being seen as a two-way process of knowledge transfer 
and voice, as suggested within the previous chapter as part of the 'transmission belt', they are 
recognised here as being firmly accountable to the global dimension and therefore to the 
detriment of the local conceptualisation of civil society. The shift in accountability upwards 
can have the effect of 'grossly deforming' the shape and nature of civil society (INTRAC 
1998, p77), and 'distorting the agenda' of NGOs who cannot respond as effectively to 
demands of citizens (Gideon 1998, p311; Freizer 2004). This severing of a link between the 
community and professional NGOs, often results in community projects being designed and 
implemented by a competitive market sector that is more concerned with project output rather 
than community input (Smillie 1994; Fowler 2000, p14), and organisational structure over 
localised specialisation (Gordenker and Weiss 1997, p445). In essence, many of these NGOs 
fail to live up to the representative claims that they entail, the products of donor funding 
rather than social demands for representation (Ottaway and Carothers 2000).   
 
A recent shift in donor strategies of service provision, has been to take an interest in the 
fostering of CBOs such as farmer's associations, women's associations and business 
associations as a strategy of incorporating service provision within their self-help approaches 
to community self-sufficiency, linking directly towards a strong emphasis on the 
Tocquevillian ideal of a multitude of associations incorporated with the free market of choice 
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 conversely, those organisations that attempt to expand downwards through diffusion and multipliers, tend to 
disperse neoliberal forms of identity throughout these grassroots collectivities (as will be demonstrated in 
chapter four) 
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(Anheier 2005, Anheier and Kendall 2002). CBOs, understood in their democratic capacity as 
a realm of associations, function within the wider context of 'welfare pluralism' (Robinson 
and White 1997, p79) where they are capable of fulfilling the neoliberal democratic emphasis 
on freedom and choice within an individual self-help environment without state intervention 
(Rankin 2001, p20; Walzer 2002, p41). A typical example of this is the way in which 
microfinance schemes are being globally promoted within a variety of CBO projects
147
.  
 
This localised form of service-provision represents the pinnacle of post-Washington 
Consensus understandings of development, through an enhanced role for welfare strategies 
embedded within collective community projects. Microfinance is said to contribute to the 
levels of social capital within associations because of the way in which it encourages 
members of these associations to form both closer intracommunity ties as a bonding 
mechanism among social groups, and closer extracommunity networks through bridging 
mechanisms with external agencies such as NGOs (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, p231). The 
succeeding chapters will demonstrate, however, that this welfare approach is deeply 
embedded within the market and has important implications for the construction of homo 
economicus at the grassroots level of civil society (Rankin 2001; Weber 2002, 2004; Fernando 
2006). 
 
2.6 Civil Society as a monitoring body for good governance  
 
The elevated role for CSOs within service provision represents the supply side of good 
governance, a method to improve the effectiveness of a liberal democracy with its focus on 
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 The role of microfinance and its relationship to both NGOs and CBOs as a neoliberal form of service 
provision is interrogated within both chapters three and four.  
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decentralised structures of authority. The contemporary support to CSOs acting as democratic 
'watchdogs' represents the demand side of good governance, and has in recent years drawn the 
attention of the donor community as a method of holding the state to account through the 
participation of non-state actors.  
 
Demanding accountability of the state has become a core development goal, where civil 
society is elevated to strengthen ―the demand for reform, promoting and monitoring 
transparency and accountability in the fight against corruption‖ (DCD/DAC 2006). 
Corruption is deemed an important development target because it is seen as ―a symptom of 
weak governance‖ (OECD 2007) therefore it is the antithesis of good governance that has 
been promoted vigorously over the past two decades. After the Paris Declaration on Aid 
effectiveness (2005) the DAC released a list of key principles to guide donors as best practice 
in the fight against corruption
148
, recognising that civil society held a supporting role, as it 
states: 
 
Work, where government commitment is weak, with local and international civil 
society and private sector actors as the primary alternative, but recognising that 
strengthening government commitment is the essential objective in the long term 
(DCD/DAC 2006, p4)  
 
Clearly the need to strengthen civil society is seen here not as an end itself, but in the services 
of an anti-corruption agenda; essential in the construction of the liberal democratic state. In 
order to successfully pluralise and open up the democratic practices of fragile states in 
developing countries, civil society is seen as the bridging mechanism between citizens and the 
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 The DAC/DAD released a report in 2003 outlining the failures of donors in addressing corruption of donor-
recipient governments, this was highlighted by the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and became a 
policy initiative and culminated in the signing of the 'Principles for Donor Action in Anti-Corruption' in 2006 
(see DCD/DAC/GOVNET 2003, DCD/DAC 2006)  
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state through, tasked with constructing an enabling environment that can allow citizens the 
ability to demand accountability from the state for its actions. The World Bank calls this 
'Social Accountability‖ and involves organising citizens and CSOs into frameworks that can 
allow for civic engagement in 'exacting' accountability from the state (Ackerman 2005, World 
Bank 2004a).  
 
There are generally five areas that are targeted as the functional domains of social 
accountability: (1) budgets (2) public policy making and planning, (3) public goods and 
services, (4) expenditures, (5) public oversight and monitoring (Sirker and Cosic 2007). In order 
to enact accountability within these areas, various tools have been implemented by local 
NGOs for citizen and community participation including for example, citizen report cards, 
community score cards, citizen ombudsman offices, citizens juries oversight committees, 
participatory budgeting, social audits, and participatory performance monitoring.  
 
Social accountability initiatives are still in the early stages of experimentation, yet they are 
being globally reproduced
149
, and as I will attempt to briefly argue here, represent another 
neoliberal form of rationality at the heart of civil society. Social Accountability tools 
contribute to the construction of identities within civil society that are akin to the passive and 
technical form of homo economicus; a valorisation of instrumental modes of rationality. As an 
example, the popular citizen report cards
150
 and community score cards
151
 are modelled on 
private sector practice, involving performance monitoring of client satisfaction, including the 
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 For example Arroyo and Sirker (2005), working for the World Bank in a stocktaking exercise, discovered 
over 80 different SA initiatives in 13 countries within the Asia-Pacific Region alone  
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 Report Cards originate in 1994 from the Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in Bangalore, India and have been 
reproduced  around the world (see Paul 1998).  
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 First developed by CARE International in Malawi 2002, these are more specifically designed at the rural 
community level and encourage meetings within villages to discuss issues with service provision and 
evaluate performances through designated indicators. 
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quality, efficiency and adequacy of public service provision. They can be seen as a 'surrogate 
for competition' (Transparency International 2004, p45) for institutions that lack the same 
levels of responsiveness found within the private sector when enterprises respond to a client's 
needs, therefore they offer a ―comparative and competitive dynamic similar to that imposed 
by the market‖ (Ackerman 2005, p14). In order for them to be successfully implemented they 
are linked by donors with the more technical minded NGOs that can serve as intermediaries 
between demanding citizens and the accountable state (Paul 2004). NGOs can respond to 
citizens' complaints through pressing the state for reforms, and disseminating information 
about the progress of these proposals. These more professionally and technically skilled 
NGOs are to help design report cards/score cards that ―aim at being constructively critical. It 
may be unhelpful if the goal is solely to embarrass or laud a service provider‘s performance‖ 
(Transparency International 2004, p48).  
 
It is interesting to note that this role for citizens, community groups and NGOs are to become 
an oversight committee of an area of the state, particularly service provision (effectively 
contracted out to NGOs in many developing countries as previously argued), thus the two 
roles of service provider and watchdog can become linked under a market based technical 
approach to participation. There is a shift towards not just being the providers of social 
services but also monitors of service provision (World Bank 2004).  
 
In a similar fashion, social audits involve the community scrutinising public projects enacted 
by the state, often they are created by NGOs who disseminate project information through 
public hearings, foster local scrutiny, and then expose their findings (Arroyo and Sirker 2005, 
p11-12). Participatory performance monitoring entails community groups monitoring and 
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evaluating the performance of public services in a similar way to the social audit, whilst 
budgetary monitoring allows citizens the chance to be involved in key decisions and analysis 
of financial spending, NGOs are again involved through helping demystify the technical 
content of budgets, raising awareness and educational training to improve budget literacy.  
 
These Social Accountability tools firstly rely upon a specific type of NGO to design and 
enforce the projects; the professional model, and secondly construct spaces for citizens 
collectively working within informal groups, associations and committees as a form of civil 
society that links advocacy to the neutral and instrumental form of democratic participation 
that leaves little room for critical ownership of the development process. The World Bank 
summarises this most succinctly with its recent report entitled 'from shouting to counting' 
where, ―It‘s not just about people protesting and making noise. This new approach to citizen 
action actually involves systematic analysis and intelligent use of data, making sure their 
governments spend effectively and keep their promises‖ (World Bank 2004b).  
 
Keane in his latest book The life and Death of Democracy (2009) describes this form of 
democratic participation as typical of a new form of democracy that is emerging within recent 
historical trends, an alternative to both the representative model, and the more direct 
democratic model; monitory democracy. This form of democracy involves the 
decentralisation of 'power-monitoring institutions' including not just political actors but civil 
society in a new elevated role (2009, pxxvii). Implicit within this disciplinary form of civil 
society there is the acceptance that progress and development depend upon the increasingly 
collaborative linkage between civil society, the market and the state where good governance 
relies upon an holistic framework and a 'synergy' between state and society (Ackerman 2005) 
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where CSOs interact in a 'refreshing' pro-active engagement with the state (Sirkir and Cosic 
2007 p77). This synergy recognises that civil society is still more-or-less analytically separate 
from the state and market in composition, however, it tends to reflect systemic (state and 
market) interruptions in the identity of civil society actors 
 
2.7 Concluding Thoughts: The Neoliberal co-option of civil society  
 
The promotion of neoliberal economic strategies have emerged within the last few decades as 
part of a complex global political project, with the intention of transforming not just countries' 
economic structures along free-market lines, but imposing a market-based ethos at the heart of 
those countries' public administrations. The post-cold war climate has allowed key economic 
actors such as the World Bank, and a host of bilateral donor agencies a new impetus on 
creating a democratic ideal of the market economy under the new paradigm of 'good 
governance'. Democratic interest in revitalised notions of social capital and the participation 
of civil society has allowed the good governance paradigm to flourish, where civil society can 
perform two important functions, firstly through providing greater levels of choice and 
efficiency by supplying service provision.  
 
Secondly, they can help form a dense network of associations and community groups to act as 
the state's democratic watchdog and demand social accountability. Both the supply and 
demand side of good governance valorises the inclusion of civil society alongside the state in 
a more collaborative framework where the overriding emphasis is upon ensuring the 
development of an enabling environment for market logics; the normative core of freedom, 
choice and participation.  
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It is interesting to note that the buzzwords of civil society, participation and democracy have 
been championed by both the right and the left of the political spectrum as a method of 
bringing the excluded and marginalised into development discourse. Despite this perceived 
consensus, it is specifically the neoliberal conception of participation that has become the 
dominant notion in international development discourse, and increasingly embedded within 
local spaces leading authors such as Dagnino to label this consensus as the 'perverse 
confluence' (2007). This confluence ―creates an image of the apparent homogeneity among 
different interests and discourses, concealing conflict and diluting the dispute between these 
two projects‖ (Dagnino 2007, p56).  
 
This neoliberal construction of space for CSOs involves the production of the technical-
professional NGO, tasked with creating an internal competitive environment to secure 
external funding, whilst providing  efficient and low-cost service provision in response to 
community needs. This technical-professional NGO has also become the preferred choice 
within the neoliberal conception of advocacy, seen as a de-politicised mediator between the 
active citizen and the state, where it encourages the neutral participation of observation whilst 
disseminating technical information accordingly. What has been implied within these roles of 
service provision and monitory oversight is on the one hand the increasingly external 
construction of NGO identities caused by the overwhelming reliance upon donor funding as 
an attempt to integrate the principles of homo economicus into the very modus operandi of 
these organisations.  
 
On the other hand these roles serve to demonstrate the decreasing detachment of local 
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representation and participation within this form of collectivity, raising questions as to the 
potential for an endogenous formation of civil society. This is compounded further by the role 
of NGOs in constructing and nurturing CBOs in these roles as part of the drive for a dense 
network of local associations to complement the market and observe the state. Although they 
have only been briefly eluded to within this chapter, the donor emphasis on promoting CBOs 
in a similar manner to NGOs is outlined further in more concrete terms within chapter four, 
demonstrating further the neoliberal attempt to externally construct the spaces for collective 
action and the sources from which to draw communicative frameworks within the lifeworld. 
If the role of civil society according to the critical cosmopolitan position is one that is 
anchored in the communicative realm of the lifeworld tasked with steering the systemic 
imperatives of the public sphere, then the examples highlighted here demonstrate that the 
reverse can occur under neoliberal frameworks where civil society can in fact become 
anchored in the systemic resources of instrumental reasoning and in fact demonstrate a form 
of colonisation of the lifeworld.  
 
The next section will attempt to ground the abstract discussion I have undertaken on the dual 
roles of civil society under the NPA framework, with a concrete examination of these external 
neoliberal processes that can construct the spaces and the meanings of civil society into a 
more instrumentalised form.  
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DYNAMICS OF REFORM AND 
DEMOCRATISATION IN CAMBODIA 
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3. NEOLIBERAL  INTERVENTIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
CAMBODIAN CIVIL SOCIETY: NGOS AND THE RISE OF A 
PROFESSIONAL SECTOR 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter served to outline the increasing cooption of civil society under a 
neoliberal framework, demonstrating how NGOs have become elevated into new spaces to 
help foster the neoliberal democratic project of a participatory form of market governance. 
This chapter will build upon the previous argument, but through a more concrete analysis of 
the relationship between the global (neoliberal discourse) and the local (civil society) by 
focusing on the specific case of Cambodia. Cambodia represents an interesting case study 
because of the way in which the donor community
152
 has firstly had a relatively 'free hand' in 
implementing its increasingly homogeneous strategy of good governance, and secondly, 
attempted to re-introduce civil society to the country due to a perceived deficit of social 
capital in the wake of the Khmer Rouge atrocities. The permeation of neoliberal policies 
through good governance, have created new spaces for civil society in Cambodia, though as 
this chapter will interrogate, these spaces of inclusion are deeply exclusive through the 
construction of a singular universal model of the professional, competitive, and efficient 
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 The usage of the term donor community within Cambodia represents the bilateral donors Australia, Belguim, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of 
Korea, Russia, Thailand, UK, and the US, as well as the multilateral institutions of the World Bank,IMF, 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and a variety of UN agencies. These external development partners make 
up the influential 'Consultative Group' (CG) and the Government Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) to 
harmonize and improve aid strategy between the government and donors.  
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NGO.  
 
This chapter is concerned with NGOs, as the formal representative of civil society in the 
country, demonstrating firstly how they have become part of service provision marketplace 
resulting in a certain conformity to external donor pressures of NPM style accountability, and 
secondly, their relationship with the emerging microfinance sector that is rapidly growing 
within the country; a neoliberal form of service provision through which NGOs are elevated 
and transformed.  
 
In order to understand how the donor community has become so dominant in both the 
neoliberal democratic reform project and the external construction of civil society, it is worth 
briefly outlining Cambodia's contemporary history. French colonial rule came to an end with 
the country declaring independence in 1954 and forming a constitutional monarchy to become 
the Kingdom of Cambodia under Prince Norodom Sihanouk. There followed a period of 
relative stability throughout the 1950s, however a decaying economy, government corruption, 
and the rise of dissidence against an increasingly hard-line rule led to a general lack of 
confidence in the Sihanouk regime (Tyner 2008 p55-84). Sihanouk became increasingly 
paranoid about the increasing popularity of the Khmer Rouge
153
, whilst equally he was 
concerned with the perceived close relationship with the US and its attempt to bring 
Cambodia into the war against the Vietnamese Communists.  
 
In 1970 Sihanouk's increasingly unpopular rule came to an end when his Prime Minister 
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 The Khmer Rouge were a communist movement originating from a group of Cambodians educated in Paris 
in the 1950s, involving and eventually being led by Saloth Sar, or Pol Pot as he later became known. For an 
insightful analysis of Pol Pot and his secretive yet authoritarian role within the Khmer Rouge see Chandler 
(1992) and Short (2005)  
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General Lon Nol
154
, ousted him from power in a military coup. Whilst Sihanouk had 
attempted to walk a fine line between the communist sympathisers in Cambodia and the US 
administration, Lon Nol had become increasingly anti-communist, seen as a staunch ally of 
the US administration and began to engage increasingly in military skirmishes with the 
Communist Vietnamese forces (Vietcong) that were permeating Cambodia's borders as part of 
their offensive with the US (see Clymer 2004, p128-152). Sihanouk had fled to Vietnam to 
attempt to establish a government in exile
155
 and in doing so strategically align himself with 
the communist movement that was growing within Cambodia, the effect was to split public 
opinion in Cambodia between the two factions. Inevitably, the spill-over of US bombing raids 
on the Vietcong in Cambodia began to have an effect on the rural population who suffered 
greatly through the deaths of thousands of villagers, the destruction of entire villages and 
arable land (see Ledgerwood 1994; Nee 1995). 
 
In addition to the rising anti-US sentiment, Lon Nol had become increasingly paranoid about 
communist insurgents and so turned his armed forces towards the rural countryside in an 
effort to repress opposition and dissent, whilst consolidating an increasingly authoritarian 
position within the government (see Hinton 2005, p58, Kamm 1998, p100- 119, Martin 1994, 
p127-131). Lon Nol's forces began a fully-fledged campaign against the Vietcong forces who 
in 1971 had managed to capture Angkor Wat, a symbol of the Khmer dynasty, and 
increasingly drew upon US military assistance and finances whilst consolidating his hold in 
parliament by passing a new constitution
156
 and declaring that it was time to end ―the sterile 
game of outmoded liberal democracy‖ (cited in Kamm 1998, p110).  
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 Lon Nol had become Prime Minister in 1969 from his post as defence minister 
155
 Sihanouk established the Front uni national du Cambodge (FUNC) and called upon Cambodians to rise up 
against the 'American imperialists' (Martin 1994, p134).  
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 This was the official constitution that transformed Cambodia from the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Khmer 
Republic in 1972 enabling Lon Nol to become head of state  
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The increasing disenchantment with Lon Nol and his American ties, combined with the 
success of the Khmer Rouge during the early 1970s in waging a propaganda war against the 
government (and of course legitimised by the deposed Sihanouk as a figurehead of the Khmer 
Rouge movement) led to another coup on April 17
th
 1975 as the Khmer Rouge seized Phnom 
Penh and created the state of 'Democratic Kampuchea'  
 
The Khmer Rouge operated a ruthlessly brutal regime under the banner of 'Angkar' (the 
Organisation) an alias for the Communist party of Kampuchea that was now in full control of 
the country. Between 1975 and 1979, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge intelligentsia enacted a 
radical restructuring of society that is unparalleled in contemporary history, decimating the 
Khmer people and contributing to over one and a half million
157
 deaths (from a country with a 
population of eight million at the time) through murder, starvation, disease, malnutrition and 
overwork. This restructuring was loosely based upon Karl Marx's notion of a communist 
utopia, however, in stark contrast to Marxist doctrine, the Khmer Rouge attempted to 
deliberately enact this revolutionary path through a re-making of Cambodian society and 
applying the label of inevitability in order to keep the wheel's turning
158
. This radical project 
involved 'liberating' the Khmer people from the capitalist system, therefore money and private 
property was abolished, economic production was collectivised along agrarian lines including 
the forced evacuation of the urban elite from the cities, religious worship, freedom of speech, 
formal education, doctors and non-agrarian professions were all banned (Hinton 2005), in an 
attempt to purify the Khmer citizen through the 'idolatry of the peasantry' (Tyner 2008). This 
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 This number has been the centre of an intense debate, due to the difficulty in obtaining this data given the 
lack of written records, often figures will range between 1.5 and 3.3 million (see Vickery 1988, Kiernan 
1990; Bit 1991, Nee  1995, van de Put 1997; Heuveline 1998) 
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 An expression found throughout the Khmer Rouge regime was ―The Wheel of history is inexorably turning: 
he who cannot keep pace with it all shall be crushed‖ (Tyner 2008, p85-86).  
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―destructive engineering on a nationwide scale‖ (Semelin 2007 p333) resulted in the collapse 
of traditional Khmer society and the forced repatriation of the 'New Khmer' a name given to 
citizens who were not members of the Khmer Rouge when Phnom Penh fell. 
 
In 1979 the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia and forcibly removed the Khmer Rouge from 
power, resulting in the establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) under the 
leadership of the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) in an attempt to remove the 
radical dimensions of the Khmer Rouge era whilst keeping the government tied closely to 
communist principles emanating from Vietnam. The PRK attempted to reverse the extremities 
that had characterised the former regime, the practices of Bhuddism and Islam were 
restored
159
, communal dining, forced labour were abolished (Etcheson 2005). In July 1979 the 
new regime established a People's Revolutionary Tribunal, designed to bring Pol Pot and his 
deputy, Ieng Sary to answer to charges of genocide and demonstrate to the Cambodian people 
that another form of government had taken charge. Conflict carried on within Cambodia as a 
variety of factions attempted to resist the Vietnamese backed government, primarily these 
were the Khmer Rouges in retreat towards the Thai border, FUNCINPEC
160
, a newly 
established party under Sihanouk, and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front 
(KPNLF) comprised of the remnants of the old Lon Nol government prior to 1975.   
 
In 1991, the Vietnamese withdrew its military forces leading to the signing of the Paris Peace 
Accords, and the establishment of a Supreme National Council (SNC) comprising 6 members 
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 Though this restoration was not fully complete until the Vietnamese withdrew and Buddhism again became 
declared as the official state religion 
160
 Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) was 
formed by Sihanouk from FUNC in 1981, comprising of Cambodian exiles that were hostile to both the 
Vietnamese invasion and the Khmer Rouges 
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of the PRK
161
, 2 from the political arm of the Khmer Rouge, the Party of Democratic 
Kampuchea (PDK), 2 from FUNCINPEC and 2 from KPNLF. This council was envisaged to 
serve as a symbolic body, whilst the newly established United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC) would retain ruling power whilst attempting to organise democratic 
elections (Widyono 2008, p34-35). Finally in 1993 Cambodia had its first democratic 
elections
162
 resulting in a coalition government between FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian 
People's Party (CPP)
163
. Cambodia's democratic transition since 1993 has been controversial 
to say the least, with questions over  intimidation, corruption, elitism and patronage politics 
(Human Rights Watch 2003, Peou 2006)  however three elections in 1998, 2003 and 2008 
have demonstrated that the country is slowly beginning to recover from the dark days of the 
authoritarian practices of the Khmer Rouge even if this form of democracy is described as a 
more 'hybrid' form
164
 (Un 2005; Ojendal and Lilja 2006; Kim and Ojendal 2009) 
 
Cambodian society suffered immensely during this period and it is generally acknowledged 
that atrocities undertaken during the Khmer Rouge era had ―all but destroyed most forms of 
social capital in Cambodia‖ (Colletta and Cullen 2002, p24). Under Putnam's conception of 
social capital determined by dense networks of associations and 'trust' it could be argued that 
Cambodian society during the years of conflict had an extremely low level of social capital. 
Trust in the Cambodian context, translated as 'tuk jat' (to put and keep in the heart), tended to 
turn towards mistrust in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge atrocities. According to Muecke, 
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 Which had been renamed the State of Cambodia (SoC) since 1989, under the leadership of Hun Sen and his 
dominant KPRP and introduced elements of the free market in parallel to what was happening in many 
communist countries globally  
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 The Constitution that came into force on September 24, 1993, was a watershed in Cambodian history, 
containing a separation of powers (Article 51), adherence to international human rights treaties (Article 31) 
and a series of provisions respecting basic civil rights (Articles 32 to 50). 
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 The CPP was the new name for the KPRP after 1991, still in power today.  
164
 In essence containing the formal institutions of a liberal democratic state but failing to comply to the norms 
values and procedures of a democracy (Kim and Ojendal 2009 p102). 
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unlike in the aftermath of the genocide perpetuated against the Jews in World War II, the 
Cambodian survivors have not developed a new sense of ethnic attachment, due to the fact 
that ―compatriots tortured and killed each other, children killed adults, and the selection of 
those to be murdered seemed capricious and arbitrary‖ (Muecke 1995, p37).  
 
The arrival of UNTAC in 1992 after the signing of the Paris Peace accords created a level of 
stability that had been absent in the country for decades, and heralded a massive increase in 
the numbers of INGOs and Development projects to assist in the rebuilding of Cambodian 
society. According to PACT Cambodia, one of the first INGOs to arrive after the 1991 Paris 
Peace Accords, when they arrived there was little collectivised activities due to a break down 
in trust, cooperation and communal bonds, its aim therefore was to mend these social deficits 
in order for a new civil society to emerge (Barton 2001, p12). Even the RGC recognised that 
this period represents 'starting from ground zero' (RGC 2006).  
 
The international donor community  began to heavily promote the emergence and growth of 
civil society, the post-conflict fragile Cambodian state represented a unique opportunity for 
them as the country took on the perception of being a ‗blank slate‘ for donors to carry out 
their various development projects (Hughes 2003, p138). Guilt over a lack of support during 
the Pol Pot regime combined with the view that Cambodia was wide open to new 
development projects and experiments, led to an abundance of aid programmes in the mid 
1990s. Importantly, the fragility of the Cambodian state allowed the vast numbers of aid 
agencies a relatively free hand to construct these projects (Grant 1998, p71). Two very 
different elements of civil society have emerged within the post-Democratic Kampuchea 
context, firstly the urban-based NGOs found mainly within Phnom Penh that are the results of 
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localisation from the large influx of INGOs over the last few decades. These NGOs have until 
the last few years, been recognised by both the donor community and the Royal Government 
of Cambodia (RGC) as the official representatives of Cambodian civil society. Secondly are 
the more ambiguous rural CBOs that have been largely designed by donor strategies and are 
continuously emerging and dissipating within Cambodia, often closely intertwined with their 
NGO counterparts who attempt to nurture them within a parental relationship
165
 
 
3.2 Civil Society in Cambodia: the external NGO bias 
 
As previously stated, an analysis of civil society within Cambodia tends to be seen by donors 
and the RGC as synonymous with the emergence of a vast NGO community. The lack of 
collectivised activities within rural Cambodia due to the devastating repercussions of the 
Democratic Kampuchea era meant that in the 1990s there was very little link between the 
emerging urban NGO community and grassroots CBOs, thus even when Cambodians discuss 
the emergence and growth of civil society, they tend to do so with a very heavy NGO bias 
(Hughes 2003, p139).  
 
There is little reliable information on the numbers of active local NGOs in Cambodia due to a 
lack of legal structure and regulatory framework to account for their numbers
166
. Some figures 
have estimated that there are around 220 active NGOs
 
(CCC 2006c), whilst others have 
described the numbers upwards of 700 (CDC 2006)
167
and even estimates of 900 (World Bank 
                                                 
165
 These rural CBOs are interrogated within the succeeding chapter.  
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 There are as yet no laws regarding the formation of NGOs in the country, the RGC attempted in 2004 to 
construct and implement a 'Law on Non-Governmental Organisations' however this has yet to materialise  
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 This represents a vast increase since 1991 when only two indigenous NGOs existed, Khemara, an NGO 
focusing on women's health, and ADHOC, a human rights NGO. Interestingly the CDC survey suggests that 
there are around 1495 registered NGOs, therefore only 45% are actually described as active.  
169 
 
2008). An overwhelming number of these NGO's tend to focus on service delivery as their 
primary function
168
 and almost all were established externally by INGOs (Henke 2010, p7). 
Even the numbers of INGOs operating within the country tend to fluctuate depending upon 
statistical source, latest statistics suggest 125 active in 2005 (CCC 2005), and up to 314 in 
2006 (CDC 2006). Furthermore the World Bank (2008, p14) has attempted to estimate the 
geographical range of operational NGOs, estimating that approximately 70% are located 
within Phnom Penh, highlighting the division between what is often seen as an urban bias of 
NGOs compared to the primarily rural development of CBOs. Despite the problematic 
statistical datasets, and the lack of codified legal structure within the country, NGOs are 
surprisingly highly coordinated and have created a dense network of informal structures and 
umbrella organisations. 
 
The lack of a legal context drew NGOs together to create a standard of consistency within 
organisational practice, for example in 1997 representatives of over 150 NGOs signed a 'code 
of ethics for social development NGOs and People's Organisations' to promote non-
partisanship and disavow political loyalties (see Clamor 2001). Various networks and 
umbrella organisations create a degree of coherence and coordination; the Cambodian NGO 
support Network (CNSN) formed in 1995 between CIDSE, Pact, Oxfam and Canada Fund, to 
discuss coordination among the NGO sector and to offer capacity building, training, and 
technical assistance to Cambodian NGOs. The Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) 
established in 1991 as an umbrella organisation for over 100 NGOs in Cambodia with the 
specific task of facilitating the exchange of information throughout the NGO sector. NGO-
forum, another umbrella organisation, comprises of 94 NGOs (international and local) and 
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 The balance between service provision and advocacy work is severely unequal in the country, figures suggest 
seventy percent of NGOs undertake the former, whilst seven percent undertake the latter (CDC 2006) 
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aims primarily at information sharing, debate and advocacy of key issues that affect 
Cambodia's development. Over the last decade these organisational networks have come to be 
seen as important representatives for the NGO community, liaising with both the donor 
community and the Royal Government of Cambodia on key development issues to provide 
relevant support, information and training to their NGO members.  
 
The origins of contemporary civil society in Cambodia reflect its exogenously constructed 
history, largely from the influx of INGOs in the early 1990s who have established the present 
NGO community that is based mainly in Phnom Penh. This chapter will now turn towards the 
role of the donor community within Cambodia, specifically to observe how its multitude of 
aid projects in the early UNTAC period have become more strategic and coordinated as they 
have aligned with the contemporary shifts in global development thinking towards the New 
Policy Agenda of democratic good governance and civil society participation. The result of 
which is to reflect a relatively homogeneous donor agenda that incorporates Cambodian civil 
society into an integral piece of the neoliberal development regime. 
 
3.2.2 The emergence of a neoliberal development model 
 
Following the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, the donor community convened the 
Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRC)
169
, 
leading in 1992 to the establishment of the International Committee for the Rehabilitation of 
Cambodia (ICORC). This was eventually succeeded in 1996 by the establishment of the 
Consultative Group (CG) a combination of donors that meet annually to discuss key 
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development priorities and to coordinate work with the Council for the Development of 
Cambodia (CDC) to carry out donor stimulants. The fragility of the newly democratic 
Cambodian state ensured that the government had a mainly passive role as observers and 
implementers in the various post-conflict aid reconstruction projects that were emanating 
from donors.  
 
The heavy reliance upon INGOs as a conduit for emergency relief and aid in the early 1990s, 
whilst keeping the state at arm‘s length, was largely because major donors were still 
concerned about the stability of the Cambodian state (Curtis 1998, p74). This concern was 
due to the problems of corruption that had manifested itself within the post-Democratic 
Kampuchea regime. In the 1980s the Cambodian state suffered from a lack of material 
resources and spent a vast amount of energy attempting to prevent any resurgence from the 
old regime, the primary role for state officials became the promotion of loyalty and stability to 
the party and the state, hence very little time or energy was spent on post-conflict institution 
building (Hughes 2003, pviii). 1989 represented the introduction of the free market to the 
Cambodian economic system, yet the lack of institutional regulation brought high levels of 
corruption and it became common for officials to ―promote opportunities...which exploit the 
poor, as a means to ensure the loyalty of subordinates‖ (Hughes 2003, pviii). In recognising 
these problems donors shifted away from providing aid as emergency relief, towards the 
―rehabilitation and the development of the physical, social and political infrastructure of the 
country‖ (Grube 1998, p3) 
 
In the global development context in the early 1990s, aid began to take on an increasing 
number of 'political conditionalities' from donors after the collapse of the Soviet Union when 
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it became no longer necessary for Western states to support authoritarian governments as part 
of larger anti-soviet alliances. By the 1990s, democratisation became a core theme throughout 
much of Eastern Europe and Latin America as donors attempted to enhance liberal democratic 
structures alongside new private sector market mechanisms, to ensure the progress of 
development (Smith 2007, p2). In this respect Cambodia represented a typical developing 
country that faced political and economic pressure from the donor community to reform 
political and economic structures to ensure a smooth transition from a centralised economic 
planning system to the free market. 
 
As a perceived antidote to the endemic corruption that was apparent within Cambodia, the 
international donor community attempted to integrate the free market further into Cambodia 
through SAPs in order to liberalise the economy further. This Washington Consensus 
approach was applied as eagerly to Cambodia in the 1990s as it was to other developing 
countries in the world, the shift to a market based economic restructuring programme seen as 
essential to push Cambodia out of its previous stagnant centralised planning system under the 
KPRP regime. In 1993 the IMF approved a 41 million dollar enhanced structural adjustment 
facility loan to support the macroeconomic policies that Cambodia was enacting under the 
new guidelines. The financial package was seen by Cambodian officials as desperately needed 
to reform the economy, Pou Sothirak, the Cambodian Minister of Industry, Mines and Energy 
(MIME) stated in 1995 that: 
 
We (The Royal Cambodian Government) firmly believe the private sector can 
much better kickstart the economic development because foreign investors have 
capital. It‘s quite obvious that the state does not have enough money (cited in Ear 
1997, p81) 
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The relative success of the first IMF loan was followed in 1995 through a second annual loan 
to cover the 1995-1996 fiscal year of approximately another 41 million dollars, this 
emphasized the continuing shift to a more efficient free market economy through privatisation 
of state assets, and public administration reform (IMF 1995).  
 
The donor community at this stage tended to prioritise economic reform and poverty 
reduction through monetarist macro-economic reform typified by the Washington Consensus 
doctrine, yet the political problems facing the country in 1997
170
 coupled with the financial 
instability that ensued, led to a reduction of loans and projects from donors. For example the 
IMF postponed two of its scheduled loan payments in 1997 partly as a result of the instability 
but also at the perceived lack of progress in economic management. The World Bank followed 
in similar suit and failed to renew its 1996 assistance budget for 1997. Similarly the CG 
meeting in 1997, that had often reflected high levels of support for the RGC in economic 
restructuring, resulted in disenchantment at the political situation and continuing role of the 
RGC in failing to foster a sound economic environment
171.
 (Gruber 1998, p5).
 
The event 
contributed to a shift in donor strategy towards a stronger emphasis upon ―strengthening the 
rule of governance, and tackling corruption‖172 (IMF 1999). In November 1998 when 
stabilisation returned to Cambodia, the IMF announced that the third structural adjustment 
loan in the 1999-2002 period would involve overcoming the weak administrative and 
institutional capacities of the state, and fostering an environment for private investment (IMF 
                                                 
170
 In 1997 violence broke out between the power-sharing parties of the CPP and FUNCINPEC, resulting in 
victory for the CPP, but at the expense of international condemnation 
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 According to Gruber (1998), the press statements released surrounding this turbulent period, suggested that 
the donor community had rescinded funding en masse, this however, was not the case, merely a more 
pragmatic realignment to ensure that corruption would in the future be targeted heavily as a conditionality of 
loans 
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 Corruption is seen here as a major obstacle to economic growth and can undermine social economic and 
political development in the country, the remedy therefore is to increase accountability through promoting 
both good governance strategies and implementing mechanisms to hold government officials accountable for 
their actions. 
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1999). 
 
Shortly after winning the 2003 general elections, the CPP released an attempted new and 
transparent economic development  plan known as the 2004 'Rectangular Strategy' in order to 
support its political platform.
173
 This programme is regarded as a landmark in that it attempts 
the first holistic and overarching attempt at establishing a comprehensive strategy,  drawing 
upon key elements from the Millennium Development Goals, the Cambodia Socio-Economic 
Development Program 2001-2005 (SEDPII) and Cambodia's National Poverty Reduction 
Strategy 2003-2005 (NRPS) to create a framework that places good governance as the 
'cornerstone' of Cambodia's development (Hun Sen 2004, p6)
174
 Good governance is 
described as a fundamental pre-condition to economic development, requiring participation, 
the sharing of information, transparency, equality, inclusiveness and the rule of law, in order 
to ensure that corruption is significantly reduced, and the voices of the most vulnerable in 
society can be heard in decision-making processes (2004, p6). The Rectangular Strategy 
received mixed reviews from Cambodia's international development partners, it was described 
as an important document that took greater responsibility for sustainable development but that 
its targets appeared 'ambitious' (ADB 2003, p3), and offering little tangible guidance for 
programme implementation (OECD 2006).   
 
In 2004
175
, the Cambodian Consultative Group (CG) a meeting between key donors in the 
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 The political agenda of the re-elected CPP was focused around four core values, 1. Promoting economic 
growth, 2. Improving levels of employment for Cambodian workers, 3. Ensuring equality and social justice, 
4. Accelerating poverty reduction reforms to achieve sustainable development (see Hun 2004)  
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demonstrate ownership of its own development process, as well as recognising the role it must play in 
improving governance as a precondition for economic development (see ADB 2005 p3) 
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 To date there has been 8 CG meetings, though the documents available only stem from the 6
th
 meeting in 
2002. Documents relating to these meetings in 2002, 2004, and 2006 are available from www.cdc-
cdrb.gov.kh 
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country and the RGC, released a donor consensus statement declaring the twin priorities of 
combating corruption and increasing accountability. The previous 2002 meeting had 
prioritised building partnerships between the RGC and donors around a variety of poverty 
reduction strategies, the release of the Rectangular Strategy in 2004, however, gave added 
weight of the need to tackle good governance as a priority for both donors and the RGC. The 
2006 CG meeting carried on with the good governance theme as a means to combat 
corruption, various donors reiterated this as a number one priority, for example the United 
States government pledged to harmonise its various funding projects in the country and would 
continue its strong ODA as long as ―there must be sustained political dialogue and even 
greater effort by the Cambodian government to strengthen accountability and combat 
corruption‖ (CG 2006a). USAID has established it as a primary goal alongside health and 
education, arguing that the integration of good governance principles are essential to 
―determine whether Cambodia succeeds or fails as a country‖ (USAID 2006, p1) Likewise the 
Australian government announced it would continue funding but that it was ―clearly 
conditional upon strengthened governance and reduced corruption‖ (CG 2006b). 
 
The World Bank released a review document shortly after the Rectangular Strategy was 
released stating that governance in Cambodia needed more radical transformation than the 
RGC had proposed to ensure development progress. The report suggests that in order to 
reduce poverty and fulfil the long-term strategy of good governance, specific attention must 
be paid to making the state more accountable through enhancing financial transparency, 
decentralisation
176
 and the removal of barriers to private sector growth (World Bank 2004).  
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allow a voice among the poor and thus create more inclusive programmes to reduce poverty (Pellini and 
Ayres 2005, p4). 
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The usage of the term ‗accountability‘ in Cambodia in recent years has not been without 
problems, the very term 'accountability' itself does not translate easily into Khmer. There is no 
direct translation, the closest being 'Kanakney-Pheap' which is associated in Cambodia with 
civil servants and financial accounting (Vuthy 2006; Kimchoeun et al 2007)
177
. Despite the 
overt financial connotations associated with the Khmer understanding of the term, it can be 
argued that the way accountability reform has been integrated into the political and economic 
institutions of the Cambodian state does resemble a very subtle form of financial 
accountability through the privileging of the market through ‗New Public Management‘ 
bureaucratic reform.  
 
The rise of the bureaucratic state in Cambodia under French colonial rule, created a strong 
discipline of public administration throughout the political system that is still present today in 
the basic structures of the state (Kimchoen et al 2007, p6). This traditional public 
administration model constructed a notion of accountability that ensured political actors could 
be held accountable for their actions by revealing information on budget construction and 
expenditure, complemented with enforcement mechanisms to ensure the accountability 
structure remained strong.  
 
In the 1980s, the global rise of the New Public Management paradigm, affected the 
Cambodian state in much the same way as other countries with a shifting focus towards a 
focus on mangerialism (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p8). In the 2004 Rectangular strategy, the 
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to the local community, many community groups tend to define it as accurate reporting and spending 
according to an agreed budget (CCC 2006, p6).   
177 
 
RGC outlined the need for public administration reform in order to enhance sustainable 
development, described as being ―neutral, transparent, professional, responsive and 
responsible‖ (Hun 2004, p8). This was a reiteration of the National Programme for 
Administrative Reform 1999 (NPAR) and its subsumation under the Governance Action Plan 
2001 (GAP), essentially outlining a broad package of administrative reforms to strengthen the 
rule of law, enhance civil service management and importantly; establish good governance 
within service provision. This has recently been updated with the Deputy Prime Minister, Sok 
An, announcing a Second Administrative Reform programme to be implemented in 2009
178
 
with a focus on improving the transparency and quality in the delivery of public services in 
order to provide effective governance whilst enacting key reforms in the area of Public 
Finance Management (PFM). The reform ideas are an outcome of the frequent 'Government-
Development Partners Coordination Committee' and highlights the continual influence that 
Cambodia's development partners have on the guiding good governance reforms
179
 
 
The international donor community since 1998, has clearly attempted to influence public 
sector reform, however, key concepts such as the drive for good governance, have come to 
change very slowly (Hughes 2003 pViii). Recent shifts towards a broader notion of good 
governance entail a new emphasis on recognising the role that civil society can play in 
creating a more democratic and accountable state structure to ensure that corruption is 
curtailed and the smooth functioning of the market.  
 
In 2004 the World Bank and the CG recognised the importance of a broader notion of 
accountability and good governance and argued that civil society could play an integral role in 
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 These reforms include developing new incentive structures for civil servants such as Merit Based 
Performance Incentives (MBPIs) 
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the fight against corruption  through providing opportunities for citizens to hold the 
government accountable (CG 2004). The World Bank views this within Cambodia as the 
development of, ―a concerted effort to strengthen, and in many cases to build from scratch, 
the foundations of a modern chain of accountability‖ (World Bank 2004, pi). This 'modern 
chain' of accountability is defined as: 
 
The obligation of power-holders to account for or take responsibility for their actions. 
―Power-holders‖ refers to those who hold political, financial or other forms of power 
and include officials in government, private corporations, international financial 
institutions and civil society organizations (Melena 2004, p2).  
 
Furthermore accountability is linked to two important and distinct frameworks here, the first 
is designed for civil servants in the role of accountable service providers. Cambodia's 
bureaucratic system was decimated following the brutal Khmer Rouge regime and as a result 
accountability practices have been slow to take root, the World Bank's 2004 report detailed 
the need to encourage a new accountable structure that would transform bureaucratic service 
provision; internal systems of audits, evaluations and monitoring mechanisms that can act as a 
system of checks and balances to combat corruption and poor service delivery (2004, p7). The 
second dimension of accountability comes from the need for citizens, as a force within civil 
society, to monitor and hold these civil servants (as key service providers) to account and 
ensure that they are transparent, as the Bank states:  
 
If the government is serious about its commitment to work with civil society as a 
partner, it needs to encourage NGOs to organise communities and the poor, as 
well as monitor the performance of bureaucrats and service deliverers (2004, 
p10). 
 
These two elements of accountability are crucial to the framework of this case study, and link 
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explicitly with the previous chapter's emphasis of the role of civil society under the New 
Policy Agenda. Firstly, the World Bank is keen to emphasize the efficient and neoliberal 
transformation of service provision, what is neglected here is that in Cambodia, like most 
other post-conflict countries, service provision is increasingly carried out by NGOs. This 
case-study will demonstrate that NPM style frameworks of accountability have therefore been 
expanded from bureaucratic state-based service provision, directly onto the governance 
structures of NGOs themselves as part of an increasingly professional sector.
180
 
 
Secondly the World Bank has taken a new interest with a broader conception of civil society 
to include local grassroots CBOs and the role that they can play as 'democratic watchdogs' 
through its new approach to 'Social Accountability' in order to hold the corrupt Cambodian 
state to account. The latter approach will be interrogated in the ensuing chapter as an example 
of the effects of good governance at the grassroots, this chapter will now turn towards an 
analysis of the former approach and demonstrate the effects upon the NGO sector in Phnom 
Penh of a global neoliberal reform agenda that not only determines the local spaces available 
for NGO activities but also the identity of these organisations.   
 
The application of NPM reform criteria reflects a conception of equating good governance 
with a form of 'managerial fix', that is technocratic, professional and efficient; the hallmarks 
of a form of instrumental rationality that is permeating the spaces of the public sphere through 
civil society, raising questions as to the autonomous sphere of communicative reasoning as 
outlined in chapter one. Accountability and decentralisation, when promoted through NPM 
techniques, exudes a neoliberal form of governance that places ‗economic‘ rationality at the 
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heart of the political sphere. 
 
3.2.3 Neoliberal engagements with the NGO sector in Phnom Penh  
 
The key development policies that emanate from the recent NSDP 2006-2010, not only 
focuses on reformation of the core state ministries, but adds equal weight to both the private 
and civil society sector too. These three institutions are seen as needing to be more 
accountable, transparent and participatory in order to meet the criteria required for a thriving 
and developed Cambodia (RGC 2006). Good governance strategies have highlighted the 
notion of ‗governance‘ to expand it through recognising the role of non-governmental 
organisations in technical and managerial models to help formulate and implement these new 
strategies as well as improve the delivery of public services.  
 
The elevation of NGOs into the role of public service providers
 
created a massive expansion 
in the numbers of NGOs enacting various programmes and projects towards donor 
specifications, the inevitable consequence was the creation of a ‗development marketplace‘ 
where donors were faced with an immeasurable number of new NGOs forming and 
submitting funding requests, leaving donors the opportunity to select preferred candidates 
dependent upon set criteria. NGOs became effective sub-contractors to this competitive aid 
market whilst government counterpart organisations severely lacked the skilled personnel to 
cope with the influx of funding and projects (Grant 1998, p71). This resulted at first in the rise 
of a multitude of Come-and-go NGOs (ComeN'GOs) that were specifically targeting donor 
funding for entrepreneurial motivations, often disbanding once projects had expired. These 
NGOs start new projects, not because of bottom-up demand from societal needs, but because 
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of the top-down supply of resources from donors (Reimann 2005, p43). Local NGOs have 
therefore been largely dependent upon external assistance, calling into question their very 
sustainability (Houm 1999, p40). 
 
Donors also tend to often have the luxury of selecting their NGOs according to the projects 
they wish to implement. According to one member of a donor organisation, there was a case 
of a rival donor that took nearly a year deciding on which NGOs they would take on in a 
funding capacity, prompting a rise in competitiveness among local NGOs in order to try and 
secure funding contracts (interview 2007i).  
 
NGOs inevitably found themselves adopting certain strategies in order to secure funding 
contracts, raising questions as to their autonomy when constructing development projects and 
their relationship with donors. According to Khlok et al:  
 
...the influence of donor agencies are clearly enhanced as local NGOs and groups 
formulate proposals around the perceived interests of donors, adding a gender 
dimension here, inserting environmental issues there, and adopting donor 
discourses of empowerment, participation, sustainability and income generation to 
lend credence to these proposals (Khlok et al 2003, p11).  
 
One member of a think-tank suggested that in Phnom Penh if NGOs are ever observed 'doing 
something' for the people through progressive ideas like empowerment and gender awareness, 
it is often to remain accountable to donors and funding sources rather than any form of 
accountability to the people that they are claiming to represent (Interview 2007a). Even some 
of the donors in Cambodia recognise the constraints that are being placed upon NGOs to 
follow certain criteria in order to secure funding and support, one project manager from a 
donor organisation suggested that NGOs are as dependent on donors as donors are to their 
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respective government funding authorities, very few are lucky enough to escape the new 
pressures of competition that exist in today‘s aid market (interview 2007b). Many INGOs 
themselves have to work hard to secure external sources of funding from their government 
and so their hands are often tied into whatever policies governments set regarding 
development, especially democracy and civil society capacity building techniques that are 
popular in Cambodia at the moment (interview 2007b)
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Another member of a donor organisation described that although there are a variety of 
interesting NGO projects that appear localised and consultative, yet if you read between the 
lines there are obvious signs that they have been engineered externally. At the consultation 
stage between NGOs and donors, projects may be on the table, however, they are pre-defined 
by donors and all that is left for NGOs is to implement the policy. Some donors attempt to 
involve NGOs within project construction but this is often paying lip-service because as a 
general rule, NGOs fall down the priority list; one face looks towards Cambodia, the other is 
constantly looking towards Europe (interview 2007b). Indeed, this mirrors closely with a 
statement made recently by the outgoing director of the Médecins Sans Frontières division of 
Cambodia (MSF-Cambodia):  
 
I have to confess that sometimes we come in and say "we want to do this", and we 
don't even bother asking if this is what [Cambodians] want. It is true that we are 
very arrogant - sometimes too much...The problem with the NGOs today is that 
they are funded by donors, so what they do, and I cannot blame them, is follow 
where the money is going. It's very tricky (Berneau cited in Strangio 2009)   
 
This of course has the reciprocal effects upon local NGOs who are forced at times to prioritise 
accountability to donors, over accountability to the local population. One NGO in Phnom 
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Penh that deals specifically with women whose husbands have died of aids, through training 
them to be able to cope with the dual burden of income generation and family care, faces 
certain donor requirements under USAID their main donor, where they are forbidden to work 
on abortion and must promote abstinence throughout their projects; something that is still 
culturally sensitive (Interview 2007c). Another NGO in the capital described their role as 
'whatever is in the interest of the donor', describing how their programmes have a certain level 
of flexibility but only when initially approved by donors (interview 2007d).  
 
The rise of the competitive aid market creates structural constraints on NGOs because 
―contractors compete for the rights to provide services, but are answerable to the principle 
through clearly defined output expectations, tight monitoring and evaluation against key 
performance indicators‖ (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p10) The direct consequence among NGOs 
who are clearly dependent upon donors for funding sources, and show a willingness to shape 
their projects alongside donor priorities, is the creation of standards of best practice and a 
level of conformity alongside donor ideals. These standards of best practice are reflected in 
the international donors‘ desire to bring good governance to civil society as part of its 
elevation alongside the state in forging democracy and the smooth transition of the market.  
 
NGOs are seen as fundamental in the diversification and decentralisation of the Cambodian 
state, however donors such as the World Bank recognise that they ―need to practice what they 
preach by being responsible and ensuring that their management and finances are subject to 
the same degree of transparency and accountability that they demand of government‖ (World 
Bank 2004, p6).  
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NGOs are therefore attempting to develop and display proof to donors of their organisation 
adapting good governance internal mechanisms, and has resulted in a new project underway 
in Phnom Penh, the ‗NGO Good Practice Project‘ (NGO-GPP), to create an accreditation 
process that can help to single out those NGOs that display an adherence to good governance 
principles.  
 
In the last decade the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC)
 
argued that it was integral 
for NGOs to appear as accountable and transparent as they could in order to have the best 
chance of attracting donor money for their projects; not appearing to be interested in ‗good 
governance‘ would make it extremely difficult to operate in Cambodia (interview 2007e). In 
2004 it created the NGO-GPP with a fundamental intention to ―strengthen the NGO sector in 
Cambodia by encouraging and promoting NGO accountability and good organisational 
practice‖ (CCC 2006a, p1). The first stage of the NGO-GPP project was to create a minimum 
set of standards and ethical principles that would structure NGOs into being more accountable 
and fundable to donors (see NGO-GPP 2007). These include ensuring that NGOs have a 
clearly defined mission statement, a commitment to internal governance mechanisms that 
promote accountability and transparency, and a regular procedure for monitoring and 
evaluating staff and management. Interestingly the shift towards a more professional approach 
includes, having an annual global financial audit, financial management systems and annual 
performance appraisals (NGO-GPP 2007).   
 
This has been reflected in an updated NGO-GPP programme that demonstrates the shift 
towards a more professionalised approach that NGOs should follow in order to be ‗certified‘ 
as practitioners of good governance. The training course, running from May 2009 to April 
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2010 offers daily topics on ‗organisational policies and board development‘, ‗effective human 
resource management‘, ‗sound administrative and financial management‘, ‗monitoring and 
evaluation‘ and ‗organisational and strategic planning‘ (CCC 2009). The NGO-GPP, once 
fully functional, will complement the newly emerging NGO sector in Phnom Penh with a 
professional and accountable ‗certificate‘ that has been designed to demonstrate to donors the 
suitability of an NGO for funding considerations.  
 
The benefits of the voluntary NGO certification system are seen as including increased donor 
confidence in NGOs, promoting a greater level of credibility, and to attract prospective staff 
and boards members (NGO-GP 2007b). In a stakeholder survey undertaken in 2006, to look at 
the potential benefits of the NGO-GPP, it was reported that donors viewed NGO 
accountability as important for a variety of reasons; it ensured tax payers requirements could 
be met through a transparent process, stakeholders could have more influence in project 
design, and information could be readily available on an organisation's agreed mission goals. 
Interestingly, these mission goals are seen by some donors as accountable when they are ―at 
least partly contingent on their willingness to share or be responsive to the donor's values and 
mission. Indeed, donors usually will not consider a partner NGO for funding unless they share 
the donor's values‖ (CCC 2006c, p4). Donors questioned in the survey also overwhelmingly 
voted that they would be more likely to fund NGOs that had been certified, one even 
suggesting that it would help them 'narrow down' the field of NGOs in consideration for 
funding (CCC 2006c, p20) 
 
Currently the accreditation strategy is only being targeted at local and international NGOs as 
seen as the more professionalised and formalised aspects of civil society. Small NGOs 
186 
 
currently cannot afford to pay the fees in order to join the NGO-GPP scheme, but it is 
something that the team want to think about at a later stage, as it is their intention to expand as 
an independent accreditation technique for all NGOs in Phnom Penh (Interview 2007f). 
Professional NGOs are seen as important for the future in Cambodia, funding has become so 
competitive that donors are continually looking for the right 'tick boxes' to implement their 
projects therefore the NGO-GPP represents a way for NGOs to conform to these demands and 
secure greater channels of funding (Interview 2007f).  
 
In 2008, the NGO-GPP had an increased budget of $409,000 and focused on expanding its 
network with the new accreditation system in operation. At the beginning of 2008 there were 
13 NGOs undertaking the application process and another 30 in the process of preparing an 
application (CCC 2008). Over 300 NGOs have participated in NGO-GPP workshops.  
 
When an accreditation process for NGO best practices is applied within the contemporary 
development marketplace, it raises further the potential exclusion of NGOs that are not 
professional and do not fall in line with distinctly western notions of civil society.
182
 Local 
more informal NGOs that are currently not being targeted because they are not seen as 
professional enough to undergo the organisational changes needed in order to apply for the 
certification, are sure to struggle when they apply for the vital funding to secure their projects 
if competing alongside these accredited opponents.  
 
The emergence of good governance practices within donor discourse has filtered down 
towards the NGO sector in Phnom Penh who, in a competitive environment, has attempted to 
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become more professional
 
and accountable resulting in the implementation of NPM style 
reforms of NGO structures and the shift towards a more neoliberal mentality. 
 
Accountability under NPM principles as embedded in private sector notions of incentives and 
sanctions; results in NGO managers having to reach certain performance requirements that 
can be measured quantifiably (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p10). Most NGOs have turned towards 
auditing as a standard method to remain accountable and fundable; many in Phnom Penh are 
now audited through the UK audit firm PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC) and must provide 
adequate financial disclosure and administrative reporting as demanded by the international 
donor community.  
 
The dominance of PWC in Cambodia reflects the new changes that have taken place within 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRTS) and marks a shift towards global private 
regulation and an increase in the power of the ‗big four‘ private firms who have an 
unprecedented global reach (Perry and Nölke 2006, p576) Previously, the rise of macro-
accounting structures in the wake of the 1929 Wall Street crash to force companies to have 
their financial reports audited, was undertaken at a national level of regulation by state 
ministries. In 1979 there was an emergence of independent commercial auditors, many 
became transnational through forming the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
that is heavily funded by the World Bank to expand accountancy alongside capital markets 
within developing countries (Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen 2007, p4-8, Oguri 2005, 
p91). The rise of the neo-liberal paradigm has enabled powerful accountancy firms to expand 
their role in unparalleled ways, alongside auditing they sell advice on deregulation, 
privatisation and self-regulation. As Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen remark: 
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Audit firms expanded into consulting and became multi-disciplinary businesses 
selling everything from legal and management advisory services to the installation 
of computerised information systems (2007, p36). 
 
In response to this many NGOs in Cambodia hire business staff in order to understand and 
facilitate the administrative demands required
183
. For example one small NGO in Phnom Penh 
that was locally established and specialises in helping domestic violence victims felt that they 
had been given a large amount of independence from their donor to pursue their own visions 
and implement their own projects. Despite the initial optimism of a local NGO that could 
operate without external pressure, it became apparent that the organisation had undergone 
significant internal transformation in order to be acceptable to donor funding. Within a short 
space of time the NGO had established a board of directors, management committee and a 
financial committee as well as getting PWC on-board to carry out financial audits each year 
(interview 2007d). The result was to see an increase in the numbers of personnel that had now 
been trained in business style techniques working in the NGO and helping to carry out project 
funding requests, audits and general administration (interview 2007d). Similarly another local 
NGO that works to improve employment among the urban poor, had to create new internal 
structures in order to qualify for funding, they felt that they struggled with the auditing side 
and had taken on extra staff with the knowledge required to liaise with PWC (Interview 
2007g). 
 
There are many NGOs in Phnom Penh that still retain strong links with their parent INGO, 
often due to the fact that many NGO directors are from the country of origin as the original 
establishing INGO.   For some local NGOs this is seen as helpful because the personal 
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relationships that are made between themselves and the parent INGO could create a clash of 
views or a misunderstanding over project direction under a Cambodian director (Interview 
2007f). This highlights the way in which there is a level of dependency built between local 
NGOs and the 'parent organisations'.  
 
This has started to change within the last decade and there appears to be a general move 
towards greater localisation of NGOs and their management structures, however, like many of 
the changes underway in NGO organisational structures, localisation is complemented with a 
schooling in western NPM methods. Cambodians that have been promoted to managerial 
roles such as directors or coordinators, are all fluent in English and trained in business 
management techniques to help bridge the NGO-donor gap and streamline the 
implementation of projects (interview 2007e). 
 
The RGC recognises that service provision needs to undergo dramatic change in order to meet 
with donor demands and its own development targets, it is aware that: 
 
Despite remarkable progress in key reforms aimed at strengthening good 
governance, the quality, efficiency and delivery of the public service still remain 
as challenges and could not yet respond fully to the real needs of the people (RGC 
2008)  
 
Furthermore the RGC is currently attempting to push through a Royal Decree on the common 
principles for establishment and operation of 'Special Operating Agencies' (SOAs), which are 
sub-level ministries that receive donor and RGC funding for contracting out service provision 
to NGOs and the private sector (Hun 2008b).
  
The only example of this in practice so far 
within the country comes from the World Bank's Second Health Sector Support Program 
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2008-2013 (HSP2)  that is currently under-way through the funding of health service 
providers. Currently AusAid, DFID, IDA Credit, UNFPA and UNICEF are co-funding the 
project alongside the World Bank with a budget of approximately $199 million in 2009, and is 
specifically attempting to change the culture of health service provision through coordination 
with the Ministry of Health (MOH) on administrative and civil service reform.  
 
This reform involves the introduction of SOAs within the MOH in order to promote good 
governance and creates new accountable and competitive grants to NGOs (See World Bank 
2008b). These agencies are designed to be highly flexible to consumer demand and represents 
a break from the previous decade where donors have directly funded NGOs from outside of 
the state framework, instead independent ministries would have more control in awarding 
contracts to relevant clients (though of course they would still be dependent upon donor 
finance). This is important because the terms of Service Delivery Grants (SDGs) and 
Management Contracts (MCs) are to be based on the principles of good governance, 
transparency, accountability and efficiency (Im 2008; World Bank 2008b, p50; Hun 2009). 
The World Bank accepts that progress has been made regarding Cambodia's public sector 
reform over the last decade yet there is still a long way to go ―particularly in changing the 
culture of service delivery‖ (World Bank 2008).  
 
The consequences of subtle external neoliberal pressures impinging on the NGO sector in 
Phnom Penh, creates a sector that has become more accountable, efficient, professional and 
fundable; in short they are being personified as homo economicus. The creation of a funding 
market has constructed NGOs imbued 'instrumental rationality', their new 'professionalism' is 
synonymous with neoliberal private sector management techniques.  
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Nowhere is this professionalised shift among NGOs felt more keenly than through the 
emerging microfinance industry that is growing at a phenomenal rate within the country, 
Microfinance as I will outline here, represents a neoliberal shift to a social welfare approach 
under the Post-Washington Consensus, yet it tends to represent the intensification of NPM 
principles into the NGO sector further, illustrating the ways in which NGOs can be elevated 
within neoliberal development discourse to create a new private sector industry where NGOs 
have become facilitators for the market.  
 
3.3 Microfinance in Cambodia: the rise of a neoliberal development 
paradigm  
 
Microcredit is a poverty reduction strategy that aims to provide small amounts of credit to the 
rural poor, not only for income generating activities but also for supplementing basic 
requirements such as food, health, housing and education
 
(Deshmukh-Ranadive and Murthy 
2005, p31). In essence microcredit is about empowering the poor by giving them a chance to 
stand on their own two feet and create new business models, therefore instilling a sense of 
dignity and self-sufficiency without reliance upon welfare provision or other forms of 
economic dependency.  
 
In recent years there has not only been an expansion in outreach to the poor but also in the 
number of services microfinance institutions are able to offer. Originally restricted to small 
credit loans, microfinance today offers an array of financial products and services such as 
microinsurance, savings schemes, remittances and payments services (Helms 2006, 
192 
 
Ledgerwood 2002)
184
. The expansion of microfinance services and products is largely driven 
by the contemporary commercialisation of the industry and its relationship with the 
competitive market.  
 
Microfinance is increasingly seen as an important poverty reduction strategy. Many of the 
world's poorest are without sufficient access to credit: fulfilling this unmet credit demand will 
provide the poor with sufficient tools to acquire control and autonomy over their economic 
situation and break the vicious cycle of poverty. It is often cited in the literature that ―the poor 
remain poor because they are powerless. Once empowered the poor are able to change their 
lives and overcome seemingly impossible odds‖ (CGAP 2006) 
 
Microcredit began to emerge in the 1970s through experimental small scale rural development 
projects tasked with opening up credit access for the poor. The founding of the Grameen Bank 
by Mohammed Yunus
185
 in 1983 represented the start of a re-conceptualisation of the poor as 
credit worthy and capable of participating in economic markets. Yunus believed that some of 
the more extreme forms of poverty were breakable by bringing the poor into the financial 
market, a radical position rejected at the time by the orthodox theories of economic 
development that saw the poor as outside of the financial system thus excluded from its 
positive potential
 
(Yunus 2006). 
 
Microfinance remained firmly on the margins of international development throughout the 
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 In the literature this is what commonly differentiates microfinance from microcredit; the broadening of 
financial options rather than just focusing upon credit loans. However it must be noted that the two terms are 
increasingly used interchangeably throughout the literature; this chapter will however will keep with the 
more common use of microfinance.  
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 Muhammad Yunus is often cited as the pioneer of microfinance and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2006 for his efforts at combating poverty through the use of microfinance projects 
193 
 
1980s as small scale localised poverty projects. However in the mid 1990s the international 
donor community and key international organisations (the World Bank, United Nations, 
International Labour Organization [ILO] etc...) began to take an increasing interest in it, 
particularly in the wake of criticisms being received from inside and outside these 
organisations for the problematic implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs). The World Bank in response began to shift its emphasis towards poverty reduction, 
and particularly the development of national PSRPs as a focal point for directing reform in the 
economy systems of developing countries. The shift to the post-Washington Consensus 
entailed a re-focusing from the macro-political to the micro-political, and a recognition that in 
the wake of market failure a welfare safety net was required in order to tackle the recognised 
persistence of poverty and rising inequality within countries. Microfinance found itself 
elevated from the margins to the mainstream and an integral part of the new 'global poverty 
reduction agenda' (Weber 2006, p44). 
 
This agenda also entailed increased interest in the participation of civil society in 
development projects (Porter 2003; Sarker 2005). In this respect, microfinance was seen to 
contribute to a localised, non-state approach to micro-economic development. Global 
movements in microfinance found themselves in increasingly important partnership roles with 
global economic institutions like the World Bank, as the privileging of non-state approaches 
to poverty reduction gave microfinance global prominence. 1997 can be seen as a pivotal year 
in the increased mainstreaming of microfinance and its institutionalisation in global 
development practices. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) was established, 
comprising of a global network of powerful donors (and partnering the World Bank) to assist 
in the global expansion and coordination of microfinance.  In June 2004 microfinance 
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received further recognition as a critical component to global poverty reduction when the  G8 
endorsed the 'key principles of microfinance' which have been translated into concrete 
operational guidance for the international donor community working with CGAP and 
establishing best practice methodologies for NGOs working in the field
 
(CGAP2006). 
 
The first 'World Microcredit Summit Campaign' was also held in 1997 in Washington DC.  
The campaign summit was a global conference that brought together leading practitioners and 
policy-makers in the field.
186
 At the summit, a universal document of intent and future 
aspirations was put forward and agreed upon by the participants. Core themes to be 
emphasized over the coming years were agreed upon including: reaching the poorest; 
empowering women; constructing self-sufficient finance systems; and ensuring a positive 
impact on clients and families.
187
  
 
The rise in prominence of the Microcredit Summit Campaign and the powerful role of CGAP 
demonstrate the links between global social movements, advocating microfinance as a non-
state solution to poverty reduction, and the elevating of microfinance by powerful economic 
institutions.  This is part of a larger convergence between civil society and development 
occurring as part of the socially oriented 'post-Washington consensus'. This relationship, 
however, needs closer interrogation to uncover the unsurprising link between microfinance as 
a market-led poverty reduction strategy, and (contra post-Washington consensus rhetoric) the 
continuation and greater intensification of the neoliberal economic regime with its focus upon 
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 The 1997 conference brought over 2,900 people from 137 countries to participate. Since 1997 there have 
been global microcredit summits in 1998, 1999, 2002, 2006; throughout this period there have been 
successful regional microcredit summits, reflecting the growth and diversity of the sector (see 
www.microcreditsummit.org for a general overview).  
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 This increasing global recognition culminated in the United Nations World Summit's announcement of 2005 
as the 'Year of Microcredit' and recognising it as a critical tool in the effort to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) 
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expansionary market rationality (Cammack 2002, Fine et al 2001) 
 
Microfinance has been promoted and intertwined with mainstream neoliberal economics to 
construct an enabling environment to empower the poor in order for them to engage in self-
help commercial and entrepreneurial activities regarded by neoliberals as the most appropriate 
path out of poverty. Mohamed Yunus himself notes that: 
 
All it needs to get the poor people out of poverty (is) for us to create an enabling 
environment for them. Once the poor can unleash their energy and creativity, 
poverty will disappear very quickly.
 
(2006) 
 
The Microcredit Summit Campaign claims ―microcredit allows families to work to end their 
own poverty - with dignity‖ (Microcredit Summit Campaign 2009). The concept of dignity 
(coupled with the rise out of poverty) is embedded within the business approach to poverty 
reduction: the aim is for anyone, no matter how poor they are, to have the opportunity to 
become an entrepreneur and thus a ‗somebody‘ imbued with dignity.  In essence, in the 
rhetoric of microfinance, the market and its entrepreneurial (neoliberal) subject is privileged
 
(Brigg 2006, p77). 
 
From small scale rural projects emanating from the Grameen bank, microfinance has been 
incorporated into the larger international development architecture. There are still, however, 
numerous debates in the literature about whether microfinance is effective at poverty 
reduction and whether it can reach the poorest of the poor (see, Goetz and Gupta 1996, 
Kabeer 2001; Copestake 2002). This is of less concern in this chapter, however; what is 
important is to understand how, in the case of Cambodia, microfinance has been introduced as 
an idealised form of poverty reduction and embedded within the dominant neoliberal 
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development orthodoxy, and crucially to see what the repercussions are on socially-minded 
NGOs, when tracing the history of microfinance in Cambodia. 
 
3.3.1 The Growth of Microfinance in Cambodia 
 
Microfinance has in recent years become of increasing importance to the Royal Government 
of Cambodia (RGC) as an integral tool to reaching its poverty reduction targets and stabilising 
an inclusive credit market to the poor. The development of the second Socio-Economic 
Development Plan 2001-2005 (SEDPII) and its subsequent inclusion into the National 
Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005 (NPRS) highlighted microfinance as one of the 
government's priority poverty reduction actions. The NPRS adapted the SEDPII targets to try 
and localise the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Cambodian conditions and in this 
way microfinance has been elevated as an example of NGOs, the private sector, and 
international donors working together to decrease poverty in Cambodia. Since its elevation to 
being included in the National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSDP) and the 
Financial Sector Development Plan 2001-2010 (FSDP), the industry has ―evolved from a 
series of small, isolated projects into what is arguable the most sophisticated segment of the 
national financial services sector‖ (Chou et al 2008).  
 
In 2006 a national summit on 'Microfinance in Cambodia' was held, organised by the National 
Bank of Cambodia (NBC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). At the 
summit, the Prime Minister, Samdech Hun Sen, recognised the growing importance of 
microfinance to Cambodia, officially declaring 2006 as the 'Year of Microfinance'. Current 
World Bank president, Robert Zoellick, visited Cambodia in August 2007 (his first to a 
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developing country since becoming President in July) where he met local entrepreneurs and 
was given a brief overview of the microfinance industry in Cambodia to which he remarked 
―The success of the microfinance industry in Cambodia is remarkable given the challenging 
business environment and the difficulty of reaching rural and remote areas‖(World Bank 
2007). Despite these challenges the figures remain impressive; active borrowers with access 
to rural credit and micro-business loans totalled over 464,122 clients in 2006, an increase of 
27% over the previous year
 
(NBC 2006).  The number of borrowers further increased to 
624,000 clients at the end of 2007 (Chou et al 2008, p7) and has grown to approximately 
951,325 clients in the latest statistics released at the end of 2008 (CMA 2008) demonstrating a 
vast level of expansion and greater levels of inclusion of rural households.
188
 The high growth 
rate of the Microfinance industry has been described as ―a phenomenon that is relatively rare 
and could make Cambodia the envy of its neighbouring countries over the next few years.‖ 
(Sinha 2008) 
 
How has microfinance developed from small isolated projects to an impressive 'sophisticated' 
industry that is continually expanding? What structural transformations have been undertaken 
given Cambodia's economic and social fragility in recent decades? It is to these questions that 
the focus will now turn.  
 
After 20 years of civil unrest had devastated the social and economic infrastructure of 
Cambodia (from 1970 to 1990), access to credit was virtually non-existent outside of informal 
money-lending activities. In the 1990s Cambodia went through a transitional period with the 
introduction in rural villages of a cash-based economy, subsequently, non-farming activities 
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 Although these figures represent the expansion of the formalised sector since 2001, there are still numerous 
NGOs that have not transformed and work throughout various provinces which are difficult for statistical 
calculation. 
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began to rise in importance in parallel to new marketing activities (Kim 2002).
189 
The 
underdeveloped urban banking system also undertook key changes to embrace the market and 
change from a monobanking system in 1989, to its first two-tier banking system, allowing the 
establishment of private commercial banks and constructing a centralised autonomous NBC 
through the 1996 central banking law
 
(ADB 2001). 
 
By 2001 credit access for those outside the newly developing financial system (much of the 
rural poor) was still underdeveloped; the main suppliers of credit were from informal sources 
of NGOs practising microfinance. At this time it was estimated that approximately 40% of the 
population had no access to the formal banking sector, due to a weak financial architecture 
(ADB 2001). Compare this with statistics in 2009, suggesting that despite this 'gap', demand 
for credit is rapidly being filled from outside of the formal banking system via microfinance. 
From a low 7-8% coverage of the gap in 1997 to around 25% today, the rise of microfinance 
has led one observer to note that at current rates of expansion, in the next 5 years 
approximately 95% of the unmet credit demand will be filled (Sinha 2008, p11).  
 
Microfinance, therefore, has been an important element in allowing greater access to credit for 
Cambodians outside of the formal banking system. Its earliest origins in the country can be 
traced to UNICEF in 1989 and the large ensemble of INGOs and donors from 1990 onwards; 
arriving to offer aid and stabilize the country, whilst experimenting with small microcredit 
programmes
190
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 It is also worth noting that it was not until 1985 that market-orientated reforms were considered acceptable 
and heralded the rise of the private sector (ADB 1997). 
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 The first to do so were the INGOs,  Group de Recherche et d‘Etudes Technologiques  (GRET),  Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS), and World Vision, as well as the international donors, United Nation Children‘s Fund 
(UNICEF), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), 
Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and USAID, see Chou et al (2008, p3) 
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In order to regulate and coordinate this large influx of donor funded microfinance NGOs, the 
RGC established the Credit Committee for Rural Development (CCRD) in 1995. The CCRD 
was supported by the UNDP to design a legal framework and establish the rules of the 
environment in which NGOs had found themselves operating in Cambodia. In order to 
modernise and tie the microfinance sector more closely to Cambodia's financial regulatory 
sector, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
pressurised the CCRD to in turn place pressure upon the NBC to take more responsibility and 
to implement more regulatory measures in the sector (Flaming et al 2005, p6). Following this 
pressure, in 1997 the 'Supervision Office for Specialised Banks and microfinance institutions' 
was established in the Bank Supervision Department of the National Bank of Cambodia 
(NBC), highlighting the expansion and importance of microfinance to the development and 
financial sector 
 
This period of the 1990s can be seen as a period of maturing of NGO activities in Cambodia 
as microfinance projects became institutionalised through a sharing of objectives, principles 
and strategies in order to make development coordination more effective (Chou et al 2008, 
p2). NGOs were seen in this context as the key facilitators for the growth of microfinance. 
Their local knowledge and high mobility meant they were the ideal vehicle for supplying 
microcredit and various saving schemes to local poor communities. Their social objectives 
provided a platform in rural Cambodia for the pursuit of poverty reduction through expanding 
access to credit to the poor and offering various saving schemes, culminating in a multitude of 
coordinated projects
191
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 This will be expanded upon in chapter four, where the effects of microfinance on CBOs are interrogated 
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Since the end of the 1990s, microfinance in Cambodia has undergone a period of rapid 
commercialisation of the sector.  This has involved a shift in NGO funding sources from 
donor to self-sustainability; significantly, it has also entailed a more professionalised and 
market-centred approach to poverty reduction.  As they move from the margins to the centre 
of development assistance, Cambodian microfinance institutions are rapidly changing – they 
must now be seen to be businesslike and professional. At the heart of this transformation of 
the sector lies the intensification of neoliberal rationality in the construction of poverty 
reduction; as scaling up market expansion and the intensification of entrepreneurial identities. 
This entrepreneurial and business-orientated approach is not an isolated coincidence; it is part 
of a global managerial transformation of perceptions as to the way that organisations should 
be structured. This shifting attitude is part of the rise of New Public Management techniques 
that, emanating from western donors and development institutions, have as discussed in the 
previous chapter, permeated the organisational structures of NGOs in Cambodia. New Public 
Management techniques create structural constraints on NGOs/microfinance institutions, 
forcing them either to adhere to market logic and contemporary 'microfinance best practices,' 
or risk being excluded from it.  
 
It has created a competitive environment that NGOs and microfinance institutions must now 
operate in, and international donors prioritise those actors who engage most effectively with 
the market, seeing them as more ‗professional‘, whilst penalising those seen as inefficient and 
unprofessional.
192 CGAP‘s Country-Level Effectiveness and Accountability Review (CLEAR) 
study emphasized that it is imperative that NGOs adapt to this new private sector 
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 In this respect NGOs and microfinance institutions become synonymous with inefficient/efficient, 
unprofessional/professional respectively.  
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development model. If there are reasons why an NGO cannot become an independent licensed 
institution then guidelines should be introduced for integrating the NGO into an existing 
microfinance institution in order for the microfinance sector to progress (Flaming et al 2005, 
p6). Also CGAP recommended that:  
 
Based on a competitive process, fund only registered NGOs that can become 
commercial, either by transforming into licensed microfinance institutions or by 
linking to sustainable microfinance institutions. Selection criteria could include 
the potential to become sustainable, including charging market interest rates; 
ability to reach scale quickly; commitment and capacity of management; and 
innovative delivery systems and product mix to reach unserved clients (Flaming et 
al 2005, p17). 
 
It has started to seem natural that NGOs should follow the economisation of the sector and 
internally adjust accordingly; if not, they risk becoming ‗inefficient‘ and failing to compete 
with contemporary development practices.  
 
3.3.2 Microfinance in Cambodia: towards greater commercialisation  
 
In Cambodia since the 1990s there has been a shifting in structure of NGOs practicing 
microfinance towards this neoliberal form of organisational management and it has had a 
profound effect on the way that the industry as a whole has shifted towards a more 
commercial economic perspective of poverty reduction 
 
Following its establishment in 1995. CCRD jointly wrote a review with the ADB in 1996 
which concludes that, although NGOs were the main supplier of rural credit, they were not 
expanding fast enough to reach the unmet demand for credit (ADB 2001). Following 
publication of the report there existed a general consensus within the government and among 
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western donors that NGOs would need assistance in order to engage more effectively with the 
unmet credit demand.  Consequently, the conversion of microcredit NGOs into formal legal 
entities operating as Licensed Financial Institutions became a development goal (ADB 2007).  
 
Under pressure from the ADB and following various talks with leading donors, the NBC 
decided to construct and implement a Prakas in 2000, requiring, under certain criteria, the 
transformation of NGOs practising microfinance into independent limited liability 
companies.
193 
One of the greatest impacts has been that NGO microfinance programmes have 
been separated from their NGO parents to become microfinance institutions. In many cases 
entire NGO structures underwent a complete transformation in order to conform to the new 
2000 regulations.
194
 
 
Although the RGC effectively created the legal context for the creation of microfinance 
institutions, it is important to understand that the government faces strong pressure to avoid 
directly providing any financial service themselves to microfinance institutions, indeed under 
NPM principles they are expected only to develop policy frameworks that can enable a 
vibrant and competitive (private sector) market structure for microfinance to excel in.  
 
Number 8 of CGAP's influential 2004 key principles states that the job of governments is not 
to provide financial service to the poor directly but to construct a supporting policy 
environment (CGAP 2006). This reflects the shift to the post-Washington Consensus in that 
                                                 
193
 This decision resulted in the creation of Prakas B7.00-06 on the licensing of micro-financing institutions, see 
NBC (2000). 
194
 For a list of the criteria see NBC (2000). NGOs that meet the minimum requirements must be licensed and 
therefore this requires transformation. However those that do not (generally the smaller NGOs that do not 
have as large credit portfolios) must still be registered, which for now does not require a shift in 
organisational structure. 
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governments can be effective in working with donors and developing policy frameworks that 
can stimulate a vibrant and competitive microfinance structure rather than directly providing 
financial services themselves
 
(CGAP 2004). Governments are seen as having an important 
role to play in involving the private sector in formulating poverty reduction strategies and 
elevating it to a leading role in development strategies  
 
The RGC backed commercialisation of NGOs and the microfinance industry is not a trend 
isolated to the Cambodian case and can be seen throughout the world where ―microfinance 
institutions are...expected to follow on a linear path on which they transform themselves from 
informal evolving funds to NGOs, to licensed microfinance institutions‖ (Conroy 2003, 
p141). Donors that had established and provided the funding for NGOs engaging with 
microfinance programs are now being replaced by ‗socially responsible investors and private 
finance institutions‘ (Flaming et al 2005, p6). This involves new boards of shareholders and 
an entirely different funding structure from the original donor-dependency. One of the key 
areas of NGO-microfinance institution transformation therefore is the shifting in funding from 
top-down donor grants to bottom-up market-based private sector self-sufficiency 
 
In Cambodia there are 18 key organisations that are responsible for the delivery of 
microfinance services in Cambodia (see table 1.). They are seen as key for a number of 
reasons; firstly, they make up a vast percentage of the entire microfinance sector,
195
 secondly, 
they are the only members of the Cambodian Microfinance Association, an umbrella 
organisation established to coordinate microfinance policy across Cambodia. Finally, they are 
made up of all the organizations that have applied and gained licenses at the NBC and despite 
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 A report in 2004 suggested that ten of these institutions represented over 84% of all  microfinance loans 
delivered (Pickens et al 2004) 
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a majority of them being NGOs prior to the 2000 Prakas, they are now all are commercial 
companies
196.  
 
Table 1. Number of borrowers of Microfinance as of September 2008 
 
Organisation Number of Borrowers 
ACLEDA  202,919 
AMRET  202,857 
AMK  173,192 
TPC  92,514   
PRASAC  83,742 
VFC  82,344 
HKL  40,513   
CEB  33,945   
CREDIT  30,042   
CHC  9,238 
SEILANITHIH  7,018 
IPR  4,283 
FUDF  2,555 
CBIRD  2,044 
MAXIMA  1,840 
TFMF 823 
EAP 192 
FF 22 
Total  
 
951,325 
 
Source: Cambodian Microfinance Association database available at www.cmanetwork.org 
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  Indeed in order to become a member of the CMA network, NGOs must have gained a license, or be in the 
process of gaining a license from the NBC; thus they must also have transformed from NGO to Microfinance 
institution.  
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According to economic policy experts there are some common reasons why NGOs in general 
choose to convert into microfinance institutions. One of the primary reasons is to improve 
access to commercial funds. NGOs were previously dependent upon donor funding but this 
becomes difficult to sustain financially whilst expanding an NGO‘s service outreach. 
Relatedly, limitations on service outreach is often combined with a limited range of financial 
services that can be offered by an NGO; for example most deal with credit only, and yet in 
order to mobilise savings effectively an NGO must transform into an microfinance institution 
in order to have the ability to attract a larger pool of clients (Hishigsuren 2005). With 
transformation, NGOs can access capital markets with ease, source capital more rapidly, and 
expand their loan portfolios at reasonable costs (Campion and White 2001, p6).  
 
Practitioners in the microfinance industry claim that NGO-microfinance institutions bring a 
higher level of efficiency and financial performance than in their previous organizational 
NGO form. Microfinance institutions become more susceptible to the demands of the market 
once they become financially formalised; thus they must conform to the demands of 
customers in order to be competitive; their services and projects therefore become more 
efficient and attuned to the customer‘s needs (Campion and White 2001, p6) Banks and other 
formal financial institutions are reluctant to lend vast amounts of money to unregulated 
microfinance institution-NGOs as these organizations struggle to leverage their equity base or 
offer a guarantee facility. A Regulated microfinance institution however is subject to ongoing 
supervision and regulation; potential investors respond to increased security with increased 
investment (Campion and White 2001, p7). In Cambodia newly registered/licensed 
microfinance institutions are continuously regulated by the NBC to ensure financial integrity.  
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These views are predicated upon the common assumption that it is of primary importance to 
create a professionalized, accountable and efficient microfinance industry; and that separating 
from donor funding requires closer conformity to market principles. Microfinance institutions 
in Cambodia have taken up this professionalised approach, and most have undergone internal 
structural changes in order to adapt to a more commercialised sector 
 
As an example, Hattha Kaksekar
197
 underwent a transformation typical of the emerging 
pattern of NGO conversions to a microfinance institution in 2001. First they registered with 
the NBC in 2000, then, after completing the transformation into a limited company with a 
three year microfinance licence, the company took on a host of shareholders. The former 
NGO is now known as Hattha Kaksekar Ltd (HKL). HKL conducted a complete internal 
restructuring of the management and staff structure in order to become sustainable. Internal 
audit, credit, financial management information systems and human resource departments 
were newly formed in order to manage the company‘s expanded financial activities (HKL 
2003) In 2004, HKL received its first rating by Micro-Credit Ratings International Ltd
198
, and 
was congratulated for its financial transformation over the last three years to a sustainable 
company. 2004 also saw the company officially become self-sufficient in terms of operational 
status, and yield a net profit increase of 195% from the previous year (HKL 2004). In their 
2006 annual report, HKL recognised that microfinance institutions are becoming more 
competitive and that there is still a sizeable market remaining; therefore they are focusing 
greater efforts, in line with other microfinance institutions, on market penetration and 
expansion (HKL 2006). The organisaiton has therefore undergone a vast transformation to 
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 'Farmer's Hand',  an NGO that was established in Cambodia with the help of Oxfam Quebec in 1996 
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 M-CRIL was established in 1998 to help facilitate the flow of commercial funds into microfinance. The aim 
of M-CRIL is to provide a standardised tool to assess the financial worthiness of microfinance institutions to 
allow investors to understand financial suitability of specific microfinance institutions, and be aware of their 
strengths and weaknesses for institutional capacity building  
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adapt to the changing microfinance sector. The early donor-based organisation has 
commercialised to become a self-sufficient (and expansion oriented) economically viable 
microfinance organisation.  
 
ACLEDA
199
 was initially established as the Association of Cambodian Local Economic 
Development Agencies, as a resettlement project of the International Labour Organisation and 
the United Nations Development Programme focusing on providing enterprise development 
training and supplying credit. After expanding to become a successful NGO, ACLEDA 
received strong support by donors such as Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), United  
UNDP, ILO and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), who 
promoted the idea of further transition from an NGO to a commercial institution and offered 
the NGO a wealth of technical and financial assistance (Flaming et al 2005, p13). According 
to ACLEDA‘s current managing director, In Channy, the organisation took the decision to 
transform from an NGO to a public limited company and then a bank based upon some 
important factors. The first was to be able to expand their network to cover 14 of Cambodia‘s 
provinces. The second was that ACLEDA wanted to have the ability to operate at a profit to 
ensure sustainability (they had broken even financially in 1998). Access to funds is extremely 
difficult to obtain by NGOs in the contemporary development climate. To fill the unmet gap 
in demand for credit, NGOs like ACLEDA felt compelled to obtain greater access to 
commercial funds, thus there was a change in the structure of ownership and the desired move 
towards licensing to become a PLC capable of accessing funds from wholesale financial 
institutions and commercial banks.(In 2002). Importantly, ACLEDA was forced to become a 
bank in order to comply with the 1999 law on banking which stipulates that the activities 
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 Perhaps one of the most successful to undergo NGO-microfinance institution transformation, it is often 
viewed as the role model of Cambodian Microfinance 
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undertaken by ACLEDA are compatible with what the RGC calls a ‗specialised bank‘(In 
2002, p5). There was an inevitable cultural change when  
 
ACLEDA went through the motions of changing from an NGO to a microfinance institution 
and took on a commercial attitude to better serve its clients. The management structure 
received an overhaul in order to deal with the complexities of expansion into commercial 
banking including strengthening the internal auditing function and bringing 
PriceWaterhouseCooper on board as external auditors. A new board of directors was 
established in order to bring a broader range of skills and experience in the business sector (In 
2002, p5). ACLEDA therefore represents the trend in NGOs who felt that financial security 
could only be met by transforming the internal structure of the organisation to a more 
professionalised, privatised shareholder approach in order to expand and become competitive 
in the market. 
 
It is clear that many of the newly emerging microfinance institution structures are shifting 
priorities towards remaining competitive in the new market environment; thus they are 
shifting strategy to concentrate more on scaling up operations and increasing market share. As 
a senior member of a microfinance institution explained, throughout transformation there is 
still a consistent emphasis upon the poor and how best to serve poor clients. However the 
private sector management style requires a priority shift towards expansion and 
competitiveness in order to meet unmet credit demand (Interview 2009a). This shift in 
strategy is consistent with New Public Management principles and the new priorities of a 
competitive market: expansion as a way to include those who are excluded from the market. 
The priorities of the privatised microfinance institution equate with a neoliberal conception of 
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poverty that views the ultimate priority of poverty reduction as ensuring everyone has access 
to credit. This shift has not always been easy for those involved in the sector, and indeed there 
are still questions raised over whether the current commercialised sector represents a form of 
'mission drift
200
 from the earlier conceptions of poverty reduction brought into Cambodia in 
the early 1990s. 
 
3.3.3 Microfinance: Social and commercial tensions 
 
An analysis by the ADB of the sector's shifting commercial focus, revealed that it wasn't as 
easy as first thought to merge the social NGO sector with a stronger private sector ethos as 
―...target NGOs were going through a corporate culture shock at being transformed into 
corporate entities‖ (ADB 2007). This culture shock resulted in the ADB's initial promise of a 
$20 million loan (to be channelled through the Rural Development Bank) being reduced down 
to $5 million due to the underestimation of how many newly created microfinance institutions 
would meet the criteria established by the ADB in order to be able to qualify for the loan.
201
 
As the ADB noted:  
 
The procedure for forming a company in itself was cumbersome as it involved 
shareholding decisions, the appointment of directors and officers, the formulation 
of memorandum and articles of association, etc. As this was a major 
transformation in corporate behaviour for financial institutions mostly operated by 
NGOs, the result was a great deal more time that envisaged was required for an 
LFI to qualify as a project participant (ADB 2007).  
 
                                                 
200
 According to Tanmay there is a major concern within the industry at the moment surrounding the potential 
repercussions of a market shift. See Tanmay (2007)  
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 The ADB loan expired in march 2006 and had successfully helped finance seven microfinance institutions 
Hatthakakseka Ltd, Seilanithih Ltd, AMRET Ltd, Cambodia Entrepreneur Building Ltd, Thaneakea Phum 
Ltd, ACLEDA, Canadia Bank) These microfinance institutions (and two Banks) were the only microfinance 
institutions that had fulfilled the criteria established in order to receive loans via the RDB. See ADB (2007)  
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The transformation from an NGO to an microfinance institution has many implications that 
parallel the shifting perspective in contemporary microfinance policy directives, as 
Hishigsuren argues, ―balancing the composition of old-NGO and new-commercial staff and 
board members is difficult...It is not always clear how one can merge these values with 
poverty reduction‖ (Hishigsuren 2006, p11). 
 
Clearly any cultural shift requires a break from the traditional approaches undertaken by the 
NGO. Campion and White believe that in order for the transition to be successful, 
microfinance institutions need to hire staff familiar with local markets and the business sector. 
The typical social service perspective associated with NGOs needs to be converted to a 
customer service orientation appropriate for a financial intermediary.(Campion and White 
2001, p10).
 
Microcredit Ratings International Ltd found in its study on the impact of rating 
schemes for microfinance practice that many of its clients still suffer the usual weakness of 
newly converted microfinance institutions: namely, they lack the current business orientations 
which can severely limit sustainability. This, it is argued, is a product of microfinance 
institutions emerging from NGOs and limiting market opportunities by not adequately 
―dispensing with a social agenda‖ (MCRIL 2002) 
 
Essentially the language from much of the international donor community suggests that 
market expansion (which is of utmost importance for the neoliberal conception of creating an 
enabling environment for the poor to be given access to the market) and self-sustainability is 
being heavily hampered by the continuing social NGO structure that cannot 'cope' with the 
competitive demands of the market. NGOs operating in microfinance often express concern 
and anxiety over the direction their organisations will take when converting into microfinance 
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institutions privileging market expansion.  
 
There are a few examples of some NGOs that have reduced their microfinance orientated 
projects because of the impact it has on the social dimension of projects they are involved 
with, problems have been highlighted with the way that poor villagers in rural areas tend to 
struggle paying the money back and the consequences of this are a worsening in relationship 
between the borrower vis-a-vis the rest of the community as well as creating feelings of 
isolation and segregation (interview 2007h). A member of an NGO currently going through 
the transformation process explained that his organisation has always given a low priority 
towards the expansion of market share and prefers to work on quality products with the small 
number of clients on its books. However there is a general fear that once they join the 
competitive market for funding (as opposed to being solely funded by their donor INGO) 
there is always the chance they will have to conform to other shareholder wishes of greater 
expansion in order to remain competitive and that this could represent an example of mission 
drift (interview 2009b)
.
 This can serve to highlight the very differences between NGOs and 
microfinance institutions and the decisions they are faced with when left to the demands of 
the market. The process of attempting to merge these two cultures together can prove to be a 
challenging task, yet it is undeniable that the commercial culture associated with 
neoliberalism is continually being promoted by shareholders and development agencies.  
 
Commercialised MFIs have a tendency to focus on the 'economically active poor', as opposed 
to the 'poorest of the poor', the latter of whom are less interested in financial services and 
more in need of subsidised provision of social services such as food, healthcare and education 
(Ito 2008). In Cambodia there is a problem developing surrounding 'chronic indebtedness' in 
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many rural communities, this is often caused by periodic droughts and floods and results in 
farmers having to borrow money in order to overcome food shortages.(Kim 2002, p5). Indeed 
ADB country director Arjun Goswami surmised that in the wake of the global economic 
turbulence currently effecting Cambodia ―The demand for MFI services will rise because of 
the impact of the slowdown on the poor - there will be a greater demand for their services and 
the poor will have to borrow more. The rural poor population may need to borrow for their 
very immediate necessities‖ (cited in McLoed 2009). This rise in borrowing levels does not 
equate to entrepreneurial choice, but out of necessity in a country with no welfare state. 
Despite claims to the contrary from its advocates, neoliberal strategies do not imbue freedom 
of choice when faced with difficult economic climates, and the saturation of chronic 
indebtedness does nothing to help the coping strategies of the poorest in society.202  
 
This raises the question further of the supposed link between these commercialised NGOs and 
the community, particularly in rural Cambodia
203
, the inclusive, endogenous and 
communicative dimension of civil society is clearly lacking in the development of 
microfinance in Cambodia, where NGOs are increasingly upscaling to become 
commercialised entities in the wake of a state based social safety net and encouraged by the 
neoliberal orthodoxy of market expansion. These new spaces are filled with an instrumental 
form of logic where the poor are viewed as customers and clients, and solutions to poverty are 
externally imposed rather than debated in an inclusive public sphere where NGOs represent 
the voices from below.  
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 Loans can become burdens on the poor; for example a study by Kleih et al suggests that there are various 
limitations of microfinance schemes in Cambodia, one of these limitations is that they found examples of a 
number of people borrowing money from one NGO in order to refund a loan from another NGO that had 
previously helped them (2006) 
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 This is a theme returned to in chapter four 
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The urban NGO sector in Phnom Penh has clearly been implicitly forced to undergo a shift 
towards a closer engagement with neoliberal practices, most NGOs are dependent on donor 
funding and have been given little alternative other than to follow neoliberal good governance 
strategies in order to entice funding and support for survival. The overwhelming percentage of 
NGOs involved within service provision has led to the emergence of a 'development market 
place' among competing NGOs and has resulted in the arrival of accreditation schemes such 
as those being implemented by the NGO-GPP, and as has been demonstrated, results in the 
prioritising of more efficient, transparent and accountable NGO structures. This 
accountability, far from being a form that links NGOs with their representative constituents, is 
squarely focused upwards to obtain donor funding, and incorporated within the NPM 
paradigm of accountancy, auditing and performance. The service provision sector of 
microfinance represents an interesting to micro-case study to demonstrate how a neoliberal 
post-SAP safety net has become incorporated as an increasingly dominant form of poverty 
reduction, and the relationship this has had on those NGOs that have been typically involved 
in microfinance service provision. These NGOs within the service provision sector 
demonstrate a good example of how civil society can effectively be colonised from the 
systemic forces of instrumental rationality from a combination of administrative power 
(NPM) and economic power (market ethos), and revealing the problematic assumption of 
equating civil society (and the formal dimension of NGOs) with the communicative structures 
of the lifeworld capable of steering the system.  
 
The microfinance industry in Cambodia has come a long way since the early 1990s, from 
small scale, donor-funded NGO projects they have emerged as autonomous self-sufficient, 
shareholder-based microfinance institutions. This transformation can be traced to the recent 
214 
 
pressure from international donors to instil neoliberal NPM principles into the NGO sector.  
Combined with the resulting new legislation in Cambodia, a competitive microfinance 
industry has been constructed where newly formed commercial organisations attempt to 
expand their outreach thanks to new, more efficient, managerial structures.  
 
The neoliberal vision of poverty alleviation promotes the expansion of the market to meet 
unmet credit demand, and when coupled with the self-sustainability of microfinance 
institutions, is seen as the fundamental method to contribute to the reduction of poverty in the 
country. This ensures that NGOs are active in creating an enabling environment for the poor 
to become entrepreneurs and contributes to a further layer of consumerism into the culture. 
Early notions of empowerment that were brought in with donors in the 1990s were attached to 
nearly every project enacted, however these days it is becoming increasingly rare to hear the 
term empowerment employed in microfinance institution internal policy discussions and 
therefore in contemporary microfinance projects (Interview 2009c). This is an interesting 
point; empowerment as an overriding major theme throughout earlier projects has become 
subsumed under the commercial preference for market expansion and service outreach, 
however, and as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, there is an implicit form of 
empowerment here, one that is narrowly related to the economistic notion of access to credit 
as the basic neoliberal element of becoming 'empowered'. The lack of an overt emphasis on 
empowerment within the formal NGO sector of microfinance, is juxtaposed with 
microfinance projects at the rural level where empowerment is increasingly on the rise yet as 
will be argued, the content is essentially the same; access to the market, the pinnacle of 
freedom and choice in a liberal democracy.  
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The next chapter will keep this core theme of the external infiltration of civil society from 
neoliberal practices and principles, however, it will now shift towards an analysis of the rural 
construction of civil society that is currently underway in Cambodia, and demonstrate how 
neoliberal interpretations of civil society promotion are being applied at the very grassroots in 
the country, raising important questions as to the ideal of an endogenous and impartial form of 
civil society.  
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4. NEOLIBERAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
CAMBODIAN CIVIL SOCIETY: STIMULATING GRASSROOTS 
ORGANISATIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has demonstrated how civil society tends to be equated with a 
professional urban based NGO sector in Phnom Penh; a consequence of the influx of INGOs 
since the Paris Peace Accords. A USAID funded report released last year recognised that this 
amalgamation of NGOs are hardly representative of genuine notions of 'civil society' because 
they consist entirely of ―a superstructure of primarily service delivery organizations and 
almost totally dependent on foreign funding along with guidance, training, and 'protection' to 
some major extent. This very dependence, while necessary, brings into question their 
'legitimacy' as expressions of a Cambodian civil society‖ (Blue, Blair and Mitchell 2008, 
p53). Interestingly this recognition that the NGO sector fails to offer the endogenous forms of 
collectivity required for a truly 'Cambodian' civil society, relates to the way in which the 
donor community in Cambodia has in the last two decades been actively promoting CBOs 
within the rural population. These have been externally promoted through a combination of 
state, donor and NGO projects since the 1991 Paris Peace accords, in response to the 
perceived lack of social capital in the wake of the Khmer Rouge atrocities 
 
The attempt to integrate greater levels of microfinance within CBO structures is viewed as 
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fundamental to the reconstruction of a more peaceful and democratic notion of social capital 
in the country. A recent study funded by the World Bank suggested that although postconflict 
communities such as within Cambodia have the potential to increase social capital through 
closer kinship integration and primary bonding relations, this is insufficient in the long term 
and represents a weak chain of social capital. In response a focus on ―postconflict market 
penetration may easily reverse this pattern and lead to more outward-focussed, bridging social 
capital in the medium-to longer-term transition to peace‖ (Colletta and Cullen 2000, p32). 
 
The attempt to get communities to engage with the market is a core theme found throughout 
this chapter as a consequence of donor interventions at the grassroots. To this end the chapter 
will firstly interrogate some of the consequences of the shift towards incorporating the service 
provision ailment of microfinance on CBOs.  Secondly, the chapter will demonstrate how a 
new approach to 'Social Accountability' is being examined and implemented among rural 
NGOs and CBOs, to create a form of civil society that can excel in the role of democratic 
watchdog. Concerns with good governance and accountability of state ministries have led the 
World Bank and various donors to engage with NGOs as bridging mechanisms between 
citizens/CBOs and the state in a professional monitoring role, consequence of which is the 
depoliticisation and technical approach to democratic participation. 
 
The drive for good governance in Cambodia encourages grass roots civil society to play two 
important roles; challenging the entrenched interests of the state by demanding a responsive 
government, and addressing the needs of vulnerable groups and remote communities through 
service provision that government agencies find difficult to gain access (Henke 2010, p4). 
Both of these examples are consequences of the NPA that was discussed in chapter two, 
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however, they represent a closer link to the grassroots than is often observed in the literature 
where 'detached' professional NGOs are selected for service provision and democratic 
oversight. The twin pillars of state and market engagement ultimately represent a form of 
colonisation of the lifeworld where civil society, often romanticised as an endogenously 
communicative entity,  is externally constructed and reproduced within neoliberal discourses 
to produce instrumental forms of rationality at the heart of these collectivities; the production 
of homo economicus. 
 
4.2 Building CBOs at the grassroots  
 
The attempt to construct CBOs within rural Cambodia has been a difficult task for 
international donors, most villagers tended to be sceptical at first when INGOs arrived and 
attempted to construct collective projects because of the association with the Khmer Rouge 
era, where forced collectivisation threatened to stamp out individuality (Goran, Pon and Sok 
1999. p9)
204
. Despite these troubles, there are generally three distinct groups that tend to 
represent this form of civil society in rural Cambodia; traditional associations, Village 
Development Committees (VDCs), and externally sponsored groups (Pellini and Ayres 2005; 
Henke 2010). The numbers of these CBOs that have emerged in recent years are almost 
impossible to determine given the relative instability of many, and the lack of harmonisation 
among donors/NGOs with regard to the construction of a database to detail the variety of 
CBO experiments that are being carried out. Despite the emergence and nurturing of these 
forms of association, levels of membership of CBOs are low in Cambodia, a recent poll from 
the World Bank suggests that only 23% of people claimed to be involved with a CBO and of 
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 Trust, as a key ingredient of social capital was seen as severely depleted in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge 
atrocities and hindered many of the projects that the donor community attempted to instil (see Muecke 1995) 
219 
 
that number an overwhelming 95.5% stated that they only belong to one organisation (World 
Bank 2009, p41). 
 
Traditional associations such as the Pagoda
205
, represent a place where villagers gather for 
communal meetings. Pagodas are normally linked to between six and eight villages. Pagoda 
committees are formed by elected or appointed Achars (Clergymen) from nearby villages to 
help organise ceremonies and maintain the Pagoda. Other Traditional associations include 
traditional self-help groups (Kroms), credit groups (Tong tin) that are informally based 
lending groups where villagers will loan cash to others with a view to make profit through 
interest.
206
 These traditional forms of association were largely but not entirely depleted under 
the Democratic Kampuchea era, yet demonstrates that social capital in the form of collective 
association does still exist in its indigenous form, despite the overarching donor 'blank slate' 
mentality (see Oveson, Trankell and Ojendal 1996; Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). Despite 
this research is still scarce on indigenous forms of civil society, instead the donor community 
has 're-introduced' these forms of association in the 1990s, coupled with western forms of 
organisation through the nurturing influence of NGOs 
 
Although the pagoda represents one of the few traditional collective associations that survived 
the civil war that has been endogenously formed, contemporary projects that have sought to 
enhance the role of the pagoda within civil society such as the Pagoda Coordination 
Committee (PaCoCo) in Kampong Thom, typifies the way in which NGOs are influential in 
developing collective organisations in Cambodia, and embody external notions of civil 
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 The Pagoda, or Wat, is a Buddist temple 
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 Tong Tin groups are often seen as a last resort for getting access to credit and are perceived as fraught with 
risk due to various tales of deception and fraud, much in the same way pyramid schemes are often perceived. 
They are becoming a rarity due to the existence of more formal procedures for obtaining credit in the country.  
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society that are adopted and reproduced as localised ownership. The PaCoCo was designed as 
a vehicle  in which donor funds could be channelled through to the (re)established modern 
associations discussed below, therefore seen as an important link between funding sources and 
local development (GTZ 2003, p5). This role is therefore largely about oversight, and includes 
the task of selecting which associations are functioning well and deserve continual funding by 
designing the criteria in order to be eligible for continual support (Aschmoneit 1998, p12).  
 
The Pacoco has been influential in the nurturing and progress of associations and continually 
implements new ideas such as ‗selling shops‘ and other self-help commercial activities. These 
new ideas were externally implemented by various donors in the area such as GTZ
207
 and as 
such according to Wharton, demonstrates two major dependencies; firstly that any projects 
benefiting association members would not take place without the coordination of the PaCoCo, 
and secondly, the PaCoCo  is itself still reliant upon the training, funding and support from 
GTZ (2003, p6).   
 
Village Development Committees (VDCs) were first established in the 1990s through the 
Seila Programme
208
 to enhance civil society's link to local governance. Their role is to 
improve  participation through the inclusion of local people in decision-making practices 
concerning development issues.  By allowing individuals a voice in development projects at 
the local level, this bottom up approach to planning is new to the Cambodian people who until 
the ending of the Democratic Kampuchea period, ―have only experienced being told what to 
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 Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zumsammenarbeit (GTZ) a German based INGO that operates in 
Phnom Penh  
208
 translated as 'foundation stone', this programme was enacted by the RGC in 1996 with funding from the 
UNDP Cambodia Reintegration and Rehabilitation (CARERE) project, to support the construction of 
infrastructure that would aid in alleviating poverty and decentralising the structures of governance. This 
includes small-scale public investment from roads, schools and irrigation, to developing greater levels of 
community participation such as the VDCs. For an overview of the Seila Programme see Anderson (2004)  
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do‖ (ADB 2001, p47). The RGC engages with VDCs through establishing in 1999 a number 
of 'Provincial Rural Development Committees' (PRDC)
209
  tasked with liaising between 
VDCs and the government institutions responsible for implementing development projects. 
Whilst this approach to participation is commendable, it needs to be critically analysed to 
understand that the process is reliant upon the external nurturing by NGOs, and therefore they 
are dependent upon the vision and ideology of these NGOs. This can result in the permeation 
of economistic forms of collective activity alongside the building of civil society, for example 
the Lutherian World Federation (LWF)
210
 held over 393 VDC workshops under the 'Integrated 
Rural Development through Empowerment Project' (IRDEP) in 2008, in an attempt to 
mainstream new concepts such as 'community-based enterprise' and 'Community Finance 
Institutions' into VDC development projects (LWF 2008a).  
 
It remains to be seen how effective and widespread these groups will become in Rural 
Cambodia given that in 2005 they were only operating in 8,000 of the 13,964 villages 
recorded due to a lack of financial resources (Pellini and Ayres 2005). VDCs are still seen as 
only being active when supported by external development agencies, whether this is the 
Department of Rural Development or the NGOs that tend to work alongside VDCs in a 
training and educational capacity (Mansfield and Macleod 2004, p22).  
 
The third and most numerous pillar of civil society observable at the community level is 
represented by those modern associations
211
 that have emerged in post-conflict Cambodia 
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 These are essentially decentralised committees from the Department of Rural Development as part of the 
decentralisation framework that is underway in Cambodia  
210
 An INGO that has been established in Cambodia since 1979, to date it has spent over $34 million on rural 
development in Cambodia and plans to localise in 2010 (see LWF 2009b)  
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 Also known as CBOs, a term often cited within policy documentation 
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under the direct tutelage and nurturing of NGOs, such as Self-Help Groups (SHGs)
212
,  
Pagoda associations, school support committees, funeral committees, midwife associations, 
help the aged associations, water-user associations, dry season rice cultivation associations, 
saving associations, community fisheries, forestry communities, and road maintenance 
committees (Sedara and Ojendal 2007, p8). These groups tend to be established to aid in the 
fostering of social capital, poverty reduction, and the enhancement of political participation 
through collectivised activities; thus they are often seen in the country as the 'building blocks 
of civil society (Colletta and Cullen 2000, p23). 
 
In particular  the increasingly common 'associations', are not based upon kinship or primary 
bonds, they cut across multiple communities as social capital bridging mechanisms 
(representing an increase in horizontal forms of social capital) and are sometimes  referred to 
as 'second-order organisations' because they operate at a supracommunity level (Bebbington 
and Carroll 2002, p235). Despite the heterogeneity of these associations, they all share the 
commonality of a dependence upon NGOs in order to remain functional. Sedara and Ojendal 
(2007) highlight that their work on community fisheries demonstrates that villagers involved 
in local projects struggle to recognise the 'local' dimensions as ―members feel that they are 
affiliated with, or even being the staff of, an NGO or a technical department, rather than part 
of a local community initiative. They become too dependent on either the authorities, who 
determine the limits for their work, or the particular external partner that is financially 
supporting their activity...‖ (Sedara and Ojendal 2007, p31).  
 
In Takeo province there are various associations that have been established by NGOs and still 
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 The modern form of Self Help Group (SHG) that is seemingly widespread in contemporary Cambodia has 
only been in practice since the 1980s  and were formed by NGOs, usually for collective income generation 
activities with a focus on savings and credit (see Khlok et al 2003).  
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in many respects remain dependent upon their support to remain functional. In 2003 
CEDAC
213
 helped establish a farmers' association in the Tramkok district, comprised of over 
75 families (out of 113 within the village selected), to coordinate and disseminate new 
agricultural techniques alongside savings and credit schemes as part of an overarching 
development framework.  The association was  initially divided into two groups; the ‗products 
group‘ and the ‗group for the dissemination of information‘ before a year later expanding to 
incorporate a ‗group for the poor‘, ‗group for women‘ and a 'group for youth‘. The farmers' 
association became fully democratic with its first elections in 2004 and became officially self-
dependent , however, most of the elected committee struggled with the administrative side of 
maintaining the association and were wholly dependent upon CEDAC for bureaucratic duties 
such as administering a draft by-law (Interview 2007h).  
 
CEDAC's training schemes have, however, enabled a few of the villagers to visit various 
regions of Cambodia to observe other farmers' associations and to undertake training seminars 
and workshops. One committee member interviewed expressed a positive attitude at the way 
in which the farmers association had helped local communities to unite since its inception 
(Interview 2007i), however, the translator was later to express to me his scepticism as to the 
style of language used by the committee member as being heavily influenced by their NGO 
training. In 2004 CEDAC administered a savings and credit scheme in order to help the 
‗group for the poor‘ and provided technical training assistance, however, although it is largely 
becoming popular there are still many problems with villagers borrowing money from the 
association and facing debt collectors and property repossession when they struggle to pay 
back what was borrowed (Interview 2007j). 
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 Centre d'Études et de Dévelopement Agricole Cambodgien (CEDAC) is a French based NGO that specialises 
in training communities in agricultural development techniques 
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Chamroen Chiet Khmer (CCK), an NGO in Koh Andeth district, Takeo province, was 
established in 1992 with the help of Oxfam GB as a disaster management and community 
development project. Over the years it has decreased its focus on disaster management 
towards its preferred project of rural development consequently establishing among other 
collectivised groups, a forestry community in the area
214
. CCK have been extremely 
influential in training and supporting the established forestry community to ensure that the 
committee members understand their legal status in the protection of local forests from illegal 
logging activities
215
. Despite an attempt to maintain a minimum of contact with the forestry 
community, one member of CCK admits that this is difficult, especially given the lack of 
administrative know-how on behalf of the elected committee, for example they have become 
intermediaries between the forestry ministry and the forestry community by becoming 
spokespersons for the community and reporting back the feedback from the ministry 
(Interview 2007k). 
 
Interestingly as is a similar pattern in many of the emerging CBOs in the region, CCK as part 
of their disaster management mission and at a request from their donors, trained many of 
these members of the forestry community in saving and credit schemes alongside the 
legal/policy advice. CCK is a partner of CEDAC among other NGOs and so various savings 
and credit schemes are shared throughout their CBO ‗projects‘. For some, this mass 
introduction of microfinance projects within associations and communities, creates problems 
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 Forestry communities are more often or not established by INGOs, and receive technical training and 
management support from them. Many forestry community leaders were also personally trained by NGOs 
and contribute to a certain style of management that is not locally instituted (Sedara and Ojendal 2007, p21) 
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 These illegal activities have been controversial in Cambodia over the last decade because of the lack of 
enforcement to stop the logging by the CPP, there is also no written legal law regarding forestry practices to 
compound the difficulties further.  
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for dependency and can create cycles of debt that are not easy to pay off. This was a particular 
concern for one of the village chiefs in Takeo province, who explained that in his capacity as a 
VDC official he turned down a host of MFIs approached him to set up credit banks in the 
area, because in his observations the poor tended to borrow frequently even when they knew 
it would be difficult to repay the money back (Interview 2007l). It should be noted here that 
the specific MFIs that approached were from Phnom Penh and attempted to offer a more 
direct form of loans system, rather than the more popular NGO supported self-help credit 
groups that are integrated throughout most civil society associations in the country, this 
difference is more of organisational structure rather than explicit differences within the raison 
d‘être of microfinance.  
 
In this developing rural microfinance sector there are roughly three identifiable approaches 
undertaken by NGOs when lending to the local community. The first is through ‗self-help 
groups‘ (or village bank groups as they are sometimes referred to)  which are small and 
socially homogeneous groups of 10-20 people who are mutually self-managed being given 
control over credit management. These are very popular in Cambodia and receive small grants 
coupled with training and support from NGOs who develop their savings capacity. The 
second approach is for NGOs to establish ‗groups as loan guarantors‘ thus groups take 
responsibility for their member‘s debt and financial management, actively monitoring each 
other to ensure compliance. The third strategy ‗lending to individuals in solidarity groups‘ is 
for smaller groups of approx 5 people to be formed with the help of NGOs, who defer 
financial responsibility to MFIs such as those outlined in the previous chapter. These MFIs 
manage the credit and saving schemes of the group to ensure maximum transparency and 
efficiency (see Kleih et al 2006, Tietze and Villareal 2003).  
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It is almost impossible to quantify the numbers of these different projects established within 
rural Cambodia, the previous chapter showed the outreach of the key MFIs (although 
information itself is only recently available thanks to the coordinating process of the CMA), 
yet given the difficulty in counting the numbers of NGOs within the country let alone those 
that offer microfinance projects within their attempts to establish CBOs, it will be some time 
before an official database will become available. I am inclined to believe that given the way 
that the formal sector within Phnom Penh has shifted towards a direct preference for a more 
efficient, transparent and professional form of microfinance, that the solidarity group process 
under MFIs, may well become the dominant form in the future, given its perceived potential 
for market expansion; the ultimate neoliberal poverty reduction ambition to ensure access to 
credit. 
 
Villagers participating within various credit schemes do not always understand the 
implications of loan repayment, in fact many are observed engaging in forms of conspicuous 
consumption such as jewellery, or the opposite; borrowing to make up for crop short-falls, 
education, and other social related services. Villagers tend to lack an understanding of the 
levels of income generation required in order to be able to pay it back effectively, 
concentrating on the obtaining of credit rather than its repayment (interview 2007m). This of 
course runs counter to the attempt by most NGOs to instil an entrepreneurial ethos, described 
below, through lending credit in the hope that it will be used to foster new local business 
models and generate new markets within rural communities.  This demonstrates the problems 
with instilling market logic among the poor who are liable to use it for direct welfare 
necessities, or as a form of surplus income, and raises questions about the apparent preference 
227 
 
of self-help versus state-supported forms of social safety nets when business logics are 
shunned at the grassroots.   
 
The increasing numbers of competing credit schemes on offer, whether directly from MFIs 
working within villages, or through NGO supported self-help saving and credit schemes, are 
often confusing for villagers (Interview 2007n). This has, however, not prevented a large 
proportion of villagers attempting to engage with these schemes. Sometimes collective 
associations (such as farmers, fisheries, forestry etc...) are even increasing in numbers because 
of the opportunities that are perceived to be available for obtaining credit from the banks that 
are seemingly closely involved. A non-member of a farmer's association in Takeo described 
the desire to join her local farmers' association because although previously she had not been 
interested in participating in the collective meetings and training offered by NGOs, the recent 
arrival of credit opportunities could be helpful to obtain cheap loans with low interest 
(Interview 2007o). Reasons given for obtaining credit was as a support mechanism in case of 
problems with rice and crop growing in the coming months (Interview 2007o).  
 
This in itself of course, can be used to highlight the relative success of microfinance, its 
expansion within the rural landscape, and how demand is being met through greater 
opportunities to generate income. The evidence from various villages and associations 
suggests that collectivised activities that operate under the banner of (an externally produced) 
civil society in Cambodia are closely intertwined with microfinance strategies as an integral 
framework to promote poverty reduction, it is seemingly quite rare to encounter a collective 
in rural Cambodia that does not offer some form of credit scheme.  
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It is interesting to notice that one of the most important distinctions, in my opinion, between 
the urban based lending structures of MFIs, and the more informally constructed self-help 
groups, centres around a preference for using or not using the term 'empowerment' within 
these collectives. As noted within the previous chapter, many MFIs have disregarded the 
notion of empowerment, seen as part of the 'social' NGO climate and therefore out of sync 
with a commercial approach to microfinance. Instead they place particular attention to 
economic market expansion, and emphasizing that the end product of poverty reduction and a 
welfare safety-net, is the outcome of this commercial process. The self-help model in contrast 
focuses more keenly on the notion of empowerment within credit based approaches and 
attempts to merge the credit system within a more social context (Reddy and Manak 2005).  
 
A good example to demonstrate the fusion of microfinance with an empowered form of 
community building in rural Cambodia comes from Pact Cambodia's Women's Empowerment 
Program (WEP) that ran in the country from 2004-2007, aiming to empower poor women in 
the country through village-based savings groups
216
 and combining a comprehensive training 
package to help them ―achieve literacy, produce income and evolve as social leaders (Pact 
Cambodia 2009a). The origins of this project emanate from a USAID sponsored program in 
Nepal in 1999 that has been replicated throughout the countries of Cambodia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. This approach to 
microfinance is, however, an alternative to the typical projects enacted previously in that it is 
a 'savings-led' approach
217
 that still appears to be under the radar of major donors, attracting 
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 These consist of 20 women who are taught through a trained 'empowerment worker' from PACT that assist 
them in the building and training of these groups. When the project finished in 2007, there were 
approximately 144 empowerment groups, reaching almost 3,000 women in the country (see PactWorld 
2009b) 
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 This differs from the standard credit approach from MFIs in that savings groups are managed within the 
community and thus interest is retained and shared in the form of dividends. Savings groups themselves are 
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approximately only 2% of public donor funding (Mayoux et al 2008, p1).  
 
The WEP in Cambodia, now renamed the WORTH programme, involved firstly developing 
women's basic literacy skills through reading educational documents regarding banking and 
lending strategies, then applied through the forming of a village group savings bank. 
Secondly, once the village bank was up and running, women were encouraged to establish 
micro-businesses and support these businesses with the dividends accumulated from the 
interest on loans. Finally successful groups would then help others to become empowered 
through a repeating of these steps known as the 'Worth Empowerment Circle' (Pact Cambodia 
2009a).  The perceived success of the model has led to renewed calls for its expansion and 
outreach to a larger number of poor women within rural Cambodia. This expansion is to be 
tested through a new initiative aiming for 2010; a social franchise model. In a rather 
predictable move reflecting the trend of microfinance in Cambodia as commercial scaling-up, 
Pact's new idea is to charge women for the training and entrepreneurial knowledge offered 
(through nominal annual membership fees) and in return a centralised WORTH global model 
will provide this training
218
 alongside new products and services to help women create 
income-generating businesses (PactWorld 2009b). The aim is to recoup over a third of Pact's 
expenses in order to reach 30,000 new participants by 2011 (PactWorld 2009b). 
 
The interest in women's empowerment mirrors an attempt by donors to raise the participation 
rates of women in decision making structures at the village and commune level. Earlier 
                                                                                                                                                        
responsible for handling the money and regulating loans to each other. It has been often overlooked because 
donors tend to focus on credit strategies of MFIs because of their ability to expand rapidly and increase the 
access to capital in a more efficient form.  
218
 This training will be carried out by WORTH entrepreneurs who are recruited by new WORTH 'franchisees' 
paying a license fee to WORTH global  
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studies have shown that despite the introduction of more participatory structures such as 
VDCs, SHGs and associations, they remain dominated by men, raising questions as to their 
supposed inclusive ideals. VDCs are almost entirely male-dominated (Chim et al 1998) whilst 
when women are represented they are often marginalised and remain passive (Biddulph 
1998). SHGs are often valourised for their large contingency of female participants, however, 
research shows that the males present within these groups still tend to take the key decisions 
(Rao and Swift 1998).  
 
Empowerment programmes are designed to remedy these effects and can be seen along the 
lines of a liberal notion that prioritises the access of women to greater levels of participation. 
This involves using microfinance to create an economic enabling environment to provide the 
required tools of knowledge to raise the ability of women to engage with decision-making 
structures. Sardenberg (2008) argues that this liberal notion fosters a form of 'empowerment 
without power' because although it focuses upon access, inclusion and participation, it does so 
without interrogating the structures of power that can often be responsible for the situation of 
exclusion, or dis-empowerment in the first place. The World Bank's often cited definition of 
empowerment reflects this, seen as: 
 
 ...the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, 
negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect 
their lives (2002, pvi).  
 
This definition highlights the need to expand 'freedom and choice' of the poor, who are often 
seen as voiceless and powerless in relation to the state and market (World Bank 2002, pv).   
 
Popular debates on gender and microfinance have sought to address these issues and 
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specifically look at the power dynamics underlying not just access to, but control of credit 
within the household and the community. On the one side there are those that have sought to 
demonstrate the ways in which microfinance often fails to challenge the patriarchal relations 
within the household resulting in low levels of management and control of loans (Goetz and 
Gupta 1996; Rowlands 1997; Batiwala and Dhanraj 1998; Rahman 1999; Mayoux 1999, 
2001). On the other side; studies demonstrate how microfinance loans have effectively 
allowed women to have greater access to bargaining power within a household and the 
positive social effects this has (United Nations Expert Group on Women and Finance 1995; 
Johnson 2000; Kabeer 2001; Skarlatos 2003).  
 
Whilst these debates are important to further the enquiry of whether microfinance actually 
improves access and control over credit for women's lives, what is more important within this 
chapter, is the way in which  the increased permeation of microfinance within community 
projects effectively imposes an economistic (neoliberal) rationality on women's collective 
organisation, that is reproduced within CBOs. 
 
Microfinance has a become a crucial tool in the neoliberal toolbox; a complementary 'safety 
net' in the wake of structural adjustment, except this safety net, unlike a potential welfare state 
orientated alternative, is designed to construct an enabling environment to empower the poor 
within specific self-help entrepreneurial identities (Weber 2004). This usage of microfinance 
as a safety net echoes the post-Washington Consensus approach of replacing the dismantled 
social welfare systems (under SAPs) with a market welfare approach, using the term 
empowerment as a way to describe the decentralisation of power and control of welfare to 
'self-help' communities (Batliwala 2007).  This shift reflects viewing women as entitled to 
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welfare rights under the old sector lending system, ―to women clients with responsibilities to 
themselves and families‖ (Rankin 2001, p29). The neoliberal conception of poverty reduction 
focuses on the poor by seeing them as at 'risk' and in need of help (to which microfinance 
becomes the solution), rather than viewing the poor as citizens entitled to rights and active 
participation within the formulation of these policies (Dagnino 2007, p67). 
 
Poverty reduction as the core development goal of donors, tends to equate poverty as the 
consequence of unfulfilled market potential; empowerment becomes synonymous with filling 
this potential (Weber 2006, p51; Fernando 2006b, p16; Dagnino 2007, p66). This is of course 
not to argue that microfinance isn't actually empowering, merely that its form of 
empowerment is consistent with the production of entrepreneurial subjectivities. Fernando 
argues that this transformation of identity can be seen as a form of 'clientification of gender' 
where women's identities are being reproduced through notions of the 'client' and the 
'borrower', in essence to promote a more subtle form of 'rational economic man' that is being 
tied to the language of empowerment but one that is overwhelmingly economistic (Fernando 
2006c, p228). The negative dimensions of microfinance, such as individuals finding 
themselves taking on credit loans to satisfy basic needs in times of hardship, and then taking 
up further loans in order to repay prior loans, is often dismissed in the rhetoric of neoliberal 
terminology for the pragmatic language of 'consumption smoothing' and 'pyramid loans 
systems' (Weber 2006).  
 
The examples that I have encountered within fieldwork interviews, of villagers and NGO 
activists, who stated a concern at the way in which microfinance was attempting to induce an 
entrepreneurial form of poverty reduction despite many clients using the loans as a form of 
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welfare security, is often lacking within the microfinance literature. The lack of criticism 
aimed at microfinance is an uncomfortable trend according to Fernando, who argues that the 
incorporation of notions such as empowerment and inclusion for the poor, offers powerful 
linguistic techniques that can marginalise challenges and deflect them as disregarding 'the 
needs of the poor' (2006b, p4). 
 
Microfinance can either be aggressively pursued through MFIs lending to solidarity groups 
within villages, reflecting this attempted form of market expansion and construction of 
entrepreneurial identities (though as has been observed this has been met at times with either 
confusion or hostility), or more subtly combined with the social dimension of education and 
empowerment. The WORTH project represents an incorporation of women into a win-win 
framework on the basis of a poverty reduction package that can build women's social capital 
and strengthen women's networks, incorporating education and opportunity as part of the 
'virtuous spiral' (Mayoux 1999, p960-966). This spiral is a form of spill-over effect that 
assumes the economic dimension of microfinance can contribute to a form of empowerment 
that will lead to social and political notions of empowerment. Lazar argues this is a form of 
credit culture that incorporates the market within a framework that includes social issues such 
as family planning, human rights and self-esteem to combine into a form of 'credit with 
education' (2004).  This approach, however, simply incorporates the 'competitive ethos' of 
grassroots capitalism (Weber 2002, p541) as an enabling environment for the construction 
empowered businesswomen who through this self-help process, can engage within greater 
levels of collective activities.  
 
As an example, a recent USAID document focusing on rural Cambodia, states that the 
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fostering of women as 'business leaders' and using their entrepreneurial skills learnt through 
microfinance, can help contribute to greater levels of policy dialogue and accountability with 
the state through increasing their participation further into local decision making structures 
(Blue, Blair and Mitchell 2008). This link with accountability and the state will be discussed 
below, but it is important to recognise that civil society at the rural community level is seen as 
the perfect experiment for a market-based social safety net that in the neoliberal mindset, 
constructs not just a self-help form of poverty reduction, but actively empowers women to be 
have higher levels of self-esteem, literacy skills and education in order to play a greater part in 
civil society, whether VDCs, or the various associations that are populating the country.  
 
The WORTH project offers a comprehensive framework combining business, banking and 
literacy with the end result of a new role for women as ―social activists, social entrepreneurs, 
and effective leaders‖ (Mayoux et al 2008, p1). Women within this model are seemingly not 
able to participate within civil society, become the 'breadwinners' of the household, or engage 
in political structures, unless they can become entrepreneurs.
219
 This is of course not meant to 
suggest that women in Cambodia do not face problems of unequal relationships vis-à-vis men 
within the house-hold, civil society, and political participation, merely that the perceived 
solution to 'empowering women' is brought about through increasing access to the market and 
instilling an entrepreneurial ethos.  
 
There is a link here with the contemporary usage of de Tocqueville, drawn upon by authors 
such as Putnam and Fukuyama, to emphasize not just the importance of a dense plurality of 
associations to deepen democracy, but the elevation of freedom and choice within the free 
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market as integral to this relationship. CBOs effectively incorporate market based service 
provision within its structures, whilst NGOs entrench the principles of homo economicus on 
the poor, reflecting the neoliberal ideal of civil society, and demonstrating that the critical 
cosmopolitan idealisation of a communicative force drawn from the lifeworld, can be 
colonised through the systemic properties of the market. 
 
These self-help groups draw upon a form of solidarity that is nurtured by NGOs in order to 
ensure that social capital remains high and that trust and reciprocity keep transaction costs 
low among members. Interestingly, according to authors such as Granovetter argue that 
'uncontrolled solidarity' can have the effect of producing an excessive amount of non-
economic claims that could hinder the efficiency of enterprise within these groups (1995). In 
order to ensure this solidarity is kept 'in check' from the economic domain, it is argued that 
individuals increase their extra-community linkages so that they can further expand into other 
markets when their entrepreneurial skills become more sophisticated (Granovetter, 1995; 
Woolcock 1998). This potentially has an effect within self-help groups where the poor and the 
non-poor separate; the poor retain close solidarity networks within the community to ensure 
protection and risk management, whilst the non-poor expand outside of these networks for 
strategic interests in other markets (Kozel and Parker 2000; Woolcock and Narazan 2000 ). 
Civil society is seen here as a stepping stone for entrepreneurial achievement, the nurturing of 
solidarity, often highlighted as a fundamental element of communicative resource among a 
community, is overlooked in favour of greater commercial expansion. 
 
This chapter will now turn towards the second dimension of the neoliberal role of civil 
society; the democratic watchdog. This involves an analysis of the latest donor project to be 
236 
 
externally introduced at the grassroots to promote the demand side of good governance in 
Cambodia; the World Bank's 'Demand for Good Governance' (DfGG) project that is 
specifically being targeted to 'stimulate demand' from civil society in order to hold the 
Cambodian state to account. This project has important repercussions on how the World Bank 
views civil society in Cambodia; a technical mechanism for the monitoring of the Cambodian 
State. 
 
4.3 Social Accountability initiatives at the grassroots: The Demand for Good 
Governance Project  
 
The RGC has established decentralisation as a process of promoting pluralist participatory 
democracy at the local level to aid in the reduction of poverty in the country.
220
 In order to 
reach this goal, there is a generally held belief that civil society needs to be strengthened and 
to hold a minimum degree of social capital, in order to foster demand side approaches to 
decentralisation and accountability (Rusten 2003, p3). Deconcentration and decentralisation 
efforts have been implemented in Cambodia since the establishment of commune councils in 
2002,
221
 however, questions are still being asked about the relationship between the creation 
of democratic, decentralised institutions, and the lack of democratic local politics on the 
ground.  
 
According to Sedara and Ojendal, the entire decentralisation reform process is called into 
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 Genuine citizen participation is seen as the ideal counterweight to corruption prevalent in the contemporary 
political system in Cambodia, it can be structured into an inclusive framework of good governance and used 
as a supporting mechanism to combat poverty (GTZ 2006, p5). 
221
 In February 2002, the first ever election of 1,621 commune councils was undertaken as a major step in the 
decentralisation of political power in Cambodia, tasked with engaging in dispute resolution, implementing 
development projects, and general administrative duties (see Mansfield and Macleod 2004) 
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question given the unique context of Cambodian civil society as a subdued and politically 
uneducated rural population, there is therefore very little upwards pressure to support 
decentralisation efforts (2007, p4). In response, the construction of participatory spaces in 
development projects to help educate and 'stimulate demand' have now become a core 
development goal in Cambodia and a cornerstone of aid policy shortly after the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005.  
 
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), following 
the majority of Western donors, shifted its focus from viewing participation as a model for 
sustainable development cooperation, towards viewing it as a constituting feature of 
successful democratisation and decentralisation (GTZ 2006, p6). Earlier models of fostering 
government accountability relied solely upon supply-side effects of internal government 
mechanisms yet the new thinking involving civil society represents a shift towards creating 
demand-side institutions, where NGOs and citizen participation are seen as the forefront; 
powerful tools of accountability
222
 (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p28).   
 
Social Accountability
223
 is a recent initiative to emerge from the World Bank's poverty 
reduction framework, considered integral to the World Bank's more inclusive approach to 
good governance as well as contributing to sustainable development
224
 and promoting citizen 
empowerment. This initiative focuses primarily on a new method of holding public officials 
and public servants to account through developing mechanisms that allow the direct 
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 It is widely believed that citizens can only force accountability from government officials when they are 
properly organised and able to use these mechanisms and tools to compliment models of accountability 
(Kimchoeun et al 2007, p27). 
223
 Often referred to as the 'demand side of good governance', it is significantly different to conventional notions 
of accountability because of its close link with participation (Malena 2004, p7) 
224
 This is made possible through a focus on improving service delivery performance  
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participation of ordinary citizens as part of a broader civil society context. This form of civil 
society differs from the typical donor understanding within the country, as an amalgamation 
of professional NGOs providing services, towards a new monitory role as described by the 
World Bank:  
 
NGOs may also need to consider a change in their current roles and, instead of 
substituting for weak service delivery, support efforts to manage and monitor 
health system performance and strengthen community-level social accountability 
arrangements (World Bank 2008b, p34). 
 
In 2006 the World Bank initiated the DFGG in Cambodia, arguably the first of its kind to 
focus exclusively on developing demand side approaches to tackle governance issues in the 
country, connecting both state and non-state institutions.
225
 The project is in response to what 
the World Bank deems low standards of governance and ‗endemic corruption‘ as the primary 
obstacles to achieving higher levels of economic and social development in the country. The 
World Bank has consistently struggled with combating corruption within the Cambodian 
state, as mentioned previously it suspended loans in 1997 due to the political instability, and 
despite the success of encouraging the RGC to acknowledge good governance as a core 
concern, it was forced to suspend various funding projects further in 2006 due to ―allegations 
of fraud and corruption under certain contracts in each of these World Bank funded projects‖ 
(World Bank 2006b)  
 
Indeed, as acknowledged by both the World Bank and the Royal Government of Cambodia (in 
the recent Rectangular Strategy 2004-2008 paper), the attainment of the Cambodian 
Millennium Development Goals seem a distant hope without substantial reform towards 
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 Although the DfGG project was conceived in 2006 it did not become operational until 2009 
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‗good governance‘ practices (World Bank 2007, p10). In order for these obstacles to be 
overcome, particular focus is placed upon ―stimulating demand from citizens for greater 
accountability‖ thus an emphasis upon strengthening civil society in order to create upwards 
pressure on governance accountability (World Bank 2007, p1).
226
 The core aim of this project 
is to allow citizens and civil society organisations to be able to hold the state accountable and 
therefore responsive to their needs. In return the DfGG project enhances the capacity of the 
state to become more transparent, participatory and accountable to these demands. There are 
four core elements of the World Bank's DFGG project: 
 
1. Promotion of Demand 
a) Disclosure of information, including budget and expenditures  
b) Demystification of information, educating citizens in legal rights, policies etc...  
c) Dissemination of information, spreading legal, financial, and policy issues to the ordinary 
public  
d) Collective action, mobilizing broader action through awareness / advocacy campaigns to 
help ‗promote‘ demand 
  
2. Mediation of demand - In order for demand to become effective there needs to be the 
strengthening of avenues for feedback of citizens and civil society to public officials, also 
informal and informal mechanisms for dispute resolutions between the state and non-state 
actors.  
 
3. Response to Demand – Programmes need to be developed within the executive in order to 
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 According to William Reuben the coordinator of the 'participation and Civic engagement' department at the 
Bank,  there is a ― lack of transparency on both sides, on the part of civil society to demand social 
accountability and on behalf of government to respond to these demands‖ (cited in World Bank 2005) 
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be able to respond to this demand from below, thus the strengthening of service delivery and 
participatory action planning  
 
4. Monitoring to Inform Demand – monitoring and oversight by non-executive actors such as 
civil society is essential for good governance, this can include mechanisms such as social 
audits, feedback surveys, vigilance committees etc...   
 
The DfGG project is clearly a new approach, not just for the Bank, but also Cambodian 
society and therefore it recognises  ―the constraints of the challenging governance climate that 
the project faces in Cambodia means the approach for developing a project that is essentially 
charting new territory in the country‘s socio-political landscape should be gradual, realistic 
and strategic‖ (World Bank 2007, p3)  There is an implicit recognition that social 
accountability mechanisms are not historically situated or embedded in Khmer culture thus 
they need to be ‗developed‘ or ‗stimulated‘ through capacity building mechanisms among 
NGOs and various CBOs. In order to ensure that this project will be smoothly implemented 
the World Bank has chosen to enact a capacity building project among CSOs by developing a 
complementary programme; the Program for Enhancing the Capacity for Social 
Accountability (PECSA). 
 
PECSA is an initiative launched by the World Bank and endorsed by the Cambodian ministry 
of interior in response to the RGC‘s rectangular strategy. As a precursor to the DfGG project it 
has two key aims, firstly to enhance the capacity for civil society to design and implement 
projects focusing on social accountability and good governance. Secondly and relatedly, the 
aim is to build on and scale up existing civil society efforts ensuring that the RGC is more 
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effective (PECSA 2009a). 
 
There are various Social Accountability initiatives that are being considered by the World 
Bank as an attempt to create ‗bridging systems and mechanisms‘ between a willing civil 
society to demand accountability, and a willing RGC to hold itself to account. These included 
for example, practices of participatory local planning, participatory budgeting, public 
reporting of expenditures, community scorecards, citizen oversight committees and civil 
society ombudsman intermediation (CAS 2007).  
 
For the World Bank, the primary audience for the Social Accountability project is the RGC, in 
order to make them more accountable to the donor community and its citizens. In this respect 
the interest in civil society becomes a secondary objective, as a pressure point from which the 
World Bank can create a new demand for accountability through various programmes centred 
around decentralisation, good governance, transparency etc... 
 
 
4.3.1 The neoliberal implications of Social Accountability initiatives 
 
In 2007 the World Bank started work on a 'Civil Society Assessment' of Cambodia in order to 
establish the possibilities and pitfalls of promoting good governance through social 
accountability techniques, this involved the contracting out of a research team to initiate a 
study of grassroots civil society and culminated in the recently published Linking Citizens and 
the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia 
(2009a). The initial meeting between the World Bank members and the research team led to 
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concerns raised on behalf of the research team about whether the World Bank was so eager in 
its focus for anti-corruption and accountability drives within civil society, that it would 
overlook genuine collectivised efforts local to Cambodian grassroots perceptions.  
 
One member of the research team suggested that at times it felt as though the team were 
simply contracted to offer a form of legitimacy to the World Bank project rather than the role 
they had hoped for; a general assessment of civil society in Cambodia
 
(interview 2007p).  It 
should be noted that although the World Bank had labelled the project ‗Civil Society 
Assessment‘ it was frequently reiterated that this entailed looking at the scope for potential 
within civil society for social accountability initiatives rather than looking at a general 
overview of what constituted civil society. This came as a surprise to a large majority of the 
research team who were expecting a general overview of local CBOs within the country. As a 
form of compromise, when the World Bank contacted the research team to undertake the 
review, the senior consultant was adamant that the review would pay particular attention to 
CBOs rather than western (NGO) notions of civil society or they would retract their input 
(Interview 2007q).  
 
The World Bank research undertaken represents one of the very few studies of Cambodian 
civil society, yet at the same time it follows the same problematic patterns as previous 
attempts to understand civil society; its western centric bias. It was noted by the author of an 
earlier assessment of civil society that most attempts undertaken to study civil society in the 
country are for the purpose of strengthening it along post cold-war interpretations (Houm 
1999, pv). This is largely due to the persistent interest by the international donor community 
of attempting to 'repair' social capital in the wake of the Khmer Rouge era, and the belief that 
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western style notions of civil society as an autonomous force to hold the government to 
account would best serve Cambodian society. In this respect it is understandable why the 
World Bank's latest project follows on along the same lines, however, it only serves to 
perpetuate the external neoliberal construction of civil society that this chapter has argued is 
currently being undertaken. 
 
The report cites a variety of mechanisms that exist in Cambodia that contribute to a form of 
social accountability closely resembling what the Bank is seeking, for example table 2. 
demonstrates that there are plenty of examples on both the national and local levels for 
citizens to gain access to public policies, revenues, budgets, expenditures, services and 
oversight (of state performance). Interestingly, there is still a heavy NGO bias involved in 
these activities (particularly on a national level), and that on the local level initiatives tend to 
be implemented through either state agencies or NGOs, yet the evidence of genuine citizen 
involvement is somewhat problematic.  
 
As an example, the government distributed 'accountability boxes' in 2005 to a variety of 
CBOs, with the idea that people could place anonymous complaints about poor quality 
projects and misuse of funds, however the report shows that a poll taken demonstrated only 
1% of respondents had actually used the box (2008a, p63). This is recognised by the World 
Bank as one of the fundamental obstacles to the institutionalisation of social accountability 
initiatives; local participation is often lacking within these projects which tend to be formed 
by more Western orientated NGOs schooled in the technical expertise of social accountability. 
Indeed the Bank recognises that some of its proposals involves ―a level of technical expertise 
that even professional NGOs can find challenging‖ (World Bank 2008a, p28).  
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Localised civil society representatives in Cambodia are acknowledged to have a limited 
knowledge of budgetary monitoring, and auditing knowledge which is an extreme hindrance 
to the project. Many of the examples of local social accountability initiatives from table 2. are 
actually rarely undertaken, from school budgetary committees to community scorecards, the 
actual evidence of a healthy level of activity is severely lacking (World Bank 2008a, p17-20). 
This lack of demand for social accountability is due to a variety of factors that the report 
highlights, for example low government transparency (thus little opportunity for access to 
information), low levels of knowledge among citizens about accountability and the channels 
they can use to demand it, underdevelopment of civil society to implement these initiatives 
effectively (World Bank 2008a, p24-30).  
 
In response the World Bank calls for a greater level of 'stimulating demand' to ensure that 
citizens are actively aware of the opportunities that surround them for demanding 
accountability, but that this must be combined with an increase in capacity building to ensure 
that civil society can take on this monitoring role with the right technical knowledge to be 
effective at demanding accountability from the state.  
 
Table 2: Social Accountability Initiatives in Cambodia  
                        Local<------------------------------------> National 
Policies/ 
plans 
 
Participatory local planning 
(Commune councils, PACT) 
 
Citizen/civil society influence 
on/participation in policy-making (NGO 
Forum, Community Legal Education Center, 
Medicam) 
Public revenues 
 
Public dissemination of financial 
transfers to commune councils 
Monitoring government revenues (Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, Publish 
What You Pay) 
Public budgets 
 
Monitoring the management of 
commune council budgets (Provincial 
National budget monitoring  
(NGO Forum) 
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accountability committees) 
Public 
expenditures 
Monitoring local expenditures 
(monitoring of Priority Action 
Program budgets by school support 
committees) 
 
Independent expenditure tracking (NGO 
Education Partnership, World 
Bank/government Public Expenditure 
Tracking Survey) 
Public  
services 
Citizen monitoring and feedback on 
local level public service delivery 
(Krom Aphiwat Phum) 
Civil society participation in sectoral 
technical working groups (NGO Education 
Partnership, Medicam, NGO Forum, 
Commune Council Support Program 
Public 
oversight 
 
Citizen Rating Report of Commune 
Council Performance 
(Commune Council Support 
Program) 
 
Corruption studies, parliamentary 
monitoring, ―court watch‖ project (Center 
for Social Development) 
 
Source: World Bank (2008a) 
 
 
There is still a general scepticism among some in Cambodia that the Social Accountability 
scheme will take off given the lack of interest on the ground for demanding such 
accountability. The idea of the World Bank exporting models from various developing 
countries into the Cambodian context and hoping for a similar adaptation was described as 
living in a dream world (Interview 2007r). Indeed even some donors recognise the difficulties 
in trying to stimulate demand for accountability when there really is no formal structures of 
civil society at a grassroots level, the dominance of NGOs in the urban sector of Phnom Penh 
are regarded as the closest model to western ideals and therefore these can be effectively 
engaged with accountability strategies but it is pointless trying to apply this in rural Cambodia 
(interview 2007b).  
 
One of the priority recommendations to come from the report, is a call for the expansion of 
those grassroots initiatives that seek to 'empower' citizens both politically and economically, 
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this is to recognise that the majority of Cambodians living in moderate or extreme poverty 
need to be alleviated from these conditions as a perquisite to political empowerment and able 
to demand social accountability (World Bank 2008a, p12).  
 
The bank advocates the expansion of 'economically empowering' initiatives such as Farmer's 
Associations with the focus on credit initiatives as poverty reduction strategies, to 
complement its political empowering 'stimulating of demand'. There are still many questions 
that are left hanging by the report, however, especially what this stimulating of demand will 
actually entail. One commentator on the initial draft pointed out that the Bank has recognised 
the problem of a lack of interest and involvement from local Cambodians in social 
accountability yet its recommendations to increase capacity building fails to tackle how this 
will entice greater interest from people (Interview 2007q). The point here of course is that this 
represents a form of civil society building that is seen as integral to the democratic essence of 
Cambodian society, yet it is seemingly constructed without the actual consent or 
representation of the people.  
 
Donors such as the World Bank have attempted to link citizens and the state through 
accountability demanding mechanisms yet they are effectively having to 'stimulate' this 
demand. This is not of course to deride the attempt to connect local participatory structures 
with the state, corruption is an important issue that cannot be dismissed, however, two 
interrelated problems tend to emerge. Firstly, the external attempt to construct this role for 
civil society runs the risk of neglecting the very constituents of collective organisation; the 
local people themselves. Studies conducted within the two villages of Prey Koh and Prasath, 
suggest that local people tend to view social capital as a community level experience, 
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unconnected to the state and in fact attempts by the donor community to increasingly link the 
community and the state or promote market penetration are seen as a weakening of social 
capital (Colletta and Cullen 2000 p78). This is interesting because it demonstrates the way in 
which a specific Western (neoliberal) construct of civil society adapted from de Tocqueville, 
and deployed in the service of the new democratic good governance paradigm, seems contrary 
to the understanding, and indeed the wishes of those endogenous forces constitute civil 
society in the country.  
 
Secondly, this externally influenced role inevitably leaves traces and prints of the (neoliberal) 
development experts themselves that are tasked with 'stimulating' this demand. This reflects 
the way in which the participation of local people and community groups can be coopted 
through neoliberal influenced training schemes in order to stimulate knowledge and interest 
on Social Accountability. 
 
In order to enhance the capacity of civil society to undertake social accountability initiatives, 
PECSA, as a supplement to the DfGG project, offers training and support to those 
organisations willing to introduce and adapt global accountability mechanisms to the local 
Cambodian context. The programme has recently announced the intention to run a variety of 
'Social Accountability Schools' in Cambodia
227
 through an intense three week training 
programme that is open to a variety of civil society organisations, from NGOs to media 
professionals. Silaka has been chosen by the World Bank to instruct the training courses due 
to its professional expertise in the field. Silaka and VBNK are the two key training agencies in 
Phnom Penh that have had a significant impact on establishing a more professional and 
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 The first social accountability school took place in April 2008, the second; November 2008  
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flexible sector to attract donor funding. Silaka has trained over 5,000 individuals from INGOs 
and Local NGOs in Cambodia in organisational practice and capacity building, they have 
recently shifted the focus of their training towards good governance techniques in order to 
create accountability and transparency within NGOs. This includes undertaking workshops in 
budgetary monitoring, evaluation mechanisms, and administration skills (see Silaka 2007). 
VBNK is a similar organisation established to provide training and consultation to other 
NGOs and assist in their capacity building, this includes helping them develop multiple audit 
systems in line with external best practices and conform to donor demands. In order for 
successful implementation, VBNK organise various training workshops on financial 
management, budget planning and monitoring, accounting systems and professional 
development (VBNK 2009).   
 
Teaching material provided by both Silaka and the World Bank for the Social Accountability 
school demonstrates the attempt to create a de-politicised notion of civil society in the 
monitoring and evaluating of service provision. For example participants are taught about the 
key tools in the demand for social accountability such as Citizen Report Cards (CRCs), these 
are promoted as ―blending the ―science‖ of surveys with the ―art‖ of advocacy/reforms‖ (Nair 
2008)
228
. The 'scientific' side is said to be integral to the data collection and analysis of service 
provision, whilst the 'art' side associated with advocacy tends to be significantly de-
politicised, for example one of the key outcomes of the report card is the engagement of 
constructive criticism with service providers, yet: 
 
The findings of the report card should aim at being constructively critical. It may 
be unhelpful if the goal is solely to embarrass or laud a service provider's 
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 This links with the World Bank concept of social accountability as 'beyond advocacy' (Melena 2004, p22)  
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performance (Silaka 2004) 
 
This statement contains more than a coincidental resemblance to Transparency International's 
best practice suggestions for its own CRCs. The CRC is a methodological process where 
citizens can design and conduct surveys, analyse and interpret the results, present the findings, 
and establish partnerships to pressure service improvements. Indeed within this positivist 
framework can be found a bias towards the more neutral ideal of ―counting and discussing 
instead of just shouting‖ (Nair 2008). Social audits (of which the CRC is an example), are 
important tools for the social accountability framework, the teaching resources available from 
Silaka discuss how the shift from upwards accountability in the traditional sense was aimed at 
checking and verifying transactions of the state and its agencies, however, with the 
development of the NPM paradigm, social auditing focuses upon downwards accountability 
to citizens through ―compliance, quality management and efficiency‖ (Silaka 2008).  
 
This external training offered is complemented by the provision of grants from PECSA for 
CSOs undertaking Social Accountability related projects, including a new scheme launched to 
create a ‗development marketplace‘ mechanism to adjudicate between potential beneficiaries 
of the available sources of funding (PECSA 2009b). The construction of a development 
marketplace parallels much of the previously discussed NGO sector in Phnom Penh with the 
introduction of intense competition and could see the same inevitable outcome of localised 
accreditation strategies and the transformation of local NGOs or even CBOs in order to 
improve funding/support opportunities.  
 
Another example comes from the Commune Council Support Project, a coalition from a 
number of prominent NGOs in Cambodia, who in 2004 designed a Citizens‘ Rating Report 
250 
 
(CRR) to enhance the Social Accountability projects that are being undertaken in various rural 
regions of the country to ―promote citizen monitoring of public service delivery‖ (CCSP 
2009). The CRR aims to document and assess basic social services, budget expenditures, 
administrative services, and infrastructure projects as a method of observing and holding not 
just the state but importantly since 2001, the democratically elected commune councils, to 
account. In the long term vision of its advocates there is a hope that it will contribute to the 
development of a core 'professional' group of practitioners that at the commune level can aid 
in the overall ideal of promoting greater levels of social accountability (CSSP 2007, p47). The 
CRR, despite being touted as a way to organise and collate citizen feedback on service 
provision potentially contributing towards the formation of grassroots advocacy, is also 
predictably ―not intended to embarrass or praise service delivery providers and other local 
government players‖ (CSSP 2007, p44).  
 
The CRR clearly attempts to create a neutral and seemingly objective mechanism to de-
politicise the process of feedback and collective response. Civil society actors are being 
―encouraged to create performance based mechanisms...and performance-based evaluation 
systems under NPM. Citizens can participate in quality monitoring and evaluation of 
delivered services, improving public servants' attention to rules and performance indicators in 
the future‖ (Kimchoeun et al 2007, p29).  
 
There is an important emphasis within the training and implementation of this monitory form 
of democracy on participation. The rush to secure participation within development projects 
in response to the new focus on a broader framework of good governance, led to a variety of 
techniques deployed by professional development experts within development agencies and 
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NGOs to ensure greater levels of inclusion such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) in 
order to boost the role of local people in the decision-making processes of development.  
 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) is a broad set of approaches and methods emerging from 
the 1990s, and used by a multitude of international donors and NGOs to incorporate 
participatory decision-making practices of local people and local knowledge in the planning 
of development projects (see Guijt 1998 Leurs 1996). PRA therefore is about empowering 
those traditionally marginalised by development policymaking in recent decades, giving them 
a greater level of control over their lives
.
 According to Chambers one of the influential 
architects of PRA, there are three common ideas that this approach shares; firstly that the poor 
are creative and capable enough to be able to carry out investigation, analysis and planning. 
Secondly the role for outsiders (through which technical and financial assistance is often 
rendered) is to be conveners, catalysts and facilitators. Finally, there is a general belief that the 
weak and marginalised should be empowered in order to effectively raise the level of 
participation from rhetoric to reality (1983, 1994, p953). 
 
This approach, however, has not been without critical interrogation and indeed a backlash is 
said to have formed throughout the last decade at the content of this participation being 
promoted by key development agencies; a neoliberal technical and de-politicised notion that 
uses the language of empowerment but without engaging with a notion of power (for example 
Cooke and Kothari 2001, Kapoor 2002; Hickey and Mohan 2004). Indeed the training 
programmes of Silaka attempt to incorporate this form of PRA into its workshops (Silaka 
2008), however, it is apparent that the language used in constructing ideal spaces for civil 
society are closely mirrored alongside a professional and de-politicised form of engagement. 
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Silaka, like many of the NGOs in Phnom Penh, are heavily reliant upon external consultants 
who are often at times 'idolized' within the NGO community
229
 yet this can often result in the 
unquestionable role of the expert within training sessions and the output of professional, 
technical discourses that can have profound implications through the shaping of  'expressions 
of dissent', potentially undermining alternative emancipatory approaches (Kothari 2005, 
p437). 
 
4.4 From Shouting to Counting: the (de)politicisation of dissent 
 
The recent social accountability initiatives that are being implemented in Cambodia represent 
a typical idealisation for the role of civil society, as a technical and professional mediator 
between the demanding citizen and the accountable state.  The latest NPRS progress report 
released in 2004, states that the continuing work of civil society is integral towards the 
monitoring of poverty reduction and urges NGOs to help prepare report cards in order to 
convey poverty concerns from the public (IMF 2004, p113). It is believed that NGOs are the 
perfect candidates for this role in the current climate, however, with more capacity building it 
won‘t be long before more localised CSOs such as trade unions and farmer's associations, will 
take on this monitoring role (IMF 2004, p113).  
 
The idea links directly to the World Bank‘s social accountability initiative through 
empowering citizens to hold governments accountable for their actions, and actively monitor 
what governments are doing with aid. Performance monitoring allows the level of 
transparency required to undermine corruption, and requires a highly technical and 
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 This of course can often be put down to the way in which the intelligentsia of Cambodian society were 
systematically purged during the Democratic Kampuchea era 
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professional conception of civil society in order to undertake these roles. The World Bank's 
recent 'From Shouting to Counting' document vindicates this strategy where it is presumed 
that citizens and civil society should act professionally and in a neutral manner in order to 
create the collaborative institutions necessary for an accountable liberal democracy (2004b). 
According to a recent USAID report:  
 
CSOs should conserve the energy they often expend on confrontation, and 
demand, in concert with donor partners, achievable but significant short-term 
reforms from the RGC. By involving both service-oriented and advocacy NGOs 
in the negotiating and monitoring process, the donors will be planting the seeds 
for a grand alliance designed to root out corruption at national, regional and 
commune levels (2004, p14).  
 
Civil Society in Cambodia, under current neoliberal development frameworks, is being 
constructed along neutral, technical and de-politicised lines. This de-politicisation is viewed 
by the international donor community as important to create professional and technical 
channels for dissent, though arguably this may in fact have the reverse effect of suppressing 
dissent. 
 
For example, trade unions in Cambodia are subject to a similar level of 'dissent 
dampening' through de-politicing spaces for dissent and replacing these spaces with 
technical/managerial structures. Hughes outlines how the ILO and the RCG created a 
regulation regime to monitor trade union-employer disputes, however, the outcome was to 
quell the highly politicised urban labour sector (who had previously been influential in 
mobilising demonstrations and protests) through feeding grievances upwards along 
professional and technical channels (2007, p844). According to Hughes, the growing numbers 
of NGOs since the 1990s still significantly failed to create a genuine sense of empowerment, 
instead, NGOs retain an 'instrumental' approach through planning projects and calculating 
budgets. This management approach is said to represent a preferencing of the professional 
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over the political (Hughes 2003, p148).  
 
This theme of the suppression of dissent has been instilled within contemporary notions of 
social justice emanating from neoliberal development projects under the rubric of 'fostering 
self-esteem' through self-help
230
 . According to Pupavac (2005), the neoliberal project of 
promoting empowerment through notions such as self-help and self-esteem, rather than 
inducing high levels of ambition and emotional self-reliance, seeks to ―moderate emotion, to 
temper frustration, not [to] fire ambition‖ (2005, p64).  
 
Social movements are seen as unlikely to emerge in Cambodia as a challenge to the status-quo 
of a dominant donor and state driven development project that seeks to include citizens in pre-
formulated projects. Henke offers three examples of activist networks that represent the 
possible emergence of social movements occurring since 2007, without NGO involvement, 
however, their protests were threatened with government intervention and as a result turned 
towards the professional channels of NGOs who ―end up legitimating, rather than 
challenging, the existing...nexus of political and economic power‖ (2010, p16).  Activism at 
the community level is often guided by local NGOs that offer technical advice, training and 
consultations that in effect teaches these groups how to network, but ensures the professional 
channelling of inclusion and participation; the end product is to ensure ―an emerging political 
awareness, but not yet a political challenge‖ (Henke 2010, p23).  
 
The neoliberal project of democratic good governance has increased the spaces available for 
civil society but this has had the effect of creating a more technical and neutral form of civil 
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that were analysed earlier in the chapter  
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society where activism is increasingly disabled. The implication is a form of participation 
where civil society can interact with development alternatives but is seemingly isolated from 
being able to effectively influence alternatives to development (Bebbington 2008), in effect to 
legitimise pre-determined plans from the donor community and have a say in the 
implementation if they conform to the required standards of professionalism and technical 
knowledge. There is therefore ―a displacement of issues such as poverty and inequality: dealt 
with strictly as issues of technical...management, poverty and inequality are being withdrawn 
from the public (political) arena‖ (Dagnino 2007, p67). 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the emergence of grassroots civil society in Cambodia is 
largely exogenous rather than endogenous, heavily nurtured by professional NGOs under the 
guidance of a framework of good governance. The perceived 'blank slate' approach by the 
donor community in response to a lack of social capital has allowed for a relatively free hand 
in constructing a neoliberal idealisation of a dense network of associations that operate in a 
supportive relationship with the free market.  
 
The integration of microfinance at the grassroots promotes a form of community 
empowerment tied to the operational logics of the market through a self-help safety net 
approach to poverty reduction. This localised form of service provision is to be kept in check 
through the second role of civil society; a democratic oversight mechanism to ensure the 
smooth efficient performance of service provision. This second role also includes the 
monitoring of the state in order to ensure it remains democratically accountable and 
uncorrupted; essential to the functioning of the market economy. The current role for CSOs as 
the new privatised social welfare provider and simultaneous professional pressure valve on 
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the state, effectively allows ―market forces to work their magic without causing social 
disruption or resistance‖ (Reimann 2005, p47). 
 
The rise of a professional role for civil society, either as a conduit of service provision, or an 
active monitor of the state, attempts therefore to disable (and colonise) the local endogenous 
forms of activism that potentially draw from the communicative properties of the lifeworld. 
The systemic imperatives of (state) administrative and (market) economic power are 
intertwined within the rise of a professional form of civil society within the country. This 
analysis is of course not attempting to suggest that there are 'no alternatives' or that collective 
forms of communicative groups are not in existence, merely the aim has been to demonstrate 
that under the neoliberal model there is an attempt to construct civil society through systemic 
forms of rationality; homo economicus, and a marginalisation of communicative practices.  
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CONCLUSION: INCLUSION / EXCLUSION AND THE APOTHEOSIS 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
The thesis has attempted to interrogate the compositional elements of the cosmopolitan 
democratic project, specifically its focus upon civil society as an attempt to form an inclusive 
dimension to global governance. The inclusion of civil society into these decision-making 
structures represents a direct link between the local and the global; a form of participatory 
democracy that allows individuals outside of the narrow confines of political authority the 
chance to impose their collective voices on the coordination of global processes.  
 
I have demonstrated that there are two distinct strands operating under a broad notion of 
cosmopolitan democracy, although both share the ambition of extending democratic control 
outside of the territorially defined nation-state, they diverge in the criteria they establish for 
the formation of a genuinely 'inclusive' project. As has been discussed previously, the liberal 
dimension of the cosmopolitan democratic project seeks to create a multi-stakeholder 
approach to the operational logics of global governance. Targeting the transformation of the 
United Nations as the key organisational actor in global politics, various authors have put 
forward their ambitious goals to expand its decision-making structures to include civil 
society
231
 as a way of ensuring that there is a wider model of representation at the global 
level; essential to their perspective on eradicating the democratic deficit.  
 
This deficit is the product of an asymmetrical relationship between the territorially bounded 
democratic political community, and the ever permeable process of globalisation, diminishing 
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  Often this is a synonym for NGOs; the formal representatives of civil society, who are regarded as the most 
capable of representing citizen interests within the formal structures of a reformed UN system. 
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the ability for citizens to participate in the decisions on political, economic, environmental, 
legal, technological, and military structures that are taken at a global level. Explicit within this 
problematisation of the spatial processes of globalisation, is a rejection of the economic 
dimension associated with the rise of neoliberal economics and its increasingly unaccountable 
ascendency within the practices of global governance, rendering a prioritising of the 
expansion of capital markets over the welfare of individuals. It is within this critique that the 
liberal cosmopolitan democratic project reveals its strong normative dimension resonating 
from the forms of philosophical cosmopolitanism associated with Immanuel Kant and John 
Rawls.  
 
The extension of democracy to the global level is designed to ensure that individuals can 
control and 'tame' this neoliberal process of globalisation. Liberal projects thus incorporate the 
forces of global civil society into their frameworks as the democratic side of globalisation 
(and as a counter project to the neoliberal dimension), valorised as the 'vehicles of humanity' 
that can not only transcend the confines of the nation-state, but channel those issues central to 
the lives of people such as the environment, social welfare, justice, human rights etc... onto 
the agenda of global decision-making structures. In this respect there is an implicit acceptance 
that civil society is imbued with a form of morality and legitimacy given its supposed 
representational link with the grassroots, not in the interest of the market or political power, 
but in more general questions regarding society and the good life; citizens, rather than market 
consumers (Galtung 2000, p155). 
 
The liberal project thus tends to prioritise the input-orientated legitimacy of civil society in 
order to ensure that greater levels of representation and the ability to participate, are 
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recognised within the multi-stakeholder approaches to global governance. For example, Held 
attempts to incorporate Global Issue Networks (GINs) as a way to increase the visibility of 
civil society and expand its influence vis-a-vis political and economic specialists. Similarly, 
Galtung attempts to create a 'World Assembly of IPOs', Falk envisions a 'global democratic 
forum', and Archibugi eludes to the possibility of a reinforced separate NGO assembly; all are 
attempts to incorporate civil society directly into transformed structures of governance as a 
way of broadening the exclusive confines of contemporary structures dominated by political 
and economic actors.  
 
Within these projects, an important question arises; how can we guarantee that civil society 
can fulfil this promise as an 'ethical domain', and  effectively challenge the entrenched state 
and market bias within structures of contemporary global governance? This question has not 
been given adequate attention by these authors, who often fail to problematise the identity of 
civil society actors, and tend to assume that their mere inclusion within global decision-
making structures can in effect eradicate the democratic deficit and effectively control the 
unaccountable and unjust forms of  neoliberal globalisation. This clearly indicates a 
prioritising of representation and access for civil society, rather than analysing the quality of 
this participation within decision-making structures.  
 
Two responses have, however, been developed in an attempt to answer this question within 
the liberal project emanating from Kuper and the more recent work from Held. Kuper 
acknowledges that the liberal dimension has effectively ignored the variety of actors 
representative of civil society and seeks to create a legitimation framework to determine 
which of these actors should be included within contemporary global structures. Held vaguely 
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eludes to a notion of deliberation within his multi-stakeholder process of governance where 
no actors are to be excluded within the decision-making process, yet as was argued within the 
first chapter, his view of deliberation is a less rigorous conception of ensuring that substantive 
content is tested through the idea of 'reasonable rejection'. What is important about Held's 
notion of deliberation is that despite claiming to be a less rigorous form of adjudication in 
contrast to the Habermasian form, it is actually implicitly selective through a direct guidance 
of  
liberal cosmopolitan principles. These principles espouse a moral framework that is designed 
to ensure that actors representing civil society, the state, and businesses follow outlined 
principles such as ecological sustainability, avoidance of serious harm, protecting the 
vulnerable etc...
232
   
 
Both Held and Kuper establish a legitimacy test for the inclusion of actors within their 
frameworks, however, this test of legitimacy is pre-determined through a form of monological 
self-reflection (Held through a Kantian appeal to universal cosmopolitan principles, combined 
with a Rawlsian notion of deliberation to reject those deemed 'unreasonable', Kuper through a 
Rawlsian form of 'original position' without dialogic consultation). The end result is that these 
attempts to create not just a privileged access point for civil society, but a more 
democratically legitimate decision-making process, are severely curtailed by the way in which 
frameworks are pre-determined and only those actors that subscribe to liberal cosmopolitan 
principles are deemed authentic voices within the global community. All of the liberal projects 
described tend to engage with this monological form of reasoning when constructing their 
global democratic projects, privileging universal ambitions for human rights, justice and 
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democracy in formulating a ‗good society‘ approach to cosmopolitan governance (See Caney 2006). 
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social redistribution inspired by Kantian forms of reasoning on universal cosmopolitan 
principles. Under this framework civil society keeps its ethical promise, but at the trade-off of 
marginalising those that exist on the outside of the cosmopolitan tradition. 
 
I have attempted to demonstrate that despite the promises of the liberal dimension of a form 
of inclusion that can eradicate the democratic deficit, its frameworks firstly fail to analyse the 
actual quality of participation within democratic structures, assuming that numerical 
representation equates with democratic decision-making. Secondly, those that attempt to 
remedy this through introducing an adjudication mechanism for democratic legitimacy during 
decision-making, tend to introduce a form based upon the monological form of selectivity 
along the lines of a Kantian/Rawlsian cosmopolitan morality; an a priori construction of the 
criteria for the inclusion/exclusion of CSOs and the democratic legitimacy of their decisions.   
 
The weaknesses and exclusive practices of the liberal dimension can be supplanted through 
turning to the critical cosmopolitan project that, in a similar way to the liberal dimension, 
attempts to expand democracy outside of the bounded political community through the 
promotion of civil society as an inclusive dimension to global governance. Unlike the liberal 
strands, however, the critical project focuses clearly upon the visibility and the quality of 
participation of a more inclusive form of global governance to solve the democratic deficit. In 
order for this to occur, frameworks are constructed along dialogical rather than monological  
lines; deliberation becomes the adjudication mechanism to ensure that democratic decision-
making is deemed legitimate and that any claims made to universality (such as the privileging 
of universal human rights under the liberal cosmopolitan dimension) are discursively tested. 
This form of deliberation, unlike the Rawlsian inspired attempts by liberal supporters, refutes 
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the attempt to predetermine the boundaries and the content of dialogue, its internal 
adjudication mechanism relying upon the ideal speech situation to ensure validity of 
outcomes. Built into this inclusive method are the practices of exposing forms of domination 
within deliberative frameworks, therefore to transcend the liberal confines of autonomy as 
non-interference, towards understanding autonomy as non-domination.  
 
The critical project outlined by Habermas recognises that domination exists when 
communicative interaction becomes distorted through systemic modes of reasoning, this is 
associated with state (administrative) and market (economic) forms of reasoning, that tend to 
privilege efficiency and profit within discursive engagement; a form of 'instrumental 
rationality'. The separation between communicative rationality and instrumental rationality 
relates to Habermas' two realms of the lifeworld and the system, where the lifeworld 
represents the background of shared human experience that can be communicatively drawn 
upon to form social meaning, values and morality, whilst the system is concerned with 
instrumental forms of bureaucratic improvement and market logics; efficiency, productivity 
and profit. The critical project aims not just at defending the plurality of meaning within the 
lifeworld from the instrumentalist notions of the system (therefore to resist its colonisation) 
but actively attempt to develop steering mechanisms that can ground and legitimise the 
systemic decisions undertaken by bureaucratic and market actors through a communicative 
engagement (therefore to avoid a de-coupling of the lifeworld and system where the systemic 
forms of rationality would operate without any form of inclusive legitimacy).  
 
Civil society becomes the vehicle of choice for this task; it is seen by the critical project as not 
only able to draw communicatively from the lifeworld (representing the inclusive 
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mobilisation of social issues) but effectively able to steer systemic modes of reasoning by 
influencing political will-formation. The critical cosmopolitan democratic project thus 
attempts to look at the role of civil society in creating a more inclusive form of global 
governance, attempting to use civil society (in its global form of being able to transcend the 
nation-state) as a counterbalance against the deeply exclusive forms of collective decision-
making currently undertaken by state representatives and market actors, idealising a role 
where civil society can not only bring legitimacy to these decision-making structures but 
effectively steer them in directions that are determined by legitimate deliberative frameworks. 
The focus on exposing distorted communication by systemic imperatives, leads the critical 
dimension away from formulating new structures of governance in the same manner as the 
liberal dimension, choosing instead to focus more keenly on present structures to expose 
exclusionary practices, or suggest ways in which inclusive spaces can be strengthened. This 
understanding of civil society is integral to maintaining an inclusive participatory democratic 
project, given the perceived importance attached to linking communicative powers and 
solidarity formation drawn from the community (the reflexive demos) to legitimise systemic 
coordination at the global level 
 
In this respect the majority of projects have analysed the spaces where (global) civil society 
interacts with state and market actors, such as global regimes, seen as more informal and open 
to civil society contestation. Most of these discussions are more abstract and advocate the 
greater need to include civil society within these spaces to ensure that they can fulfil their role 
as defenders of the communicative realm of the lifeworld, through the incorporation of a 
deliberative structure to allow civil society to effectively steer the systemic forces presently 
enjoying dominance of decision-making within these structures. Where empirical analysis 
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does exist, it tends to reflect how far away an inclusive democratic project is within grasp, 
where civil society is often blocked, excluded and undermined by instrumental actors in 
pursuit of their own self-interest.  
 
These projects have focused upon micro-sites of deliberation, between CSOs, state 
representatives and business actors,
233
 however, Dryzek's macro-deliberative approach to the 
global democratic project is to concentrate on the ability for civil society to keep its distance 
from the systemic modes of organisation, focusing upon its ability to generate political 
opinion-formation rather than direct will-formation. In this way civil society can act as a 
steering mechanism from afar, rather than directly involved in the formal structures of 
governance using its ability to generate 'soft power' to influence the shaping of global 
discourses. The WSF as an informal global institution outside of the direct systemic forms of 
governance, I have argued, could be an interesting avenue to pursue this idea of a quasi de-
coupling of the lifeworld and system (where steering is undertaken through the shaping of 
global discourses), however, it opens itself up to the problems of whether it will be as 
politically effective as the micro-deliberative attempts at a more direct steering mechanism 
through deliberative engagement involving civil society, the state and the market within 
deliberative global public spheres.  
 
This is not a debate that I have chosen to focus upon within the thesis, however, instead I have 
demonstrated that throughout all of these critical projects, there is an unproblematised 
understanding that the dominant systemic forces operating within the structures of global 
governance, can be steered through the inclusion of civil society as an inclusive, localised 
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 These projects include the previously discussed work of Nanz and Steffek (2005a), Eckersley (2007), Higgott 
and Erman (2008), Kapoor (2004) Krajewski (2001), Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler (2005) and Dany 
(2008) 
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ideal that represents the communicative link between the lifeworld and the public sphere. 
Civil society is seen to operate under the dualistic logic of defending the communicative 
infrastructure of the lifeworld, whilst simultaneously operating as a steering mechanism to 
influence (both directly or indirectly
234
) the systemic modes of governance associated with 
efficiency, productivity and profit (the instrumental rationality of state and market actors in 
governance).  
 
My central problem with this notion is that it creates an homogenised understanding of the 
contemporary practices of civil society as an antidote to neoliberal forms of instrumentality at 
the global level, its elevation as a communicative platform representing the local, is said to 
steer the exclusive systemic forces entrenched within the global dimension of governance in 
order to create a more democratically legitimate framework. What this analysis fails to 
understand, is the way in which neoliberalism understood as a political project rather than a 
simple steering mechanism, has constructed new spaces for civil society that effectively 
'colonises' the communicative dimension through an incorporation of systemic modes of 
rationality.  
 
The vision of global civil society as a panacea for the communicative legitimacy required to 
contest the illegitimate instrumental forms of global governance that currently operate have 
been problematised within this thesis, where I firstly outlined how the neoliberal project of 
democratisation has sought to incorporate the participation of a modified role and identity for 
CSOs under the instrumental logic of homo economicus. Secondly, I have attempted to 
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 This again represents the differentiation between micro and macro deliberative spheres, emanating from early 
Habermasian understandings of macro deliberation outside of the formal sites of politics (to which Dryzek 
has argued can steer indirectly through discourse production), to the later work by Habermas and the majority 
of the critical cosmopolitan project. These frameworks attempt to include the formal aspects of politics 
within deliberation as a direct form of steering.  
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interrogate the global influences of this project on the local, through a case study of 
Neoliberal strategies within Cambodian civil society. I will briefly summarise these findings 
before drawing upon them to discuss the implications of theorising global democracy from 
the critical cosmopolitan democratic project. 
 
The second chapter within this thesis attempted to interrogate the origins of 'neoliberal 
globalisation' that is invoked by the critical cosmopolitan democratic project, as an exclusive 
and unaccountable economic dimension of globalisation driven by systemic modes of 
rationality through the expansion of markets and the administrative logics that support them. 
The chapter briefly traces the economic rise of neoliberalism and its monetarist origins into a 
dominant economic paradigm that prioritises the expansion of the market and has been 
replicated globally through the key IEOs of the World Bank and the IMF.  
 
The expansion of the so called Washington Consensus through structural adjustment 
programmes has been at the forefront of critique from the liberal cosmopolitan democratic 
project, seen as unjust and harmful because of the social welfare and environmental costs, the 
critical cosmopolitan position, however, tends to focus on how the logics that drive this 
consensus are directly linked to the production of an instrumental form of rationality; homo 
economicus. At this stage the critical project recognises the scale of the task at hand; reversing 
this logic of globalisation that promotes an efficient, market driven form of governance often 
to the detriment of a communicative dimension. Its solution to incorporate civil society as the 
communicative saviour to steer this form of globalisation and 'reclaim control of the market' 
(Habermas 2001, p156), fails to recognise the way in which neoliberal practices and processes 
of global governance have taken a keen interest in the idea of civil society as an enabling 
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environment in the service of the market; part of the new democratic good governance 
agenda. Ultimately it raises important questions about the identities of actors that participate 
within global public spheres, potential distortions need to be recognised and interrogated as 
exclusionary practices.  
 
The World Bank, and a variety of key bilateral donor agencies, have constructed a new role 
for civil society within their development projects, designed to ensure that markets are 
smoothly integrated through promoting and strengthening the liberal democratic state within 
developing countries. This notion of democratic good governance creates a supporting and 
participatory role for civil society, firstly as a decentralised form of service provision that is 
seen as more efficient than the welfare state (and one where the community is afforded more 
choice and freedom through the application of a competitive market structure; the hallmarks 
of a neoliberal notion of democracy). Secondly, they are to play an observational role as 
democratic watchdogs of the state, involving not just holding the government accountable to 
ensure that corruption is undermined, but also the performance monitoring of the 
aforementioned service provision.  
 
Both roles are described in brief detail as an abstract process that is representative of the 
neoliberal New Policy Agenda paradigm, an agenda that in line with the more contemporary 
usage of CSOs over NGOs, includes the nurturing of CBOs as endogenous forms of civil 
society that are seen as having the potential for increasing social capital within the 
communities.  
 
The notion of Social capital stems from de Tocqueville's study of democracy, and the 
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importance attached to increasing the numbers of CBOs as a rich plural network to effectively 
keep the state in check, and intertwined with notions of self-help, where these CBOs can 
become responsible for their own welfare. The link forged between neoliberalism and a 
participatory form of democracy (that focuses on civil society) as the inclusive force required 
to ensure the smooth functioning of the market, has resulted in the transformation of not just 
the role, but the identity of CSOs partaking within these projects.  
 
The idealisation of civil society as a remedy to the neoliberal dimensions of (global) 
governance from the critical strand of cosmopolitan democracy, fails to understand that civil 
society itself can become colonised under the NPA agenda. The examples within this chapter 
attempt to briefly interrogate these new identities, highlighting how NPM strategies have 
transformed service providing NGOs into organisations imbued with a de-politicised, 
technical and ultimately an instrumental form of rationality. This instrumentality can be 
observed within the construction of a role for CSOs as democratic oversight mechanisms that 
are promoted by donors (such as the social accountability initiative), where this 'advocacy' 
role  for CSOs involves a technical, professional  and de-politicised observation role, 
scrutinising budgets and forming technical reports, ultimately to enact a form of counting 
rather than shouting.  
 
Neoliberal forms of global governance have engaged with a new global democratic project, 
this is of course different to the cosmopolitan democratic project, because it can  be 
understood as a  geographical global democratic project (rather than a spatial attempt to 
transcend the nation-state) in a similar way to the literature on democratic peace theory. The 
difference here of course is that unlike the DPT, there is an overt focus on governance (thus to 
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explicitly include civil society), whilst prioritising the free market as the end product of its 
democratic good governance interventions. Never-the-less this global project is important 
because it engages with the local through building new spaces for civil society and represents 
the systemic colonisation of these CSOs through implementing an instrumental form of 
rationality that captures the neoliberal essence of productivity and efficiency in the service of 
the market; state (administrative efficiency) and market (economisitic) systemic logics are 
embedded within the structures of civil society.  
 
Discussions at this point have only involved generalised notions of civil society and the roles 
CSOs have undertaken under the neoliberal project of democratic good governance. In order 
to provide a concrete description of the external colonisation of civil society under systemic 
modes of rationality that links the global with the local, the thesis turned towards an empirical 
case study of Cambodian civil society. This case study is crucial to provide the evidence of 
colonisation at the very local level of civil society construction, in order to refute the 
assumption of the critical cosmopolitan democratic project, that contemporary civil society is 
solely anchored within the lifeworld as a communicative dimension and designed to steer the 
systemic modes of (neoliberal) governance at a global level.  
 
Cambodia, as outlined previously, is an interesting case study to demonstrate this direct form 
of systemic colonisation through the permeation of neoliberal practices, the result of an 
influential development community that has externally constructed and nurtured CSOs in 
accordance with the neoliberal democratic good governance paradigm. The first part of the 
case study demonstrated that the perceived lack of social capital in the country in the wake of 
the Khmer Rouge atrocities, resulted in an influx of INGOs offering humanitarian aid, and a 
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relatively free hand by bilateral and multilateral donors in enforcing their good governance 
agenda to reduce what was perceived as endemic corruption; a barrier to the smooth 
functioning of the market. This good governance agenda became a central focus of the donor 
community in the wake of the 1997 political violence and growing questions as to the culture 
of democracy present within the country, resulting in the intensification of NPM reform of 
state ministries, and an increase in spaces for NGOs as part of the decentralised service 
provision industry.  
 
Donor preferences for an efficient, competitive and productive service provision industry 
under an NPM format, led to the transformation within the very identities of NGOs 
themselves; systemic forms of rationality began to permeate these structures through a close 
alignment between efficient administrative reform and the logics of the market.
235
 NGOs in 
Phnom Penh are predominantly involved in service provision and the shift towards a 
'development marketplace' has led to the emergence of a competitive industry where NGOs 
cannot afford to lose out on the funding offered, resulting in internal shifts towards greater 
efficiency, productivity and performance based accountability systems.  
 
The development of the NGO-GPP has increased this level of competition, seen as an 
accreditation certificate that is valued by donors and requiring new levels of systemic 
professionalism. Observing these trends in Cambodia, it was noticeable that one service 
provision sector, microfinance, was receiving an unprecedented interest within the country as 
a neoliberal form of social safety net, directly linked towards a self-help notion of poverty 
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 To reiterate, the Habermasian conception of the system includes the state and the market, however, this is not 
the same as suggesting that actual state and market entities influence civil society, but to analyse how the 
administrative steering mechanisms associated with state actors and market logics associated with an 
economic approach can influence of civil society.  
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reduction. An interrogation of the actors involved reveals the extent to which systemic forces 
can permeate the structures of NGOs within the capital; some have become so professional 
and market orientated as to dispense with their more social attributes that originally took 
priority, instead focusing upon greater market expansion and penetration.  
 
This professional direction has led many NGOs to transform into MFIs, raising questions as 
to whether they can even be said to represent a form of civil society any longer, let alone the 
increasing gap between representation and accountability to the local communities that are the 
beneficiaries, or 'clients'. The chapter demonstrates how urban NGOs within the capital have 
developed in accordance with the structural logics of external development policies that focus 
on democratic good governance as a method of ensuring a greater role for NGOs within 
service provision, but only a certain type of NGO; the professional instrumental form of 
organisation, at times imbued with a form of rationality resembling homo economicus.  
 
The dominance of NGOs within the urban capital of Phnom Penh, clearly represent a 
formalised component of civil society yet it is only part of the story within Cambodia, and so 
I attempted to interrogate the dynamics of civil society within the rural populace, arguably 
representing a closer link to communities than the overly professional and increasingly 
unaccountable (at least in vertical conceptions towards the community) NGO sector in Phnom 
Penh. 
 
Civil Society was understandably lacking in the country where traditional community groups 
had been disbanded under a universal model of forced collectivisation implemented by the 
Khmer Rouge, the result was a heavy campaign of civil society building by INGOs and 
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donors after the Paris Peace Accords. The development of associations and self-help groups 
that are increasingly emerging, are interesting to analyse because of the way in which they 
incorporate service provision in the form of microfinance, within this collectivisation. This is 
directly linked to the perception of social capital as overlapping market transactions to 
provide choice and a self-help form of 'community' that doesn't need to rely upon the 
(inefficient and overly bureaucratic) state. At the same time it contributes to the notion of 
welfare pluralism where civil society retains responsibility as consumers for welfare. The 
result is to observe an attempt to saturate the market within collective organisations, often 
under the terms of 'empowerment' where civil society aims at imbuing individuals with the 
ability to participate within the market through collectivised activities.  
 
An interesting example was outlined through USAID's WORTH programme where 
specifically poor women were deemed in need of empowering through access to credit and 
the market as part of an enabling environment for a neoliberal welfare safety-net. The 
example served to highlight how external donor projects can not only effectively colonise the 
communicative dimension of civil society, but reconstruct subjectivities within these spaces 
towards the production of homo economicus; perhaps this could serve as a demonstration of 
how even the lifeworld itself can be colonised by systemic forces through the creation of 
subjects structurally bound by the stock of knowledge pertaining to instrumental forms of 
reasoning. Of course as reiterated previously, the lifeworld cannot be entirely closed off or 
subsumed under systemic logics; the point is to suggest that contemporary practices of civil 
society can potentially be the conduit through which systemic imperatives can attempt this 
colonisation of the social stock of background knowledge.  
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This is not to suggest that endogenous forms of civil society cannot draw from the lifeworld, 
merely to highlight that the contemporary understanding of civil society as synonymous with 
the lifeworld's communicative practices and shielded from the systemic forms of interaction, 
are in fact problematic.  
 
The democratic good governance agenda within rural Cambodia that has resulted in a more 
participatory approach to service provision, also includes a new role for civil society as a 
democratic watchdog of service provision and the state in general. This monitory form of 
democratic participation was investigated through an analysis of the World Bank's recent 
social accountability agenda, an attempt to uncover potential for local associations, self-help 
groups and VDCs to demand accountability from the state.  
 
In Cambodia, there are a few social accountability mechanisms in operation, however, this 
approach is unheard of as an endogenous activity among local collectivities. In order to secure 
the desired results of a bridging mechanism between CBOs and the state to demand 
accountability, there needs to be a certain level of 'stimulating' of this demand among 
individuals and communities. Two consequences of this are that social accountability 
mechanisms being implemented within Cambodia are firstly, externally implemented 
according to donor prescriptions of those included and excluded in this form of organised 
advocacy (thus technical and professional NGOs are selected for their ability to implement 
and disseminate complex economic budgetary and audit information). Secondly, the 
construction of these selective spaces for advocacy roles, serve to disable the construction of 
critical spaces for activism and more fundamental questions of participation in the macro-
questions of development; instrumental observation as participation is the preferred option to 
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a more reflexive form of control over development policy. 
 
Systemic imperatives of instrumental rationality ensure that civil society remains a de-
politicised and technical fix to pre-constituted development projects. The idealised role of 
civil society as (defensively) nurturing democratic 'opinion-formation' and even (offensively) 
forming democratic 'will-formation' (Cohen and Arato 1992; Habermas 1996), is severely 
tested under the neoliberal model in Cambodia. It is not that civil society fails to undertake 
these dual roles, more that they are undertaken through instrumental means where 
collectivisation and democratic participation is subsumed under administrative and economic 
formations.  
 
The case study serves to demonstrate a number of important points about the critical 
cosmopolitan attempt to construct a more inclusive form of democratic global governance. 
The liberal dimension demonstrates that its preference for the progressively moral forms of 
civil society need to be nurtured through some form of selective inclusion criteria, whether 
this is under a monologically constructed 'cosmopolitan law' (Held) or the promotion of a 
simplified monological process to select those 'preferred' NGOs involved in global structures 
(Kuper). These forms of selectivity are deeply exclusive for the way in which they reject 
those that do not conform to liberal cosmopolitan principles. 
 
The critical dimension creates a more open and inclusive framework where all CSOs are to be 
included through a process of deliberation within the global public sphere; future frameworks, 
norms, practices and policies are subject to a discursive testing mechanism to determine the 
legitimacy of outcomes. I have highlighted how the problems associated with this more 
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inclusive ideal emanate from the belief that civil society can operate as a steering mechanism 
against systemic imperatives saturated within contemporary frameworks of global 
governance. This is because civil society is presumed to be an entity that operates as a form of 
communicative and reflexive rationality, able to steer systemic imperatives through the 
framework of deliberation.  
 
The case study supports my problematisation of the reification of civil society as a 
communicative structure and presumed antidote to neoliberal forms of governance. The 
concept of civil society as a panacea has been severely questioned through an analysis of 
Cambodian civil society, demonstrating that systemic forms of rationality can effectively 
marginalise endogenous and communicative forms, colonising the very identities of CSOs. 
This is not of course to suggest that civil society construction in Cambodia is simply the 
instrument of systemic processes and that this is a uniform process occurring throughout the 
country, merely to point out that these are the dominant tendencies associated with (global) 
neoliberal forms of organisation that are having a transformatory impact on (local) spaces for 
civil society. Utilising Burawoy's extended case method provides the empirical evidence to 
support the theoretical hypothesis that we cannot simply assume that civil society operates as 
a communicative vehicle, embodying the potential to steer systemic logics that operate within 
the exclusive dimensions of contemporary governance 
 
The case study raises a further point with regard to this panacea role for civil society; the 
attempt to create an inclusive global democratic structure presumes that the local (civil 
society) can be used to provide the communicative legitimacy required to steer the global 
(neoliberal forms of governance). Where is the interrogation of the local within these 
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projects? The local, a term that is invoked as the democratic anchor within the exclusive 
structures of global governance, tends to be equated with civil society as a transmission belt 
between the citizenry of nation-states and the formal structures of global governance, able to 
represent a plurality of voices and issues; the communicative antidote to the instrumental 
logics plaguing present structures today. Yet this local remains elusive and abstract, reified as 
the steering mechanism within deliberative frameworks at the global level. Abstract 
discussions on the importance of a global public sphere from the critical dimension of 
cosmopolitan democracy, describe how CSOs represent the communicative realm that can 
create the inclusionary dynamics required for a legitimate form of global governance, yet 
there is little interest from these authors in unpacking the role and identities of these 
organisations and questioning their supposed representation of the local.  
 
The positioning of civil society as an antidote to neoliberal forms of globalisation contains the 
usual assumption of neoliberalism as an unaccountable global economic process that 
permeates national borders, yet what is missing from this understanding, is the way in which 
the democratic project of neoliberal forms of global governance, have drawn upon the 
participatory logics of civil society for smooth implementation of its global development 
policies. There is a tendency here within the literature on cosmopolitan democracy to under-
theorise the role of neoliberal globalisation and a general failure to recognise that it is a 
profoundly political project that incorporates and marginalises the very actors that are 
assumed to provide the 'steering' mechanisms at a global level.  
 
The case study of Cambodia represents the tracing of these neoliberal forms of democratic 
transition to show how the global (neoliberal policies) impinge upon the local (Cambodian 
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civil society) and demonstrates that the battle for a more inclusive form of global democratic 
governance, must take seriously questions of the local. 
 
Once the critical dimension takes seriously the possibility that systemic modes of reasoning 
can penetrate from the global to the local, in opposition to the assumed steering logics of civil 
society from the local to the global, then it can more effectively pinpoint sites of resistance 
and expose sources of domination that exist within the construction of civil society itself. 
Cambodia represents only a narrowly focused case study that can highlight these faults within 
cosmopolitan theorising, but what about the wider implications for the practices of a truly 
inclusive structure of global democratic governance? I want to briefly return to the notion of 
the 'global' here, it is commonly used throughout the cosmopolitan literature in both its liberal 
and critical variants as a spatial description, essentially outlining the potential for civil society 
to transcend the nation-state. This has allowed authors to tread carefully around issues of 
geographic globality, given the evidence that suggests around the globe there are large 
discrepancies in the ability for CSOs to form networks and engage in decision-making outside 
of the nation-state.  
 
Authors such as Dryzek for instance use the term transnational to avoid the practical obstacles 
associated with the geographical form of the global, and keep the post-Westphalian 
conceptions of democracy as an ethical promise to be realised. Whilst I understand and 
sympathise with trying to forge a global democratic project as a normative ideal where the 
problems of CSO access are obstacles to be overcome, without an interrogation of actual 
concrete global (geographical rather than spatial) practices, the project runs the risk of 
constructing generalised and de-historicised ideals of the local, such as I have described with 
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respect to the assumptions of civil society.  
 
Cosmopolitan democracy has created an ahistorical and de-contextualised notion of civil 
society as an assumed communicative steering mechanism in a post-Westphalian context, this 
thesis argues that not only is this a problematic assumption when an interrogation of 
contemporary practices are undertaken, but that the global democratic project of neoliberalism 
may in fact be constructing a project that is expanding geographically and having an impact 
upon those countries within which are susceptible to its democratic good governance agenda. 
The cosmopolitan democratic project cannot hide behind the spatial form of the global when 
evidence is emerging that the very actors it privileges as an inclusive anchor within the global 
governance project, risks being undermined by a counter-global discourse of good governance 
that is being replicated geographically 
 
I have hinted that this may be the case within the second chapter by describing how the 
dominant neoliberal development paradigm is having an effect on a multitude of local 
contexts globally, with evidence obtained from a variety of interrogations of neoliberal 
projects at the grassroots. This is not only situated within developing countries where the 
relationship with neoliberal development policies are most intense, but even within the so 
called developed world where third way politics and NPM strategies are just as penetrating. 
What this means is that the empirical case study on Cambodia represents a call to arms for 
those advocates of a cosmopolitan democratic project, to re-engage with a contextualised 
local in order to resist the (potentially) global colonising practices on civil society, essential to 
realise more fully the promises of a truly inclusive form of global democratic governance.  
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At times, I find myself more sympathetic to the macro understanding of the de-coupled global 
public sphere. The micro-deliberative frameworks seem to highlight far too often the 
violations of deliberative legitimacy within forums encompassing CSOs, state and market 
actors. If we accept the Habermasian understanding that only those logics pertaining to 
communicative competence are to be accepted as valid under strategies of argumentation, 
then it seems strange to be surprised that frameworks including systemic forms of reasoning 
would invalidate deliberation. To locate strategies of deliberation within the formal spheres of 
politics, perhaps asks too much to expect that systemic forms can be 'bracketed' off from 
argumentation. In this respect, I can understand the hesitance from authors such as Dryzek, to 
engage so closely with these formal sites and instead locate deliberative frameworks outside 
of the formal spheres. The WSF represents an interesting avenue because it is situated outside 
of the formal apparatus of governance within the global system and is comprised of a 
potentially more communicative resource to draw upon for deliberative legitimacy. Despite 
the questions that can be raised about how successful this global public sphere can be in a 
(quasi) re-coupling with the formal sites of power, there is still an important point that needs 
addressing. 
 
Although the thesis has described how a global synergy of state and market modes of 
rationality can effectively permeate the structures and identities of CSOs (thus to provide 
more legitimacy to the macro de-coupling argument), it has also shown how we cannot 
assume that civil society in contemporary historical contexts is communicatively bound. The 
repercussions are that separating global governance into a crude system-lifeworld distinction 
in a way that the macro-deliberative approach does (such as CSOs at the WSF vis-à-vis state 
and market actors at the WEF), runs the risk of failing to understand that civil society is itself 
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a contested terrain 
 
Honneth (1995) makes an important criticism of Habermas' system-lifeworld dualism for 
effectively idealising a lifeworld that is deemed free from strategic and instrumental forms of 
action, and a system that lacks a normative dimension within its modes of action (1995, p298-
303). Civil society under the cosmopolitan project follows a similar line of thought, where it 
is reified as a communicative /anti-instrumental lifeworld that neatly forms a dualism against 
the instrumental / anti-communicative system.  The very contested logic of civil society that I 
have described within the thesis, serves to demonstrate that systemic forces can just as easily 
impinge upon the collective dialogic community, and in fact restrict the reflexive forms of 
knowledge and dialogue that these authors presume the foundation of civil society. Local 
collectivised activities in Cambodia demonstrate how reflexive dialogue is marginalised 
through a disciplining system that rewards and encourages instrumental forms of dialogue; the 
goal of instilling the logic of counting over shouting simply furthers the tempering of critical 
reflexivity. 
 
What are the implications of this thesis for the critical cosmopolitan project? I have made it 
clear throughout that the thesis remains sympathetic in the attempt to create a more inclusive 
democratic project utilising non-state actors within a deliberative public sphere. The attempt 
to construct a global framework that connects the three sites of administrative, economic and 
solidarity formation (where the latter acts as the locus of communicative power and anchors 
the legitimacy of the first two steering mechanisms) is admirable in the overriding focus of a 
more reflexively democratic coordination mechanism at the global level. Various deliberative 
projects have highlighted the importance of civil society as the vital link between the 
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lifeworld and the system; preserving the former whilst guarding against permeation and 
attempting to steer the latter, yet this thesis has raised questions about the internal identities 
surrounding civil society actors and the potential systemic distortion effects that can occur 
prior to deliberation within the public sphere. Empirical deliberative projects tend to analyse 
the obstacles that can undermine authentic deliberation for NGOs in various international 
regimes, highlighting the ways in which state and market actors can shape dialogue and 
coordination mechanisms to the detriment of NGOs. This is of course valuable research and 
offers an important adjudication mechanism to highlight illegitimate and exclusionary 
practices at the global level where reflexivity is lacking without authentic discursive practices. 
The key concern with this research is, however, the way in which civil society actors are still 
assumed as communicatively bound; there appears to be a lack of research into the very 
identities of these actors within deliberative models. These theorists are correct to look at 
distortions between CSOs and state/market actors, but they must deepen the adjudication 
mechanism to analyse the very distortions possible within CSOs themselves. Interestingly, 
Bohman has recently recognised that in order to generate the reflexivity required for 
communicative freedom and institutionalising it as communicative power; civil society must 
have a high degree of plurality in perspectives in order to meet the ―diversity necessary for 
deliberative practices‖ (2010b, p436). He argues that: 
 
―Deliberation about the implementation of such goals is certainly inferior if the 
full range of actors and their epistemically relevant perspectives are not included. 
This improvement concerns the shaping of the process of deliberation rather than 
the specific outcome, since the pool of reasons is narrowed by testing‖ (Bohman 
2010d, p440).  
 
 
This is an important idea that begins to look at how we can construct an adjudication 
mechanism without simply excluding those actors deemed ‗distorted‘ in a pre-discursive way 
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in a similar method to the liberal cosmopolitan project. His analysis is to test the ‗narrowing‘ 
of discourse produced during argumentation and can have the benefit of recognising systemic 
identities that offer little reflexivity in terms of deliberation. 
 
Bohman also briefly recognises the problems of ‗NGOization‘ and the way in which criteria 
should be constructed to ―judge the democratising potential of various forms of civil society 
or associations‖ (2010b, p441). As of yet this criteria mains elusive and must be undertaken in 
a cautious manner in order to avoid the pitfalls of liberal pre-determined inclusion/exclusion 
categories.  This brings me to the second element of the thesis that needs further investigation 
and operates as a potential avenue for future research. I have demonstrated that the target of 
deliberative critique, unreflexive neoliberal steering mechanisms, can actually permeate the 
identities of CSOs themselves and is part of a larger neoliberal global democratic project 
under the New Policy Agenda. Research is urgently required to link the various empirical 
projects in the literature that highlight NGOization,
236
 with a sustained theoretical critique of 
colonising tendencies emanating from key discourses on NPM best practices and de-
politicised ‗shouting to counting techniques‘. These systemic imperatives that re-shape CSOs‘ 
identities towards a technocratic understanding, fundamentally violates the solidarist link 
between lifeworld and system where they are incorporated into capitalist functional spheres. 
As Germain notes, deliberative democracy is ultimately important in the battle to ensure that 
political decisions can be made without abandoning the grounds of politics to technical 
administration.  In essence the critical cosmopolitan project must acknowledge that ―crucially 
the link between power and the organisation of capitalism needs to be recognised as a central 
concern of debates on deliberative democracy and the public sphere‖ (Germain 2010, p496). 
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 Understood as the professionalization of the sector into a technocratic coordination mechanism 
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More research is thus required to resist this neoliberal colonising agenda and its attempt to 
construct an ideal form of civil society in its own image, the increasing synergy between state, 
market and civil society subsumed under systemic logics and coordinated globally; requires 
urgent attention.  Critical cosmopolitan discussions on CSOs at a global level, must 
acknowledge the potential for these distortions within their deliberative projects, and 
effectively engage with the very local contexts that they are anchored within. Assumptions of 
de-contextualised entities can only serve to undermine the construction of a more inclusive 
global democratic project. 
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